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ACRONYMS & INSTITUTIONS 
Acronyms 
• AGM: Annual General Meeting 
• CBNRM: Community based natural resource management 
• CPA: Community Property Association  
• CPI: Community Property Institution  
• CRLR (or ‘Commission’): Commission for Restitution of Land Rights 
• DLA: Department of Land Affairs  
• DRDLR (or ‘Department’): Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (previously 
Department of Land Affairs) 
• LCC: Land Claims Court 
• KZN: KwaZulu-Natal province 
• RLCC: Regional Land Claims Commission (provincial offices of the CRLR) 
 
Legal entities in the case studies:  
 
The Ngcolosi claim  (‘Amangcolosi’ = the Ngcolosi people) 
• Amangcolosi Community Trust: Trust established to hold and manage the land  
• Ithuba Agriculture: Operating company jointly owned by AmaNgcolosi Community Trust 
and Crystal Holdings 
The Mkhabela claim  (‘Amakhabela’ = the Mkhabela people) 
• Gayede Trust: Trust established to hold and manage the land  
• Mkuzangwe Pty Ltd: Operating company jointly owned by Gayede Trust and Crystal 
Holdings  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1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Background to the study 
Shouldering the responsibility of shifting South Africa’s racially skewed landscape, the 
land reform programme aims to begin redress of the millions of people who were dispossessed of 
land, resources, and economic rights under colonialism and apartheid.  Starting from the 17th 
century, white settlers in South Africa over time appropriated more than 90% of South African 
land, through a complex process of colonialism and dispossession. (Ntsebeza, 2011) When a 
democratic government finally took power in 1994, restoring equity in land ownership to 
previously disadvantaged South Africans was a critical to building an equitable economy, and to 
restoring dignity to individuals and communities who had been stripped of their livelihoods, their 
rights and their cultural heritage. 
The land reform programme is comprised of four pillars (Hall & Cliffe, 2009):  
• Land restitution: To restore rights to land, or a portion of land, that was dispossessed due 
to racial discrimination.   
• Land redistribution: To redress racial imbalances in land ownership by providing 
previously disadvantaged households with financial grants to buy freehold land.   
• Land tenure reform:  To provide people with security of tenure where they live, and 
prevent arbitrary evictions. (This is particularly relevant for labour tenants and those 
living on communal lands in the former homelands.)   
• Land development (added in 2014): To capture the importance of productive land use and 
benefits beyond pure transfer of ownership. (DRDLR, 2011) 
Land reform has been an ambitious and crucial venture, but it is fraught with 
complexities and obstacles.  More than just transferring land, it is “a combination of land claims, 
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acquisition of land, securing tenure, involving communities in the conservation estate, reforming 
communal land tenure, and building capacity to manage land.” (De Villiers, 2008, p.1)  These are 
each immense, complicated and often highly political tasks.   
Twenty years into the process, outcomes are mixed.  It is estimated that about 8 million 
hectares have been transferred to black owners since apartheid, roughly 30% of the targeted 25.5 
million hectares, even after the target date was extended to 2014. (Walker & Cousins, 2015; 
Chitonge & Ntsebeza, 2012)  It is an issue of quality as well as quantity: even the land that is 
transferred does not seem to bring about the intended benefits.  In 2012, the Minister of Land 
Reform and Rural Development asserted that 90% of land reform projects have been a failure.   
Some argue that this figure is inflated, and that more considered and contextually relevant 
definitions of success would drop the failure rate to 50% (with a further 30% which are 
‘struggling’). (Sherry, 2012; Chitonge, 2013). Reflecting on an analysis of sample of restitution 
cases, Edward Lahiff writes:  
“The most striking finding from the case studies is that the majority of beneficiaries 
across all the restitution projects have received no material benefit whatsoever from 
restitution, whether in the form of cash income or access to land.” (Lahiff, 2009, p. 4) 
Some of the factors causing widespread underutilisation of transferred land include the 
enforced structure of group production, the imposition of capital-intensive commercial business 
models, and the lack of post-transfer support, extension services, and market access. (Hall & 
Cliffe, 2009)  As a result, “agricultural production on transferred land is generally disappointing, 
and many land-reform projects are mired in leadership and community disputes.” (Walker & 
Cousins, 2015) 
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Indeed, conflict around decision-making, governance and resource management is often 
at the heart of ‘failed’ land reform projects.  These issues are not easily resolved through the 
standard interventions of skills training and technical support provided by government and civil 
society organisations.  “People are more likely to unite, and their united voices are more likely to 
be listened to, when there is something to struggle for than when the struggle has been 
won.“ (James, 2000, p. 634)  Once the land is granted and decisions must be made about land 
allocation, membership, and finances, things fall apart.  Myriad cases in South Africa tell this 
story.   
1.2.  Research objectives 
 “In every community there are certain individuals whose uncommon behaviours 
and strategies enable them to find better solutions to problems than their peers, while 
having access to the same resources and facing similar or worse challenges.”  (PDI, 2014) 
This is the basis for the concept of ‘positive deviance’, an asset-based approach to social 
change that enables people to identify successful outlying behaviours and strategies, and adapt 
them into solutions for the wider community.   1
On that premise, this research explores the experience of a successful land reform project, 
the Amangcolosi Community Trust, in an effort to understand what factors have allowed them to 
succeed where so many others failed.  The neighbouring Mkhabela community is used as a 
secondary case study for comparison. The research places particular emphasis on how divergent 
This differs from much mainstream analysis of poverty and social exclusion, which often starts with the 1
problems and barriers to change, or lessons from earlier planned development interventions.  (Biggs, 2006) 
First developed with striking successes in the field of public health, the positive deviance approach has 
been adapted for the study of groups in a variety of sectors, including social development and 
organisational behavior.  (Devane, 2009)
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interests and community power struggles are managed after land restitution claims have been 
settled, in cases where the restored land continues to be farmed commercially.   
This study explored the following questions:  
1. What is unique about the Ngcolosi experience, context, or actions that have led to success 
where many others community property institutions (CPIs) have failed? 
2. What factors have allowed elite capture to jeopardise that success?   
3. Are there transferrable lessons for land reform implementation and commons 
management? 
To answer these questions, the research explored:  
• Is the Ngcolosi project successful?  If so, what are the core factors that allowed it to 
succeed? 
• What led to a different outcome for the Mkhabela community? 
• What are the sources of conflict and how is it managed? How has unity within leadership 
and the community been maintained? 
• What were the roles of the joint-venture partner, the Regional Land Claims Commission, 
and the traditional authority in contributing to or hindering their success? 
• How has the legal structure of the CPI as a Trust impacted the outcomes of the case? 
1.3.  Justification for the study 
 Recent, hotly contested policies have set the government on track to transfer more land, 
more quickly.  The Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act (RSA, 2014), which originally 
accepted claims until December 1994, re-opened the claims window until 2019.  It is projected 
that this will result in up to 400,000 new claims. (Heard, 2016).  The Expropriation Bill, passed 
through Parliament in February 2016 and now awaiting approval from the National Council of 
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Provinces, restricts the former willing-buyer, willing-seller basis for land reform, and potentially 
allows the state to expropriate land (with payment) for public interest.  (Debate still rages over 
SA’s land reform, 2016).  
 With the potential intensification of land transfer, the cost of getting it wrong looms large, 
and has enormous implications for rural livelihoods and economies, national food security, and 
consolidation of power under elites and political authorities. The academic literature and 
practical studies around land reform provide a clear view of where the problems lie in communal 
land management, with an array of suggestions for policy and practice on to make projects 
viable.  By and large, insights are drawn from cases where things have gone wrong, as these 
clearly highlights the gaps in policy, implementation and support.  Yet, although failure is 
widespread, the land reform terrain is also dotted with success stories which provide a glimpse of 
what land reform could be, and insights into whether widespread “success” is really feasible.  
There is space in the literature for more detailed examination of successful case studies in land 
reform, particularly those that are representative of the context and challenges faced by other 
communities.  Furthermore, the issues of governing communal property is becoming 
increasingly relevant on a global level, as societies explore how to preserve common 
environmental resources and provide benefit to the majority while preventing exploitation by a 
few. 
 The Amangcolosi Community Trust has, by land reform standards, had remarkable 
outcomes, and although there has been some media coverage of the case there has been little or 
no academic reflection on their experience.   2
 An informant told me of another university researcher, but I was not able to locate his/her report.2
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1.4.  Outline of the research report  
Chapter 2 of this report will describe the research methods which were used, the sampling 
and profiles of informants, limitations of the study, and ethical implications.   
Chapter 3 provides a survey of the literature on communal land management as relevant to 
this research.  It explores the drivers behind and challenges to group land management, the 
role and needs of communal property institutions, and the impact of internal community 
dynamics.  It then explores the influence of external actors, including the government, 
traditional authorities, and joint-venture partners. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the research: how the Trust built up a successful company, 
and what challenges jeopardise that success, as well as the experience of the Gayede Trust. 
Chapter 5 explores the findings in greater detail in light of the relevant literature.  It looks 
first at the factors leading to success, and then at how that success was jeopardised, 
considering the sources and management of conflict and corruption. Finally, it reflects on the 
implications of these learnings for governance of the commons. 
Chapter 6 summarises the report, providing an overview of the research aims and 
methodology, an overview of the literature surveyed, and key points of the discussion and 
analysis. 
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
2.1.  Research methods 
 This research focuses on the challenges faced by community property institutions after 
land has been restored to them through the land reform process.  The issues are very complex, 
and outcomes are very context dependent.  Therefore, qualitative research, which generally 
provides a more intensive study of fewer cases, was appropriate.  (Dahlberg & McCraig, 1990) 
The research did not seek to collect objective data or provide a description of land reform 
experiences across the country, in which case quantitative methods would have been selected.  
Rather it aimed to understand how two specific communities managed challenges within their 
particular shared context, and whether their experiences could provide insight into the broader 
land reform experience. 
2.1.1.  The case study method 
Founded on the concept of positive deviance, this study explores what lessons for 
community property management in land reform can be extrapolated from the positive 
experience of one particular community.  The qualitative case study method was chosen as a 
fitting approach.  R. K. Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth, within its real life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”  (Yin, 2009, p.18)  In other words, 
case studies are particularly appropriate for inquiries that are highly context specific. They are 
also appropriate for a qualitative and intensive approach to research, which examines in depth 
one specific example of a phenomenon. (Swanborn, 2010)  Furthermore, a case study is 
appropriate for time and resource limitations of this study. 
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The single case study method is limited, however, in the extent to which findings can be 
extrapolated for other communities.  (Collier, 1993) To further aid the analysis, a secondary, 
comparative case was added, that of the Amakhabela.  The primary units of analysis in the two 
cases were the communal property institutions (CPIs): the Amangcolosi Community Trust and 
the Gayede Community Trust [although there is much overlap with the affairs of their respective 
agricultural companies (Ithuba Agriculture and Mkuzangwe Pty. Ltd.)]. 
2.1.2.  Case study selection 
The Amangcolosi case was selected through ‘deviant sampling’ because it is a unique and 
extreme case.  (Patton, 1990)  There are a limited number of cases of land reform in South Africa 
that can claim effective land management, successful communal production with ongoing profits, 
financial transparency and strong governance, and direct visible benefits to the claimants and 
broader community. (de Villiers & van den Berg, 2006) 
The secondary case of the AmaKhabela, was selected as a comparative case to allow for a 
deeper understanding of what aspects of the Amangcolosi experience may be unique to their 
context, and what aspects may be relevant or replicable in other post-settlement land reform 
communities.   It was selected because it is strikingly similar to the AmaNgcolosi experience in 
context and history and yet has had very different outcomes, therefore providing a good basis for 
comparison. 
These two communities, both located near Kranskop in the Umvoti Municipality of 
KwaZulu Natal (KZN), form the basic units of study for this research. 
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2.1.3.  Data collection methods 
The case study method is qualitative by nature, using descriptive rather than statistical 
analysis.  Although quantitative methods can be used, such as providing a questionnaire to 
community members, issues of language, literacy, and logistics made this impractical for this 
study.   Methods for data collection were purely qualitative, and included:  
2.1.3.1.  Semi-structured in-depth & focused interviews 
Because the study was not quantitative, and because the research is exploratory, 
interviews were not fully structured.  However, they were semi-structured in order to ensure that 
data collection met the research objectives, and a full understanding of the situation was gathered 
(to the extent possible given limitations).  (DiCiccio & Crabtree, 2006).  As Dahlberg & McCraig 
(2010) emphasise,   
“There is flexibility in [semi-structured interviews], and the researcher can change the 
order and wording of the questions in order to achieve a more natural style of 
conversation. … [T]he interviewer must recognize moments in the interview that have 
potential for further questioning and be able to formulate the questions ‘of the cuff’…. 
Although much of the data the researcher collects will essentially be comparable, due to 
the flexible nature, each interview will be unique and adapted to the circumstances of 
each participants.” (p. 119)  
The flexibility of the semi-structured format was critical for this research, in that it allowed for 
unexpected issues and new information to surface, and also allowed the researcher to 
accommodate the shifting dynamics among interviewees. 
 In-depth, long interviews, usually of one to two hours, were used for a large group of 
select key informants.  Shorter, focused interviews were conducted to corroborate and/or probe 
findings from the in-depth interviews. (Yin, 2009)  The majority of these were face-to-face 
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interviews, but many telephone interviews were also conducted after the second research trip, to 
verify or further explore information provided by informants.
2.1.3.2.  Semi-structured group discussions  
Many interviews were conducted in small groups, as informants would sometimes stay in 
the room after their interview, sitting in on subsequent interviews.  On some occasions this was 
not desirable (for example, when the tribal leaders were present for one of the only female 
interviews.)  However, in most cases, after the one-on-one interview a useful group discussion 
would develop.  Informants were often talking to each other about the questions, creating a more 
relaxed atmosphere and allowing for greater candour.  It also gave rise to various perspectives 
and issues that may not have otherwise surfaced.   
As with the individual interviews, these group discussions were semi-structured in 
content.  There were five group discussions in total, ranging from two to six participants each.  
However, they were not formal focus groups, in that the participants were grouped purely by 
chance and logistical factors, rather than by intention. 
2.1.3.3.  Document analysis  
The following documents were reviewed:  
• AmaNgcolosi Community Trust Deed:  This is the founding document for the 
Amangcolosi Community Trust and is highly relevant to issues of governance, leadership 
and operations. 
• AmaNgcolosi Participatory Rural Appraisal Report: This study, commissioned by the 
Trust and implemented by a third party, is an assessment of what are the greatest needs 
and challenges faced by the community, especially important for informing the Trust on 
how profits should be spent and benefits shared. 
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• Memorandum to the AmaNgcolosi Community Trustees: This details the allegations and 
complaints of some beneficiaries who feel the Trustees are misusing their power.  
• Minutes from government parliamentary briefings on the cases:  These detail several 
parliamentary committee meetings involving the two claims, and provide a formal record 
of related events. 
• Government gazette detailing the land claim: This outlines the details of the initial land 
claim. 
Additional primary document analysis included numerous government publications 
(including minutes from Parliamentary proceedings, and presentations to Parliament), as well as 
newspaper articles detailing relevant events.    3
2.1.4.  Interviews and informants 
2.1.4.1.  Interviewee sampling 
 Interviewees were selected through both purposive and snowball sampling techniques.  
As the Ngcolosi case was studied as a deviant case, purposive sampling identified key 
informants from both communities who are particularly well placed to describe and explain the 
CPI experiences.   Snowball sampling was used to identify and supplement key informants, and 
gain a richer pool of data.  (Patton, 1990)  The latter was particularly important given the 
limitations noted in Section 2.3 below. 
 Both Trusts are in a sensitive period, and were not ready to share all of their documentation, such as 3
meeting minutes and financial statements.
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2.1.4.2.  Profiles of informants 
Informant identities remain confidential, but they can be categorised as follows:  
2.1.4.3.  Interview formats 
35 interviews were conducted, with 27 informants.  (Eight interviews were conducted as 
a second or third interview with the same informant.)  Face to face interviews were conducted 
during two visits to the Kranskop area, in March and November 2015.  Telephone interviews 
were conducted after these field visits.  The formats of the interviews were as follows: 
Ngcolosi Case
Profile No. Notes
Amangcolosi Trustees and former trustees 7
Tribal authority members 4 *Includes 2 people from the 
AmaNgcolosi chieftaincy at Hillcrest
Beneficiaries w/out leadership role 6 *4 of these were the children or spouses 
of current or former trustees
Commercial farmers, with land under claim 2 *Spoke about both case studies
Crystal Holdings representative 1 *Spoke about both case studies 
Ithuba management 2 *Includes one who also served as an 
Mkuzangwe manager
Mkhabela Case
Gayede trustees 2
Mkuzangwe management 2
Kranskop community member 1
FIGURE 1: PROFILES OF INFORMANTS
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All in-person interviews and group discussions were recorded, and some telephone 
interviews were recorded, all with permission of the informant.  Recorded interviews were 
transcribed, and the transcriptions coded in hard copy according to the area of content.  These 
were then compiled according to content area for the findings and discussion. 
2.2.  Disclosure 
As part of a documentary film team, I was one of two people conducting interviews with 
the AmaNgcolosi leaders and community, around the story of their claim. We interviewed 14 
people over two days in February 2014. These interviews formed the foundation from which the 
proposal for this research was developed.  This research report is based on extensive interviews 
done subsequently, independent of the film company and purely for the purposes of this report.  
The 2014 interviews are not included in the above numbers.  However, in some areas of analysis 
material from the 2014 interviews is relevant, and is therefore used in this report and cited 
accordingly.  These 2014 interviews allowed me to begin the research with a basic understanding 
of the case, and also to note changes over time. 
FIGURE 2: BREAKDOWN OF INTERVIEWS BY FORMAT
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2.3.  Limitations 
There are several unexpected limitations to this study.  Power struggles, allegations of 
corruption, and tensions around benefits at the AmaNgcolosi Community Trust surfaced during 
the course of the research.  As a result, the Trust is in a particularly volatile period.  This made 
the case study much richer and more multidimensional, but also impacted my research as 
follows: 
Informants: For the first research trip (March 2015), the Trust was my primary access 
point into the community, assisting with in identification of informants as well as logistical 
arrangements.  This was very effective from a practical perspective, but also gave them some 
control over who I spoke with..  I now recognise that individuals with certain opinions may have 
been excluded from the group of informants.  For example, I interviewed six people who were 
‘ordinary’ community members, not in positions of employment or leadership.  However, I later 
discovered that four of these were direct relations of current or former Trustees, and therefore I 
cannot say whether they accurately represented the broader claimant community. 
Location and presence: The March 2015 interviews were all held at the Ithuba office, 
and the founding Chairman of the Trust sat in on many of the interviews.  Furthermore, the 
interpreter provided was a former Trustee (despite my efforts to obtain an independent 
interpreter).  Although some of the discussion was very candid, the location of the interviews and 
presence of these individuals inevitably impacted what informants were willing to share.   
Other limitations included: 
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Gender bias: The vast majority of interviewees were men, despite my intentions and 
efforts otherwise.  In the March 2015 research trip, two of the female informants scheduled failed 
to arrive, and the one who did came with her husband, who did most of the talking.  This reflects 
the gender bias and exclusion of women in AmaNgcolosi leadership as a whole. 
Language: The majority of interviews were native speakers of isiZulu.  An interpreter 
was present, and the interviewee was given the option of conducting the interview in isiZulu or 
in English.  Most informants chose to speak in English, and the interviews went smoothly, even 
where an interpreter was used.  However, I recognise that a different rapport may have been 
developed had I been able to interview these people in their first language. 
Mkhabela access:  Finally, I had fewer interviews than expected with the Mkhabela 
community.  Two of the informants cancelled at the last minute, and several other promised 
interviews failed to materialise.  Some of this is due to politics within the community, as the 
Trust is on one side of a struggle over the chieftaincy.   
These limitations were managed by focusing the research and analysis on areas where 
sufficient data and diverse perspectives could be gathered, which was manageable given the 
richness of the case study.  The report effectively answers the core questions, but perhaps with 
more breadth and less depth than initially intended.  For example, an in-depth analysis of 
community conflict management, as initially intended, would have required several more field 
trips which were not possible within scope of the research.  Therefore, analysis of community 
unity and conflict management is only included where data was sufficient.  However, the 
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interviews also provided much more extensive data than expected in other areas, such as the 
roles of government and the joint-venture partner.   
The above limitations were further mitigated by: 
• Accessing informants through other contacts during the second field trip. 
• Conducting subsequent telephone interviews. 
• Conducting multiple interviews with Mkhabela informants who were available.   
• Recognising potential bias during the reporting and analysis of the findings.  [Responses 
that I could not substantiate were either excluded or noted in the report as potentially 
unreliable.]   
2.4.  Ethics 
The research followed closely the methods outlined in the proposal, which met with 
university and departmental guidelines on research ethics, and was approved by the ethics 
committee.  All of my interviewees were adults, over the age of 18yrs, and I did not interview 
any vulnerable individuals.  I did not conduct an interview, nor record an interview, without 
written or oral informed consent. 
The key ethical issue in this report is confidentiality.  All of my interviewees were willing 
to be named in the report. However, there are criminal allegations included in the findings, and 
there has been violence over the allegations and power struggles.  To avoid putting anyone at 
risk, pseudonyms have been used for all informants cited throughout the report.   
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To understand the context of the Ngcolosi and Mkhabela cases, and to place the issues 
raised within the broader debates and discussion on communal property management, this 
chapter will review the academic literature around internal and external factors impacting 
communal land management in South Africa (CPIs).   
The first three sections (3.1) look at internal factors: the concept, practice and debate 
around communal tenure; the legal entities that hold communal land, and the challenges they 
face, and the role of community dynamics in effective common property management.  The next 
three sections (3.2) explore the place and impact of external actors: government, traditional 
authorities, and commercial partners.  
The academic literature is drawn primarily from peer-reviewed journals, other academic 
articles, books, and conference proceedings.  This has been augmented by reports and studies 
from civil society organisations working in land reform, as well as relevant legislation and 
Annual Reports from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform.   
3.1.  Communal property management: Internal factors 
3.1.1.  Managing the commons 
“Successful land reform requires not only committed public institutions, at the national 
and the local levels, but also strong and committed organisations of the intended 
beneficiaries.”  (IFAD 1995, para.5)   The way in which intended beneficiaries have organised 
themselves is at the heart of this study.  Collective action is core to successful poverty 
alleviation, and communal property is ownership is historically and culturally appropriate in 
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much of South Africa.  However, the fragmentation of rural communities under apartheid, and 
the shortage of skilled and financial resources in rural areas, result in a number of practical 
challenges for common property management. The following section looks at the drivers and 
debate around communal property. 
3.1.1.1.  Why common property? 
Although land restitution and redistribution programmes are open to both groups and 
individuals, in practice most land has been transferred to groups, ranging from a few hundred 
people to thousands of households. There are a few factors driving this tendency toward group 
ownership.  The foremost is the Constitutional recognition of indigenous law, and by extension, 
traditional forms of land management, which are based on communal tenure.  About one-third of 
South Africans live within traditional communities, and many of these communities still practice 
customary land tenure, whereby traditional leaders manage the land on behalf of their subjects.  
Land claims are often based, then, on the historical rights of a particular community, and so 
transfer is made to the group as a whole. (Lahiff, 2000; Cousins, 2008)    
In the case of land redistribution, many individuals or families find the Land 
Redistribution and Agricultural Development (LRAD) grant too small to purchase a viable farm, 
and so come together to purchase as a group. This ‘rent-a-crowd’ syndrome was recognised as 
one of the key failings of the first phase of land reform, as many beneficiaries had little intent of 
using the land, and the extended, often incoherent ‘communities’ resulted in challenging group 
dynamics.  (Hall, 2009, p.26) As noted above, the Commission may also bundle claims, or 
extend the boundaries of claims, enforcing group ownership across multiple communities, or 
amongst people who do not have interests in common.  
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Reinforcing the need for group claims is state resistance to sub-divide commercial farms.  
Despite expressed political support for rural development, policies strongly favour large-scale 
commercial farming as the preferred system of agriculture in South Africa, out of professed 
reluctance to disrupt production and jeopardise the nation’s food security.  (Lahiff, 2000) The 
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act was passed in 1970 to protect agricultural land by 
preventing its subdivision into portions that would not be ‘economically viable’.   Frantz (2010) 
argues that the Act actually aimed to preserve prime agricultural land for white ownership under 
Apartheid, and that it continues to promulgate racial segregation by limiting black access to 
agricultural land. In 1993, the Provision of Land and Assistance Act waived the applicability of 
Subdivision of Land Act in cases of land reform projects, but there is still “no practical, 
accessible legal mechanism whereby groups can formally subdivide their land among their 
members after transfer to the group, and no example of such subdivision has been reported.”  4
(SDC, 2007b, p.4)  
So, as most of the land available for restitution in South Africa is relatively large, white-
owned commercial farmland, communal ownership is often the only option.  The issues of 
communal tenure security and effective common property management are thus paramount to 
successful land reform. 
3.1.1.2.  The Commons debate  
Vesting property rights in a group of people can be both highly practical and highly 
problematic.  Communal tenure (if properly managed) is very efficient, economically and 
 In 1998, the post-Apartheid legislature repealed the Subdivision of Agricultural LandAct, but the Repeal 4
Act has not been made operational;  in 2008 the Constitutional Court therefore ruled that Act 70 of 1970 
continues to apply until the legislature takes further action
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ecologically, for the livestock production to which Africa’s arid landscape is so well suited. It 
allows for mobility, and this is crucial for finding water in times of drought, and for allowing 
portions of the land to rest and replenish. It also accommodates shared infrastructure, and is 
usually deeply embedded in societal and cultural norms which view land as an long-term 
resource to be protected.  Formal or informal institutions govern usage rights, whether in cases of 
small scale agriculture, grazing, fishing, hunting or other types of land use. Customary forms of 
land management have evolved over time, with the flexibility and fluidity to accommodate the 
environmental variations, social relations, and political changes of their particular context. 
(Cousins & Hornby, 2002) 
However in 1968, Garret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” thesis called into question 
the long-term feasibility of communal property arrangements.  He argued that individuals are 
fundamentally self-interested, and will exploit a group resource for his/her own short-term 
benefit.  For example, by grazing too many cattle on shared pasture, or using more than one’s fair 
share of water an individual will benefit, but the consequences of his/her actions will be borne by 
the group as a whole.  Ultimately, individual exploitation of common resources will deplete or 
destroy them. (Hardin, 1968). Hardin’s theory was a powerful challenge to the environmental 
sustainability of communal land management systems, and over the next two decades there was 
increasing focus from environmentalists, aid organisations and policymakers on the severe 
degradation caused to shared grazing lands and forest areas, particularly in ‘developing’ 
countries. (Peters, 2002) 
A. Tekié  !21
Decades of debate ensued on the relationship between individual interest and group 
interest, and the conditions necessary for collective action. Aligning with Hardin, the “rational 
egoist” perspective argues that because individuals will always act out of their own self- interest, 
natural resources would only be properly cared for if private ownership and potential profit 
incentivised good stewardship.  (Ibid.)  The primary alternative to privatisation of the commons 
is ’command by control’, meaning the state is responsible for enforcing compliance.  This is 
effective in situations that can be easily monitored, if there is budget available for monitoring, 
and if the government is strong and not corrupt.  (Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, 2003)   
Many researchers (most famously, Elinor Ostrom, who received a Nobel Prize for her 
work) argued that there was a third route beyond privatisation or state control. Citing a variety of 
empirical literature on how people act collectively and prioritise long-term group interests over 
short-term personal gain, they note the potential for self-governance in the commons.  (Ostrom, 
1990)  “Individuals in all walks of life… voluntarily organise themselves so as to gain the 
benefits of trade, to provide mutual protection against risk, and to create and enforce rules that 
protect natural resources.” (Ostrom, 1999:1).  Hardin’s theory did not distinguish between open 
access property, and common property.  In the latter, usage rights can be limited and regulated so 
that exploitation does not occur.  Ostrom and others argue that the cause of resource degradation 
is not communal tenure per se.  Rather the formal and informal systems of governance that 
manage the commons must be adapted and enforced to accommodate shifting political 
boundaries, integration into larger economies, and the increasing heterogeneity of communities. 
(Dietz, Ostrom & Stern, 2003) 
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A final option which is not widely covered in the literature, is ’unitization’, or ‘unified 
management’, in which  a single operator is designated to manage and use the resource, and 
profits are divided among the community users/owners. (Thompson, 2000, p.3)  This is most 
often applied in management of oil and other underground resources (see Feeny, Berkes, McCay 
and Acheson, 1990), but is particularly relevant for South African land reform.  It is common for 
communities to either lease out restored land, or have it managed by a farming company, either 
externally contracted or formed internally by the CPI.  Profits from that company are then paid 
out as dividends or spent on community projects. (See Chapter 3.2.3) 
The global trend towards market-based development has of course followed the 
privatisation approach, with international institutions championing private property rights as a 
foundation for economic development, and aiming to minimise state involvement in management 
of resources.  Results have been mixed.  Communal tenure continues to prove resilient, often re-
emerging in practice over government attempts to institute formal legal privatisation (Cousins & 
Hornby, 2002).  In addition, titling and registration schemes have in some cases become a way 
for investors, prospectors, and elites to strip land users of their rights. Land privatisation has left 
a legacy in many places of disabling livelihoods, increasing poverty, and causing general 
confusion over rights and process. (Klug, 2000; Ruhiiga, 2011)  South African recognition of 
communal ownership under customary tenure is therefore seen as a progressive step towards 
tenure security for rural communities. 
Yet the communal nature of land ownership has remained a serious stumbling block for 
land reform in South Africa.  Institutional failures have led to poor governance and cooption of 
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resources, especially in the many cases where traditional authorities and communal property 
institutions (CPIs) are competing for rights to manage the land.  Furthermore, in traditional land 
management practices women’s rights to land are very limited, despite their central role in 
subsistence agricultural production.  Even within the more equitable and democratic framework 
of most CPIs, diverse interests and power struggles within a community can result in a deadlock, 
wasting resources and halting land use.  These issues are further exacerbated by the failure of 
state to enact policy guiding communal land tenure, which has been repeatedly drafted and 
contested by civil society in court. (Ntsebeza, 2000) 
3.1.2.  CPIs: Institutional options and challenges 
3.1.2.1.  The ‘Commons Trust’ 
In recent years, the increasing prominence of environmental policy debates and the felt 
impacts of climate change have triggered a renewed popular interest in the commons. The focus 
of this revived discussion extends beyond the traditional, physical commons, such as land and 
water rights, to also include social, intellectual and technological resources like cultural 
traditions, the internet and security.  The discussion is around how to protect and enhance the 
commons within a more equitable and sustainable form of capitalism, especially as physical 
resources are increasingly exploited by individual, corporate, or even state interests. (Quilligan, 
2009; Tomales Bay Institute, 2006) . 
In a lecture exploring the relationship between capitalism and the environmental 
commons, Peter Barnes (2003) argued that “the great challenge of the 21st century is to make the 
commons visible, to give it proper reverence, and to translate that reverence into property rights 
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and legal institutions that are on par with those we currently give to private property.”  (para. 2) 
This essentially means developing, formalising and enforcing the types of context-specific usage 
rights and governance principles that Ostrom and others studied.  Formalisation is done through 
legal institutions created to guard and manage the commons, thereby allowing public property to 
become both a counterpart and a counterweight to private interests.  (Ibid.)   
The most appropriate and widely used legal institution for safeguarding the interest of the 
commons and its users is the trust, as “trusts are the only fiduciary institutions accountable for 
the long-term preservation and sustenance of a resource.” (Quilligan, 2009, p. 39)  In principle, 
Barnes explains, a trust is a fiduciary relationship based upon the confidence of beneficiaries in 
selected trustees to hold and manage property on their behalf. (Barnes, 2003, p. 6)   
 The concept of the ‘commons trust’ has taken root.  A few examples include the 
following, which all use varied forms of unified management:  
• State Land Trusts: In 1787 the US government set aside over 150 million acres of land to 
benefit public schools.  That land is held and managed by state land trusts and revenues 
from timber, grazing or oil production on the land are distributed to schools. (Ibid., p.8)   
• The Alaska Permanence Fund: 25% of revenues from oil leases on state land is put into 
trust for the benefit of all Alaskan citizens.  A diversified portfolio of about $30 billion pays 
out a yearly dividend to every Alaskan person, including children. (Tomale Bay, p.19)   
• The PCC Farmland Trust in Seattle, Washington: The Puget Consumer Cooperative raised 
funds to purchase farmland and prevent it from being used for property or other non-
agricultural development.  Raising funds from over 1400 donors, the Trust has purchased 
additional farms, and leases the land back to the farmers, who grow food and train other 
emerging farmers. (Ibid., p6)  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When applying the principles of common property to newly restored or redistributed 
land, the South Africa land reform programme also looked first to legal trusts to institutionalise 
and govern communal lands.   
3.1.2.2.  Legal entities in South African land reform  
Although the Restitution Act allowed for group claims, it made no reference to the legal 
identity of that group or to the specific institution to which land should be transferred. (Pienaar, 
2005) Trusts were initially the predominant legal entity for land restitution.  In South Africa, 
trusts are legally designated by the Trust Property Control Act of 1988, and defined as: 
“An arrangement by which the ownership in property of one person is by virtue of a 
trust instrument made over or bequeathed to another person, the trustee… to be 
administered or disposed of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for the 
benefit of the person or class of persons designated in the trust instrument…” (RSA, 
1988) 
Thus the property of an individual (in this case, a class of individuals) is vested in 
appointed trustees, who control and administer the assets. (Ibid.)  The ‘founder’ is the individual 
who forms the trust. The ‘beneficiaries’ are the individuals or entities entitled to benefit from the 
trust assets or income, in this case the previously dispossessed persons and their descendants.  As 
custodians of the assets, the trustees may or may not be beneficiaries.  
In time, however, the use of trusts came to be considered problematic in the land reform 
context, for several reasons.  In the legal arrangement of a trust, beneficiaries do not have direct 
property rights over the land.  Although trustees are by law accountable to act in the interest of 
the beneficiaries, and information and decisions are shared (in best cases) at regular meetings, it 
is ultimately the trustees who have final control over how the land is used or allocated.  (Ibid.) 
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This structure is convenient for traditional authorities or other elites within the community who 
want to control over of the land. (Claasens, 2014) Appointed as trustees, they can manage the 
resources as they choose, provided it is within the mandate set by the Trust Deed.  Although the 
trusts created for land restitution entail particularly strong rights for beneficiaries, countering 
trustees requires legal recourse which is often expensive, lengthy, and bureaucratic.  In addition, 
trusts are accountable to the High Court, and so the government department managing land 
reform [initially Department of Land Affairs (DLA); from 2009 the Department of Land Reform 
and Rural Development (DRDLR)] has had limited ability to regulate or intervene in the affairs 
of community trusts, even when there are problems or breaches of the trust deed. (SDC, 2007b; 
Cousins & Hornby, 2002).  Finally, gender imbalances in traditional communities result in male 
domination of trusteeships, and women, who are often the primarily users of farmland, have had 
limited voice and rights in the restored land. (Rangan, H. & Gilmartin, M. 2002) 
In the dawn of the new South Africa, there was a clear need for a more democratic 
solution, an entity that could recognise customary communal law, but still allow for greater 
equality and transparency.  The Communal Property Association (CPA) was the proposed 
solution, creating a more equitable, democratic, and non-discriminatory framework for 
community land ownership.    
The CPA Act of 1996 was passed “to enable communities to form juristic persons… in 
order to acquire, hold and manage property on a basis agreed to by members of a community in 
terms of a written constitution”  (RSA, 1996, p.1).  This constitution is the central feature of the 
Act, guiding how beneficiaries define themselves and the manner in which they intend to govern 
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their ‘new’ resource. The constitution must be based on principles of fair and inclusive decision-
making, equality of membership (including gender equality), democratic processes, fair access to 
property, and accountability and transparency. (Ibid.; SDC, 2007b) The Act also includes a 
provision for DLA (now DRDLR) monitoring and regulation of CPAs, to enable enforcement of 
the constitutional principles and transparent governance.  Community members thus have more 
substantive and accessible recourse should their rights be infringed. ‘Similar entities’ holding 
land, such as voluntary associations, companies, and trusts, only fall under DRDLR jurisdiction 
if they choose to file an application with the Department to be registered as a CPA. (RSA, 1996) 
3.1.2.3.  Trusts vs. CPAs 
CPAs are the government’s preferred form of community property institutions.  As of 
2015, there were 1428 CPAs registered with the DRDLR. (DRDLR, 2015, p.2) However, many 
communities and/or their leaders still prefer trusts.  Up to date numbers on land reform trusts are 
harder to come by, as they are not registered with the DRDLR, but as of 2010  there were almost 
twice as many trusts as CPAs nationally.  (Numbers across provinces vary, but CPAs were 
predominant only in the Northern Cape and Eastern Cape.) (DRDLR, 2010) 
The predominance of trusts was explained by a few factors.  Some communities prefer 
the independence of a trust, and do not want interference from the Department once they have 
received the land.  There is also a perception that banks prefer to work with trusts over CPAs, an 
important influence on communities in great need of capital to manage their land. (PMG, 2010) 
Finally as noted above, traditional authorities prefer the structure of trusts, as it facilitates a 
greater role for the tribal authority in land management.  (Claasens, 2014) This is exemplified in 
the recent Constitutional Court case of the Bakgatla ba Kgafela community.  The community 
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voted to establish a CPA to manage their restored land and submitted the paperwork, but the 
chief and traditional council wanted a trust to be created, and pulled political strings to prevent 
registration of the CPA. The case highlights how traditional authorities feel threatened by CPAs, 
as well as the how political dynamics influence administrative processes in the DRDLR.  (Clark, 
2015) 
Despite the CPA Act’s attempt to legislate equitable and well-governed institutions, and 
despite some highly successful, well functioning land reform projects, generally outcomes have 
fallen far short of expectations.  A 2005 commissioned report by the Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research on the status of CPIs (including both trusts and CPAs) found that 
The majority of CPIs are partly functional from an institutional perspective but are 
largely or totally dysfunctional in terms of allocation of individual resources and the 
defining of clear usage rights, responsibilities, powers and procedures for members and 
the decision making body. Transparency and accountability is also often below what is 
required. (As cited in SDC, 2007a, p. 161) 
Research by the Sustainable Development Consortium in 2007 corroborated this, finding 
that ‘overwhelming majority’ of CPI leaders did not understand their constitutions or were not 
using them as the basis for operations (SDC, 2007a).   
3.1.2.4.  The barriers to successful CPIs 
Nearly two decades of experience, documented through case studies, academic research 
and civil society reports, have led to general consensus on where the problems. (See Cousins  & 
Hornby, 2002; SDC, 2007b; de Satge & Baiphethi, 2013, CLS, 2015;.)  The following sections 
explore some of the challenges faced by CPIs in more detail. 
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a. Institutional design, administration and governance  
The CPA Act prescribes what must be included in a CPA constitution, and what policies 
and procedures must be in place for registration to be successful.  However, in order to be truly 
effective these policies and procedures need to be highly customised for the community in 
question, with potentially contentious issues debated and resolved.  Instead, the formal creation 
and registration of CPAs has become a pro-forma administrative task, outsourced to service 
providers or government officials, and completed as cheaply and quickly as possible.  
Constitutions and procedural documents are often entirely inaccessible to membership, written in 
English, dense with legal terminology, and sometimes not even physically available. (Cousins & 
Hornby, 2002) 
As a result, the constitutions are often “not aligned to the evolving needs, values and 
circumstances of the community” (DRDLR, 2012a, p. 75) The same holds for Trust deeds.  They 
include contradictory policies, and fail to provide clarity on central issues of land rights 
management, such as criteria for membership, rights and obligations of members, land use and 
allocation, benefit and cost sharing, and transfer and inheritance procedures.  If these most 
critical aspects of communal tenure management are unclear, or contextually inappropriate, the 
doors are opened wide for internal conflict, mismanagement, and/or cooption of resources — 
particularly when there is no accountability or state monitoring.   
Cooption of resources often takes the form of ‘elite capture’, defined as “a phenomenon 
where resources transferred for the benefit of the masses are usurped by a few, usually politically 
and/or economically powerful groups, at the expense of the less economically and/or politically 
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influential groups.” (Dutta, 2009, p. 3)  Unfortunately, this is a widespread challenge in land 
reform communities, where traditional authorities or CPI leaders often abuse and exploit their 
power.  This is discussed in more detail in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 of the analysis. 
b.  Technical capacity and training 
Beyond the institutional issues, many CPI’s simply lack the skills to effectively manage 
the land.  In 2001, the DLA Quality of Life surveys found 61% of land reform beneficiaries to be 
illiterate, reflecting the low levels of education across rural areas (SDC, 2007b, p. 263).  While 
communities may (or may not) have experience with small scale farming, they are under 
pressure from the DRDLR to keep farms as commercial entities.  Should they override this and 
choose to do small scale farming on the land,  South Africa’s agricultural industry is heavily 
biased towards commercial farming, and it is  almost impossible for small scale farmers to 
successfully compete. (Lahiff, 2000) Managing large tracts of land on behalf of diverse and 
sometimes divided communities, presents an array of technical, business, political and 
administrative challenges that will often require advanced management skills, agricultural 
expertise, and business acumen.  To expect individuals with little access to advanced education 
and limited work experience to succeed in this environment is entirely unrealistic.   
Training, therefore, is particularly important to the success of land reform projects. The 
Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) assessed 178 settled land restitution claims, and 
found that 127 projects had received no training at all.  Overall, technical assistance provided to 
the reviewed projects was deemed to be completely inadequate, and relevant government 
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officials were under-qualified to provide the necessary support. (as cited in SDC, 2007b, p. 
266-267).   
c.  Accountability & state support   
As noted, DLA ability to regulate and intervene in CPA affairs was a core principle 
behind the creation of the CPA Act.  However, in actuality there has been very little monitoring 
of CPAs by the DLA/DRDLR.  As of 2009 - 13 years after the CPA Act was passed - the 
government CPA register consisted of a single, handwritten registry, with the first 400 entries 
gone missing.  (SDC, 2007b, p. 261)  For many CPAs the government has no record of the 
boundaries of land held, or a membership list. CPAs are required to submit annual reports to 
facilitate accountability, but there was very little compliance with reporting obligations.  
(Mogaswa, 2013)  Pitiful records and lack of human and financial resources in the department 
have severely limited government intervention & support.   Unless they choose to be treated as a 
CPA, other forms of CPIs are even further distanced from departmental monitoring, as they are 
not within the land reform jurisdiction.   
Recently, however, this has started to change.  In 2010, the Department began issuing an 
annual CPA Report, a baseline study to assess the status quo of CPAs. In the same year, a ‘turn 
around strategy’ was developed, based on the pilot ‘regularisation’ complex CPAs through the 
Land Reform Management Facility (LRMF). Regularisation is an in-depth process of research, 
facilitation and customised support to bring CPAs to a state of compliance with CPA law and 
financial solvency, or referring them to judicial administration if necessary. (DRDLR CPA 
Report, 2011) In the last year, there were 65 pending cases, only 12 successfully regularised and 
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15 were sent back to the department because they could not be resolved. (DRDLR, 2015) These 
low success numbers give a sense of how deeply rooted and difficult to resolve are the issues 
facing CPAs.  
In a context where policies and procedures are inappropriate and overly sophisticated, 
where few individuals have the requisite skills, and where there is no monitoring to hold people 
accountable, nor training to enable them, it should not be surprising that CPIs are not submitting 
financial statements or properly convening their general assemblies. 
3.1.3.  Community dynamics 
At the 2014 National Land Tenure Summit, the Chief Land Claims Commissioner 
presented on CPAs: 
There is an emerging consensus that CPAs have tended to fail in performing their basic 
functions, largely because they are riddled with internal governance deficits and conflict 
among members. Such conflict undermines the land rights of members and constrains the 
effective utilisation of land by beneficiaries, who also face hostile markets. (Gobodo, 
2014)  
Indeed, land reform is not a set of technical problems to be solved; it is a dynamic social 
challenge. (Hart, 2013) Some CPI managers have noted they spend more than 60% of their time 
addressing community disputes rather than managing the land. (de Villiers, 2008) Across the 
various CPI assessments and recommendations for support runs a common call for solutions that 
are highly contextual, and based on extensive “community” building.  The following sections 
will explore the blurred definition of “community” in the context of land reform, as well as 
drivers of conflict and dissonance within communities.   
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3.1.3.1.  The boundaries of ‘community’ 
The 1994 Restitution of Land Rights Act defined community as “any group of persons 
whose rights in land are derived from shared rules determining access to land held in common by 
such group…” (RSA, 1994)  However, after centuries of land dispossession, evictions, and 
labour migration, geographic and ethnic communities in South Africa are often not the coherent 
‘rural communities’ comfortably referred to by government, media and even civil society 
organisations.  (Kepe, 1999) 
“Not only do the notions of ‘community’ held by local and external social actors often 
conflict with one another, but local geographical and social boundaries are also often 
fuzzy, and serve as sources of internal conflict. […]  Who is included or excluded in 
‘group’ forms of tenure?  […] How are the benefits from claims by large and poorly 
defined groups… to be distributed?  How do power imbalances within ‘communities’ 
affect land rights?  The answers to these questions largely depend on which notion of 
community is held by the implementers of land reform (in most cases, government 
officials).” (Ibid, p. 418) 
Even when the boundaries and membership of community are agreed upon, strong 
internal differences can present a fundamental challenge.  Charles Taylor (2002) has argued that 
effective democratic participation requires “not only commitment to the common project, but 
also a special sense of bonding among the people” (p. 99).  Without mutual trust, members of a 
community will not be willing to compromise their individual interests for the sake of 
agreement, or consent to redistribution of resources.  Chipkin & Ngqulunga (2008) suggest that 
social cohesion, defined as feelings of solidarity among compatriots, is a proxy measure for the 
state of governance: where there is high social cohesion, it is much more likely that government 
will be effective, transparent, and democratic.  
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In their analysis of social cohesion in South Africa, Chipkin & Ngqulunga found that the 
‘fault lines’ of division in South African society are not along racial, linguistic or cultural lines.  
They are within the family and between friends — thus not between communities, but within 
communities.  (Ibid.)  However, to strengthen their claims to land and other project support, 
beneficiaries are often represented as cohesive units.  Decisions are presented as consensual, 
omitting the negotiations, compromises, and ongoing differences of opinion behind those 
negotiations.  (Grant, 2011) Once the land is granted and decisions must be made about land 
allocation, membership, and finances, however, the diversity of interests re-emerges.   
3.1.3.2.  Sources of internal conflict  
A helpful framework for exploring community conflict can be derived from studies on 
community based natural resource management (CBNRM).  The Overseas Development Institute 
notes two important arena for conflict studies in CBNRM: peace-building, including the 
resolution and prevention of armed conflict, and conflict over natural resources in the pursuit of 
sustainable livelihoods, which is usually non-violent.  (Warner & Jones, 1998) The proposed 
research falls into the latter arena.  Such conflict is usually either directly caused by new 
developmental pressures, which can skew access to natural resources, or is linked to deep-seated 
latent conflicts (such as structural inequality or long-standing ethnic difference) that flare up as a 
result of developmental pressures. (Ibid.) 
 Eddie Koch classifies the primary sources of conflict in community based natural 
resource management (as cited in Fabricus & Collins, 2007).  These include: 
1.  Competition for benefits at the time of success; 
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2.  The “fluidity” of communities; 
3.  Tension between traditional authorities and elected leaders; 
4.  Conflict between entrepreneurs and collective action; and 
5.  Competing livelihood strategies. 
Each of these is applicable to land reform cases in South Africa, but the first three are 
particularly relevant for the proposed case studies, namely: 
Competition and cooption of benefits: Once a claim has been won, those who drove the effort 
may also expect larger rewards, and internal power dynamics may leave women and other 
vulnerable populations with less than their fair share of the benefits.  (SDC, 2007b)  CPIs often 
lack clear methods for dispute resolution, enforcing internal power disparities.  
Fluidity of communities:  Unclear boundaries and membership rules can result in a variety of 
disputes.  For example, a successful claim may draw an influx of urban or other migrants 
returning to claim their share.  In cases where claimants form a subset of a broader ethnic 
grouping, the latter may claim that benefits should accrue to the community as a whole, not just 
to specific claimant families.  (Kepe, 1999) 
Tension between traditional and elected leaders:  Tension between tribal authorities and state 
mandated CPIs is a core challenge.  Land reform policy has swung a wide spectrum on this topic, 
but the formal relationship between CPIs and traditional leaders remains unarticulated, left to 
communities to work out on an individual basis. In some cases, CPIs have managed this well, 
linking them to wider institutions in the district.  In many others, the overlapping legal systems 
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and competition for power have led to a dysfunctional institution.  (Cousins & Hornby, 2002; 
SDC, 2007a) 
Notably, in an analysis of five of the most well-researched land reform communities, 
Pienaar (2002) found little to no link between the amount of internal conflict, and the size of 
community, type of legal entity, or amount of post settlement support received. This is important; 
it may seem that trusts, which are less democratic than CPAs, would have less room for 
difference of opinion, that small communities would be more cohesive, or that external support 
would help in preventing or resolving conflict.  Yet the conclusion drawn here is that these three 
factors are not primary factors in determining community cohesion.   
3.1.3.3.  Potential for collective action 
Peters (2002) notes that these challenges of intra-community dynamics are not unique to 
South Africa, nor are they inimical to successful communal property management.  Most rural 
communities are not free of conflict, nor are they heterogeneous.  Studies show that even in cases 
of the most effective communal resource management, user groups are highly heterogeneous, 
boundaries are flexible, and there are competing principles governing claims and use.  Tjosvold 
argues that insufficient attention is given to the potential for conflict to actually create solutions 
and strengthen relationships, when it is successfully managed.  (Tjosvold, 2006) 
Based on case studies, Ostrom (2004) suggests five attributes of groups that are able to 
facilitate successful solutions to the challenges of common resource management: 
• Individuals involved agree that issue or problem is important. 
• The group has autonomy to take action, without fear of political oppression. 
• Members take long-term view of the future and the shared resource. 
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• There is a level of mutual trust and strategies of reciprocity. 
• Community has prior organisational experience and supportive local leaders. 
 
This is a useful structure for considering, on a case-by-case basis, if and how community discord 
can be resolved in post-settlement land claim communities. 
3.2.  Communal property management: External actors 
3.2.1.  Government capacity in land restitution 
Conflict within land claim communities both exacerbates and is exacerbated by poor 
government capacity in land reform administration and implementation.  Government has a 
mammoth task.  Restitution in itself is a difficult process, and it is further complicated by 
complex histories, messy social dynamics, and very high political and financial stakes. Five 
years into the restitution process, Cherryl Walker, Regional Commissioner for KZN at the time, 
observed.  
“It has not been an easy five years and I do not think the Commission has done very well 
when measured against both the expectations and the need — though I think the 
Commission has done fairly well when measured against the constraints and the 
obstacles.” (Walker, 2000, p.1) 
3.2.1.1.  The Restitution of Land Rights Act 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994 (Act No 22 of 1994) restores the rights of land 
to individuals and communities who were forcibly evicted or otherwise removed from their land 
over the last century of racial oppression in South Africa.  Forced removals included evictions 
and displacement from white-owned farms, group removals from mission lands, evictions for 
infrastructure, military and conversation programmes, and urban relocations. Within the former 
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reserves and homeland areas, scattering communities and resettling across tribal boundaries 
created overlapping and conflicting land rights. (Ntsebeza, 2011) These removals and 
resettlements were facilitated and formalised by government legislation - most notably the 1913 
Native Trust and Land Act, which marginalised blacks to ‘traditional’ areas, but also a suite of 
subsequent legislations that undermined land rights and facilitated removals. The 1936 Natives 
Land and Trust Act allocated only 13% of South African land to black South Africans, who 
comprised 80% of the population.  (de Villiers, 2003) 
The right to restitution required claimants to prove they were dispossessed due to a 
racially motivated law or practice.  The initial Act required that dispossession had taken place in 
or after 1913, and that the claim was lodged by 31 December 1998.  (RSA, 1994) In addition to 
detailing the criteria by which one qualifies for restitution, and regulating the process for 
assessing and processing each claim, the Act created two important institutions. The Land 
Claims Court (LCC) is mandated to adjudicate disputes around claims. The Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights (“Commission”), is charged with receiving, investigating, and 
resolving land claims through mediation or negotiation, and includes a Regional Land Claims 
Commission (“RLCC”) in each province.  (DRDLR, 2014)   
The recent passage of the Restitutions of Land Rights Amendment Act (RSA 2014) 
enforced several important amendments to the Restitution Act.  Most notably, the lodgement of 
claims was re-opened for a five year period, and the process is now open to those who were 
dispossessed before 1913.  In theory, this allows those who were not able to claim by 1998 to 
have access to land restitution, as well as those who were dispossessed long before the Natives 
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Land Act, such as the Khoi-San.  It has, however, created a number of complications, including 
claims upon land already restored to another community, and vast tracts of land put under claim 
by traditional leaders. (CLS, 2013) As of August 2013, before the amendment passed, over 
20,000 claims had yet to be finalised and fully implemented, twenty years after Restitution was 
begun.  Since the 2014 Amendment Act, over 120,000 new claims have been lodged, and nearly 
400,000 are expected by the cut-off date of 2019.  (Cousins, Hall & Dubb, 2014) This places an 
enormous burden on the Commission, and the Department as a whole, both of which were 
already struggling with insufficient budget, administrative capacity, and human resources.  
3.2.1.2.  Challenges in implementation 
The Regional Commissions are responsible for processing the claims as follows:  An 
individual or community lodges a claim at the RLCC.  The Regional Commissioner decides 
whether there is a basis for the claim, in which case it is published in the Government Gazette to 
inform all interested parties and invite comment.  The Project Officer at the RLCC is then 
responsible for working with all parties to thoroughly investigate the claim; if the claim is is 
validated, it then  seeks to settle the claim by negotiating and, if necessary, mediating between 
the claimants and land owners.  (de Villiers, 2003, p. 55-57)  RLCCs are thus main point of 
contact for land claimants and land owners involved in a claim.   From inception of the 
programme until March 2014, just over 3 million hectares of land was transferred to formerly 
disadvantaged South Africans through the Restitution programme. (Zulu, 2014) 
In 2014, the South African Department of Monitoring and Evaluation commissioned a 
review of the Restitution programme, from 1999 to 2014.  The objective was to evaluate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the business process of restitution, and to develop 
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recommendations for strengthening the programme.  That report provides the basis for the 
findings in this section.  The evaluation was thorough, and the results were disheartening. 
Genesis Analytics (2014), the consultancy conducting the in-depth review, found a daunting list 
of shortcomings at the Commission: 
• Inexperienced programme personnel, often lacking the necessary legal and research 
skills.   
• Poor communication with claimants 
• Inadequate archival systems and reference material 
• Weak arrangements for managing the quality of outsourced research  
• Poor documentation of claims and incomplete files  
• Claimant verification and research process compromised by inconsistent and incomplete 
application of research, generally of poor quality.  (No standardised process exists for 
claim research and validation.) 
• Proliferation of review and authorisation steps which dilute accountability and undermine 
efficiency 
• Inconsistencies during claimant negotiations, in which the Commission project officer 
promotes one type of compensation over another, resulting in long and arduous 
negotiations  
Archives, documentation, and files are crucial to the legitimacy of legal process and 
integrity of the restitution process, and so their poor state undermines the ability of the 
Commission to credibly process and validate claims.   Poor research and record keeping lead to 
the referral of significant numbers of cases to the Land Claims Court, where challenges to the 
Commission are usually upheld.  As exemplified in the case studies of this report, they also 
contribute to exacerbated conflict during and after claim settlement.  All of these factors result in 
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a restitution process that is often unnecessarily long; it is not unusual for communities to wait 
more than a decade for their claim to bet settled. They undermine public legitimacy of the 
Restitution programme and ultimately cost the Commission extensively in time and resources.  
(Genesis Analytics, 2014) 
3.2.1.3.   Restitution in KwaZulu-Natal 
From 1996 to early 2013, 15,837 land claims had been settled in the province of 
KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), costing the programme a total of R8,4 billion. 75% of this funding was 
for land, covering an area of 764,000 hectares.  The remaining 25% was paid out as financial 
compensation. Eighty-four percent of claims were on urban land.  Of the sample cases studied in 
the Genesis Analytics review, 41% of beneficiaries opted to claim the land, 31% opted for 
financial compensation, while 20% chose a combination of land and financial compensation.  
(Forsyth, 2013, p. vii) 
The shortcomings of the Restitution process as a whole are exemplified in the KZN 
Regional Land Claims Commission, as detailed in the KZN Provincial Review of the same 
evaluation (Forsyth 2013).  Administration and research are remarkably poor.  Files are often 
incomplete, duplicated, or missing entirely.  Research on the context and rights of individual 
claims is weak; stock phrases on dispossession are repeated across multiple project files, and 
often lacking the detail necessary to validate a claim.  Over 20% of the files examined showed no 
evidence of a specific investigation of land rights, reflecting a concern that  research into land 
histories and claim validity is limited and insufficient.  The testimonies of elders and community 
members which inform the claims are too rarely validated by secondary research or 
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documentation.  This weak research results in a very high rate of claims being sent to the LCC, 
which are then sent back to the commission for another round of research. (Ibid.) 
There are also irregularities in the ‘gazetting’, or formal publication, of claims.  The 
gazette may include properties which were well beyond the original claim, in which case 
individuals are sought out to be listed as additional claimants, or family claims are made to look 
like community claims.  The Regional commissioner is assessed upon how much land is 
purchased and transferred, and the RLCC is thus under pressure to transfer large tracts of land.   
At times, claims are purposefully extended under instruction from senior management.  The 
process is illegal, but changes are only made if the extended claim is challenged in court. (Ibid., 
p. 17) 
A related issue arises in the bundling of land claims.  In KZN, claims are bundled when a 
group of people on a parcel of land claim the same property.  The piece of land claimed must be 
coherent and contiguous, in which case, the research and administration of the claims is far more 
efficient if they are handled as a single claim.  This is legal, as long as approval is given by the 
Commission and the claimants.  However, too often claims on overlapping land are bundled 
without the necessary research and consideration, and even without approval from the claimants.  
This quickly becomes problematic when further into the claim process, or even after settlement, 
people come forward with disputes that undermine the legitimacy and viability of the claim. 
(Ibid., p. 13)  
The Commission, which initially was independent of the former Department for Land 
Affairs, has now become a branch of the DRDLR.  Over the life of the institution, there have 
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been ongoing shifts in responsibility and blurred lines of accountability, especially as to who is 
responsible for the critical support to communities after claims are settled.  Project staff at the 
Regional Commission struggle with the challenges of mediating within and between 
communities, and between claimants and landowners.  There are differing opinions as to who the 
Commission is representing, and how far the influence of the Commission should extend in 
community decision making.  This is exacerbated by the lack of sufficient training for staff, who 
are often put on the job with little or no preparation or training. (Ibid.) 
Capacity on the part of the state can amplify, and in same cases even drive, conflict 
within and between communities around claims.  Bundled claims, weak research, clumsy 
administration, and lack of clarity around post-settlement support on the part of the state are all 
are at the heart of the challenges and ensuing conflict in the Ngcolosi and Mkhabela claims. 
3.2.2.  Traditional authorities 
A second external actor in community property institutions is the iNkosi (chief) and the 
Tribal Council in areas operating under traditional authority. 
When the Communal Property Association Act was introduced in 1996, it was heralded 
as the “most progressive piece of legislation yet tabled by the government… send[ing] a clear 
message… about what the government understands by the concept of democratic control”.  
(Streek, 1996, quoted in Klug, 2000, p.5)  The Act seemed to both recognise and respect 
customary forms of tenure, while using a constitutional framework to require the gender equality 
and democratic participation that were lacking in traditional systems.  “On the one hand, there 
has been increasing recognition of the political significance of traditional authorities and 
A. Tekié  !44
indigenous law.  On the other hand, there has been the formal triumph of universalism.”  (Klug, 
2000, p. 8) 
According to customary law, traditional leaders (‘chiefs') are responsible for allocating 
land or granting usage rights, resolving disputes, and controlling evictions, inheritance, sale, and 
privatisation of land.  Specific to the community or tribe are the governing regulations and 
procedures, as well as the hierarchy of authorities.  (Alcock & Hornby, 2004).  However, the 
CPA Act created independent, community-based legal entities (CPAs) which would be 
responsible for owning and managing the land, and which would be operate based on principles 
of democracy and equality.  Despite recognising traditional governance and authorities, the Act 
did not give them any formal role in land reform, nor any guidance on how the overlapping 
institutions might be integrated. Indeed, one of three principles guiding the DLA in 1998 was 
that land would not be owned by tribal authorities or local government unless they were 
specifically asked to do so by landowners. (Ntsebeza, 2000) 
3.2.2.1.  The policy debate 
In the early 2000’s, however, policy began to shift in favour of a greater role for 
traditional authorities. The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (TLGFA) 
was passed in 2003, to harmonise the institution of traditional leadership within the new 
constitutional democracy. It recognised traditional communities, and legally entrenched the 
hierarchies of traditional leadership and traditional councils.  Furthermore, it provided a statutory 
framework within which traditional leadership would operate which infused with democratic 
principles, including quotas of elected representatives, and female representation on traditional 
councils. (Kamieth, 2007)  
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Two subsequent legislations, the Communal Land Rights Act (CLARA) of 2004, and the 
Traditional Courts Bill (TCB) of 2008, sanctioned greater authority for traditional leaders.  
CLARA was enacted to secure communal tenure by transferring communal land from the state to 
communities, providing for increased cooperation between traditional institutions and local 
government.  It also included a role for traditional leaders on the governing structures of land 
boards, which administered communal land.  (RSA, 2004)  The TCB aimed to integrate 
customary courts into the recognised South African Justice System.  Both Acts were highly 
contentious.  Opponents argued that CLARA consolidated power at the level of unelected 
traditional councils (including chiefs), essentially dismissing the role of localised decision 
making at the lower levels of traditional institutions, such as family, user groups, village, and 
clan.  In addition, it did not sufficiently vouchsafe for the rights of women in land ownership.  
(Cousins, 2008)  The TCB was accused of “undermining the intrinsic character and 
accountability of existing customary dispute resolution mechanisms”. (UCT, 2012, p. 2) After 
extensive efforts by civil society activists, CLARA was finally overturned in 2010 by the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds of a procedural violation, and the TCB was never enacted by 
Parliament.  (Grootes, 2014) 
The political pressure to give traditional authorities control over communal land persists.  
The 2014 Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act (RSA, 2014) opened up “the floodgates for 
traditional leaders to claim vast plots of land which they could rule over as their personal 
territory”. (PMG, 2014) Indeed, less than a year after the reopening of restitution claims, a 
number of large tribal claims have already been lodged. 
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3.2.2.2.  Land rights and democracy  
Why is it problematic for land to be restored to Tribal Authorities rather than community 
members? Those continuing to resist the growing authority of traditional leaders argue that it is 
simply incompatible with democracy.  Land management is perhaps the most important terrain 
on which this issue plays out. CPAs were created to provide a democratically elected form of 
communal governance. By legally entrenching unelected traditional authorities as governors of 
communal land instead of CPAs, the people in those areas are deprived of the democratic option, 
and of the fundamental right to legal ownership of the land restored to them. (Ntsebeza, 2002) 
It is a direct contradiction of the Constitution, argue Rangan & Gilmartin (2002), that 
although bantustans were officially abolished under the new democratic dispensation, the 
traditional authorities who were used to exploit and oppress rural communities in these areas 
continue to enjoy protected status under the Constitution. 
A final critical challenge to integrating traditional institutions into democratic governance 
is the patriarchal nature of customary law and land tenure.  In the South African economy, over 
50% more women than men earn a living through agriculture.  (Jacobs, 2011)  Yet under most 
customary laws, women do not have the right to own land outside of marriage, and access to land 
is defined entirely through their relationship to their husbands or other male relatives.  Tenure 
security, as a core pillar of land reform, “threatens to subvert the customary rules and practices 
that uphold existing social hierarchies and gendered privilege” in traditional communities.  
(Rangan & Gilmartin, 2002)  
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An alternate view, however, argues that the historical exploitation and unelected nature of 
customary law should not be reason to simply eradicate it altogether.  Rather, these institutions 
should be adapted in line with the democratic values of the Constitution.  Under the post-1994 
state, a wide variety of institutions required a process of transformation in order to effectively 
serve the constitutional values of democracy and equality.  Traditional institutions, argue Alcock 
& Hornby (2004), were excluded from this transformation process for political reasons.  
Although this has begun to change with the recognition of traditional leaders through the TLGFA 
and other policies, these attempts to legislate transformation have been insufficient.  The focus 
has been on representation and elected leadership, rather than the systems and practices that 
define these institutions in day-to-day practice.  
Simply eliminating the role of such systems and practices in the area of land reform 
would be a mistake. Traditional institutions have persisted into the new South Africa, and remain 
deeply rooted in the structure of many rural communities, especially customary land practices.  
Eradicating them would be difficult, and replacing them would be both risky and costly.  
Furthermore, there is increasing question of actual state capacity to successfully manage the land 
reform programme. (Alcock & Hornby, 2004)  Cousins (1995) notes that customary institutions 
may indeed be particularly useful in the areas of defining “community” membership, conflict 
resolutions at the local level, and rules for resource management based on local knowledge of 
ecological dynamics. Traditional institutions can and should be better adapted for the current 
political and social paradigm, including a shift toward democratic representation and equal rights 
for woman.  
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3.2.2.3.  Implications in land reform cases 
These multilayered tensions and contradictions between CPIs and traditional leaders, 
both of whom are vested with community property rights under two different legal systems, has 
been a serious cause of dysfunction in CPIs and failed land reform projects.  For example, in the 
Thembalihle community in KZN, a trust was set up through a facilitated, participatory process 
with the community.  Once the trust took transfer of land, two amakhosi (chiefs) laid claim to the 
land, leading to a war over jurisdiction and ultimate failure of the land reform project.  (Cousins 
& Hornby, 2002, p.21) 
In the case of the Makuleke Communal Property Association in Mpumalanga, the CPA 
fell under the jurisdiction of the Mhinga Tribal Authority.  Without CPA consent, the tribal 
leaders allocated portions the restored communal land to members of the traditional authority, 
and allowed outsiders to graze their cattle on CPA land.  (Jacobs, 2011) 
Similar cases throughout the country test the potential for customary and statutory law to 
functionally coexist, with mutual respect, in a constitutional democracy. 
3.2.3.  Commercial partnerships  
Government’s reticence to subdivide farms or support a change in production has resulted 
increasing use of joint-venture partnerships, especially on high value farmland.  In these 
partnerships, beneficiary communities are paired with individuals or companies who can provide 
the necessary capital and expertise to keep the newly acquired farms functioning as a ‘going 
concern’, with minimal changes to the mode of production. (Hall, 2009)   The partnership can 
take a variety of forms, and exact terms will vary.  In general, however, claimant communities 
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are expected to benefit through income from the land lease and profit shares, preferential 
employment opportunities, training and expertise development, and in some cases possibilities 
for new supporting business ventures and preferential procurement.  In turn, commercial partners 
also get profit shares and in some cases a management fee or or salary, control of upstream or 
downstream activities, and similar preferential procurement. (Lahiff, Davis & Manenzhe, 2012) 
After years of experience, results on these partnerships have been mixed.  Most joint 
venture partnerships have failed to provide the expected benefits to one or both partners, or have 
collapsed entirely (Lahiff, 2013; Business Trust, 2011).  There are numerous reasons for this, 
including:  
Weak partnership arrangements: 
• Lack of agreement around precise responsibilities, especially regarding provision of 
capital 
• Benefit flows not agreed to upfront, or benefit arrangements are otherwise inadequate, 
illiquid, or perceived to be unfair. 
• Vast differences in knowledge and experience between communities and commercial 
partners 
• Lack of emphasis on skills development 
• Failure of the Department of Agriculture (or other relevant entity) to monitor and regulate 
the contractual arrangement between parties. 
Challenging community dynamics: 
• Contestation for authority between structures, such as the CPI and the traditional 
authority, or between overlapping traditional authorities 
• Personal privileges given by developers or partners to community leaders, isolating them 
from the community 
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• Insufficient investment made in keeping the community involved and informed 
Financial difficulties 
• Long delays by the state in transferring the land and releasing grant funding 
• Loss of faith in the partnership by claimants, as profits and visible benefits are delayed 
due to loan repayments or business setbacks. 
(Compiled from Business Trust, 2011; Vumelana Advisory Fund, 2014; Lahiff, Davis & 
Manenzhe, 2012) 
Presenting at conference on commercial partnerships for land reform, Paul Zille argues 
that CPIs by nature are inappropriate for commercial partnerships:  
The central problem with CPAs and trusts is that they are ill-equipped to manage 
land-based businesses. The land cannot be bonded or sold. The capital improvements 
from the partnerships cannot be realised. Revenues and capital gains are not predictably 
or transparently distributed. The perception of unfair arrangements for the distribution of 
benefits by the CPI to members often leads to conflict. This is compounded by a dilution 
of ownership, accountability and benefits as demographic changes result in some 
members exiting the CPA and others joining in an often haphazard way. (VAF 2014, p.10) 
Mayson (2003) notes that corporate and commercial actors may have other direct and 
sometimes circumspect interests, including access to land and capital, marketing, and BEE and 
social responsibility goals: 
“Proponents of JVs argue that they contribute to transformation of the countryside by 
providing poor, black people with a pragmatic option for engaging in agriculture, 
particularly commercial agriculture. Critics argue that JVs are a new form of exploitation, 
a mechanism through which white commercial farmers and corporations are able to 
spread the risk of engaging in an increasingly complex and capital-intensive sector, while 
gaining market and political credibility in the process.” (p.1) 
The result of all of this, states Zille, is that despite the valuable asset of land they have 
received, claimants often “live poor and die empty handed”. (Ibid.) 
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However, there are models of partnerships that are working.  Lahiff (2013) argues for 
commodity based rather than community based approach to partnerships.  These would bypass 
CPIs and work directly with individuals, or  small groups, particularly those who have potential 
to advance to commercial farming.  The partnership would centre around the supply of a specific 
commodity, much like the well-known outgrower model used in the sugar industry.   This will be 
looked at further in Section 5.1.2, in light of the case studies. 
Understanding these core causes, both internal and external, of the repeated collapse of 
many land reform projects provides an essential context for exploring the cases of the Ngcolosi 
and Mkhabela communities.  The cases can shed light on ongoing efforts by government and 
civil society to improve the capacity of CPIs, as well as policy discussions about the appropriate 
legal vehicles for communal owernship, the role of traditional leaders, and preventing the 
corruption which so often prevents individual community members from reaping the benefits of 
restored land. 
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4.  FINDINGS 
In sketching the context in which CPIs operate, the previous chapter explored why 
common land ownership is important, and the debate around whether it can be viable in the long 
term for both resource sustainability and community interests.  South African land reform has 
provided a platform for formalised, legal communal tenure to be tested, through the community 
property institutions created to hold and managed the land.  However, these institutions face 
extensive challenges, operating in a dynamic social context and lacking the technical, 
institutional and financial capacity need to effectively manage communal land.  This is further 
complicated by the role of government, traditional authorities, and commercial partners, all of 
whom can be both a tremendous asset or a resource drain on CPIs.   
This chapter will set down the experience of the Ngcolosi and Mkhabela communities in 
facing these challenges, particularly as relevant to commercially farmed communal lands.  It 
begins with the history of land and relations in the Kranskop area, then tells how the two 
communities reclaimed their land and worked to operate them as commercial farms, one building 
a successful, profitable agricultural company while the other fell into disrepair.  Finally, it looks 
at what challenges have faced both communities, including government corruption and the onset 
of elite capture.   
As noted, the names of all informants have been changed in this report to preserve 
confidentiality. 
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4.1.  The Amangcolosi arrive in Zululand 
In the 16th century, the Amangcolosi arrived in Zululand when Bhengu Dlamini, a 
member of the Dlamini royalty and potential heir to the throne of Swaziland, was expelled from 
the royal family and exiled from the area after having an affair with his sister.  Accompanied by a 
number of families, Dlamini led the group into Zululand around 1575.  After moving around the 
region, they settled in Ntunjambili, in the mountains near the Thukela River.  As oral tradition 
goes, after a series of wars with giant cannibals the Bhengu followers were victorious and took 
the whole area.  On this land, the town of Kranskop was founded a few centuries later, east of 
Greytown in what is currently the Umvoti Municipality, KwaZulu Natal.  (Bhengu, 2012)  
As close allies to King Shaka, his assassination in 1828 embroiled the Amangcolosi in 
conflict with the new King Dingane. The people fled Ntunjambili at the king’s onslaught.  This 
migration away from Ntunjambili led to concentrations of AmaNgcolosi all over the region.  The 
core group settled south near the eMgeni River, at what is now Hillcrest.  When their chief was 
later killed by the king, his sons quarrelled over who was the rightful successor.  It was 
eventually agreed that one son, Ndlokolo, would remain in eMgeni as iNkosi, and the other, 
Hlangabeza, would return with his people to the Ntunjambili area and be installed as iNkosi 
there. To this day there are thus two AmaNgcolosi chieftaincies and the other at Ntunjambili. 
(Bhengu, 2012) 
4.2.  Contestation for land at Ntunjambili 
4.2.1.  Contestation for land 
When Hlangabenza and his people left eMgeni and returned to Ntunjambili, they found 
much of the land they had formerly inhabited had been settled by others.  Some had been taken 
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over by white farmers from the Greytown area.  In addition, several surrounding Zulu tribes, 
including the Dlomo (also known as the Mkhabela), had expanded their borders, encroaching on 
Ngcolosi land. Fighting between these tribes and the returned Ngcolosi ensued, and continued 
for over a century.   An Mkhabela community leader described the ongoing conflict between the 5
Amakhabela and the Amangcolosi, which came to a head at the assassination of a chief in the 
1980s:  
“After that all the community went to fight.  Fighting with machine guns, big guns.  All of 
the chieftancies are armed. Most of the arms came from Joburg, and they shot most of the 
family. […] Fighting was stopped when they met in the river we call Amazalati. It was 
1987.  Until then they’d been hiding through the forest, fighting through the trees, and in 
the hostels and the trains of Joburg.  At Amazalati they came face to face, they fought from 
3:30 am to sunset.  Then they were finished.  Most people died.  Even now if you pass 
there with your dog, you’ll find him carrying an arm.  The bones are still there.  After that it 
was peace - no one wants to fight again.  They were done.”  6
Although the fighting has indeed stopped, disputes over land boundaries continue. 
Relations between the chieftaincies, however, were for many years peaceful and by some 
accounts even amiable. 
Also competing for the land in the 1800s were white and Indian farmers.  The Ngcolosi 
continued to herd and farm, but the fertile lands of the area - some of the most productive land in 
KZN - were increasingly taken over by large-scale farmers, some of whom have been there since 
the mid 1800s.  One interviewee recounts, from oral history: 
“When the black people came back [to Ntunjambili], the land was occupied by whites, so 
they settled on the other land that was not as good as this one, the edges of the land by the 
rivers, where it’s not as productive and fertile as this flat land in the high lying area.”   7
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Other tell the stories passed down off whites appropriating communal lands of the Ngcolosi and 
other tribes: 
When the first whites came to Zululand, they were looking for a place to settle.  When 
they asked for land, they didn’t tell the landowners that they were going to use it for 
farms, they asked just if they could live with the people and help them.  […] They would 
first come and just ask for an allocation just to live as a neighbour.  So they were given 
land free of charge.  They then started calling people ‘trespassers’ if they went on the 
land.  “You must have an appointment to see us.” Thats how they started moving people 
off, by claiming they had trespassed and sending them to jail.   8
4.2.2.  From farmers to labourers 
As they grew increasingly organised, white farmers in the area were frustrated by the 
refusal of Zulus to work as labourers. The local communities were herding cattle and goats, and 
successfully farming food both for subsistence and trade.  The Amangcolosi were known to live 
comfortable, for some even prosperous lives. (Bhengu, 2012; Rule, 1993).  The following was 
published in the Natal Witness in 1869: 
The progress made by the Kaffirs in agriculture is fast giving them the lead in supplying 
local demand.  They now grow forage extensively — a thing totally unknown in 1858.  
They have, during the last ten years, bought many hundred of ploughs - indeed you might 
say, with truth, thousands.  They all have a few oxen; they are adept at breaking the oxen 
in; they can make their own yokes, yokeskeys, trektouws, reins, neck straps, and, indeed, 
all that is necessary to set them up as ploughman. Under present arrangements, and 
indeed under any equitable arrangement, the Kaffirs must for many years to come make it 
impossible without capital to get a living in ordinary agricultural pursuits in Natal.  (Rule, 
1993, p. 19) 
Concerted efforts were made to curtail the growth of independent African farming, and to 
force blacks to work on white land.  Traders refused to buy produce grown on black land, and 
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blacks were only allowed in business districts if they wore European clothing. Duties were levied 
on basic farming implements such as picks and hoes. A range of taxes were introduced on each 
hut, each wife.  (Steinberg, 2002) 
In 1905, the British colonial administration introduced a poll tax of one pound was 
introduced for every unmarried adult male.  “The tax was exorbitant, more than anything that 
had preceded it, and paying it would require transferring countless men from independent 
production to labouring on white farms.” (Steinberg, 2002, p.125) Several chiefs in the area 
resisted the poll tax; the most well known of these uprisings was Bambatha’s Rebellion.  The 
British massacred more than 200 Ngcolosi troops during this time, buried in mass graves 
between Greytown and Kranskop.  The revolts failed, the taxes were enforced, and the 
Amangcolosi and their neighbours became farm labourers and domestic workers.  (Steinberg, 
2002; Bhengu, 2012) 
The 1913 Natives Land Act resulted in further dispossession.  The Amangcolosi and 
Amakhabela tell stories of whites coming into the area on horses, accompanied by the police, 
and declaring that all the land was now a farm belonging to so-and-so.  They recount the 
experiences of their parents’ and grandparents’ generations. “This was something common, to 
remove people from one place to another one.  If you knew someone in government it was very 
easy to get people off the land that you wanted.”   Those living on the newly claimed farms were 9
either evacuated or became labour tenants. “The farmers were sending trucks and just dropping 
people off in the middle of nowhere.  Those people must figure out how to survive without water, 
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without anything.”   This thirst for land continued to push people out, until the last family was 10
evicted from the fertile farmlands in the 1970s. (Dardagen, 2012)  “The area where we find 
ourselves now is dry land.  It is becoming drier and drier.  That impacts on our stocks - if there is 
drought, they just die.”  11
Many of the current generation of Ngcolosi were born to labour tenants on the white 
farms. They told of their parents, and even themselves, working “isithupa”, where for six months 
during the off season they were only paid R1 per month: 
First it was our grandmothers then our mothers who worked for six months without pay 
for land rental here in this farm. We grew up knowing that as a way of life and it was very 
difficult, you could not even walk anywhere in the farm you must only use the way 
allocated to you as a black person.  12
The 1980s were a time of upheaval in South Africa, and very much so in rural KZN.  The 
Kranskop area was no exception.  The intense fighting amongst local chieftaincies described 
above was compounded by rising tension between the blacks of the area and the white farmers.  
When the new government took over in 1994 and began planning for land reform, the area was 
ripe for land contestation. 
4.3.  Claiming the land 
4.3.1.  Lodging the claim 
In the late 1990s, a group of Ngcolosi community leaders went to the Regional Land 
Claims Commission (RLCC) to enquire about claiming the land from which they had been 
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removed.  On 8 December 1998, a few weeks before the closing deadline for claims, a claim was 
lodged at the Commission on behalf of the Ngocolosi/Ntunjambili community for over 20 farms 
in the Kranskop area. (DLA, 2003) 
A few years prior, in January 1996, their neighbours, the Mkhabela of the Dlomo 
chieftancy, had also lodged a claim for land from which they had been dispossessed.  As the 
communities were both in the same area, the Commissioners coming from Pietermaritzburg 
suggested they process the claims jointly, for the sake of efficiency.  Other accounts take it 
further, asserting that the two groups were actually putting in a joint claim, which they would 
later sort out ‘under a tree’, and that the Commission eventually advised them to submit separate 
claims.   13
The Ngcolosi claim had adversaries on two sides.  Many members of the Ngcolosi 
community, including the beneficiaries themselves, opposed the claim. They felt that the whites 
would never return the land, and even if they did, the people would not be able to successfully 
farm it. They feared that once transferred to the community, the farms would fail, and the 
workers would be left unemployed, hungry, unable to send their children to school.  “I was very 
afraid!  Thinking it would be like Ethiopia, where whites were chased away and people became 
very hungry and they suffered starvation a lot.  I was afraid!”   The committee managing the 14
claim held meetings with the community to keep them updated on what was happening, and to 
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convince them of the claim’s potential.   However, the more important factor was the 15
endorsement of the chief.  “When it comes to the mouth of iNkosi, all of us we are bowing our 
heads.  So if he says we must claim the land, everyone listens.”  16
Relations with the white farmers in the area, whose land was under claim, were not so 
straightforward. 
4.3.2.  Rising violence with farmers  
From the early 1990’s there was a steady rise in violence against large commercial 
(primarily white) farmers. The politics and literature around farm violence in South Africa debate 
the motivating force behind these attacks; projected motives include robbery, labour disputes, 
land-related intimidation, and revenge.  (SAPS, 2003)  Amongst the white farming community, 
there was a strong conviction that the harassment and attacks on farmers was politically 
motivated, aimed at driving them off of the land.  Some even believed these were supported and 
driven by the ANC. (Ibid.; Steinberg, 2002).    
In the Kranskop / Ntunjambili area, tensions were high. “There was ongoing conflict 
between blacks and whites.  The farmers were generally of German descent and wanted things 
done they way they wanted them done; there were abuses on both sides.”  Stock theft was a 17
widespread problem for commercial farmers, as was robbery. The South African Police Service 
commissioned a thorough report into farm attacks in 2003, and the report covered the Kranskop 
area specifically, noting that: 
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[There are] thirteen farms near to the border with the reserve area which have 
experienced problems, including incidents of poaching, arson, and stray animals on 
property, and illegal land occupation. Fencing was stolen, and boundaries were difficult 
to distinguish. Cattle and goats caused considerable damage to crops, the impoundment 
of livestock was a contentious issue, especially as poor people found the costs of 
reclaiming their cattle beyond their meagre means. Theft of timber and sugarcane was 
also rife.  (SAPS, 2003, p.156) 
Farmers were consistently trying to limit trespassing on their farms, especially for trucks with 
building materials, as squatting on farms was becoming a problem.  (SAPS, 2003, p. 127-8).  
When trespassers were apprehended or reprimanded, farmers would find their sugarcane set 
alight.   
 This, of course, is one side of the story.  Cutting across farms, or ‘trespassing’, 
considerably shortened the distances for people travelling by foot.  Theft may have been a 
natural outcome of the poverty to which people in the tribal authority had been formally and 
systematically degraded.  (SAPS, 2003) Housing conditions for blacks were poor, and black 
students were not provided transport as whites and Indians were. Fees for high school were R70/
student; workers were only making R67.00 per month plus mealie meal.  “Towards the end of the 
1980s, I was in Standard 3.  Life during those years on the farm was too difficult.  As we were 
young, we knew something must be done.”    18
 One informant recounted how he and friends wrote an anonymous letter in 1989 to their 
parents’ employer and landlord, demanding a dramatic increase in wages and specific 
improvements in living conditions.  The letter caused a stir in the farming community. 
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“Whatever was done by one farmer in Kranskop was done by the others.”  In the ensuing 19
tension, groups of youth burnt sugarcane and timber land to put more pressure on the farmers. 
Ultimately their demands were met, although the young people paid for it with short term 
imprisonment and evacuation of their families.  20
 A decade later, two years after the Ngcolosi lodged their land claim, a white farmer was 
murdered on his farm, Dulumbe.  Opinions differed as to whether it was simply a violent 
robbery, or whether the local people were making a statement. Then in August 2002, an alleged 
poacher was killed by a farmer’s private security guard, and his two companions injured. “It was 
our land,” the people protested. “Hunting is in our culture.” (Dardagen, 2012) Two weeks later, 
white farmers in the area were presented a memorandum from the AmaNgcolosi Tribal 
Authority. It was entitled ‘Reasons that lead to a decision to chase the Whites out of the area.’  It 
listed the following complaints from community members (SAPS, 2004, p.125): 
• the impounding of goats and cattle, 
• the killing of donkeys, 
• the shooting of innocent civilians by white security guards, 
• the pointing of firearms at people using the road passing near ‘the farm’, and 
• the discovery of bones in the bush and sugar cane fields on the farms of persons who 
had allegedly been killed by whites and their security guards. 
 R. Williams, personal communication, 14 November 201519
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The memorandum continued, “We beg not to be misunderstood, we don’t mean we don’t want 
the Whites; we are just asking for them to be removed from our society’.  It stated the following 
resolutions taken by the community at a meeting held just prior: 
1. ‘We don’t need the Whites in the in the area and we ask them not to come beyond       
Kranskop. They must stay 10 kilometres away from us. 
2. Whoever came with sugar cane [interpreted as a reference to Indian sugar cane farmers       
in the area] he/she must take it away, whoever came with the soil/land he/she must take 
it away and leave the Tribal land. 
3. We don’t need security guards [referring to the private security company hired jointly by       
the farmers] 
4. We don’t want the whites to go to Shushu even if they are going for fishing we don’t       
want them 
5. We don’t want whites to go to Die Kop       
6. We are asking the Station Commander to go and fetch any Whites at Shushu right now if       
there are any 
7. The cattle, goats and the donkeys that were pounded (sic) and those that were killed we       
want them back 
8. From now on we demand that no cattle, no goat and no donkeys are pounded (sic)       
9. We want all our demands to be met and complied with within a month that include the       
return of cattle, goats and donkeys and their removal (sic) 
10. Failing which we will be up in arms as we are not scared of anyone 
11.  We are appealing to the National Minister of Land Affairs to intervene in this 
matter’  (Ibid.) 
A land reform official from the RLCC in Pietermaritzburg office was tasked with negotiating 
between the parties. (SAPS, 2004, p.153) 
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The Ngcolosi land claims were formally gazetted on 7 March 2003, as were those of the 
Mkhabela.  The two claims totalled 30,000 ha.   (DLA, 2003; SAPS, 2004).  After the claims 
were submitted, farmers in the area held a meeting.  They put on the wall a map of the farms, and 
told people to put a pin on their farm: green if they were willing to sell, and red if they were 
staying.  When those with red pins saw they would be surrounded by reclaimed land, many of 
them changed their pins.  The farmers were giving up, and were ready to return the land.  
According to one interview, they were paid well for it, up to twice the farms’ market value.  21
 In September 2005, 12 of the farms claimed, totalling 8000ha, were handed over to the 
Ngcolosi people.  The Amangcolosi Community Trust was formed as the entity which would 
manage it.  Around the same time, their neighbours, the Mkhabela tribe, received 15 farms 
totalling 18,000 ha, and formed the Gayede Trust to hold the land. 
4.4.  Making the land work 
4.4.1.  Deciding how to use the land 
A founding Trustee commented on the initial vision of the committee spearheading the claim.   
“There was no plan, there was no vision. Ours was just to get land.  We were discussing 
the process and waiting, then something came to our mind: what is going to happen if 
government said tomorrow, here is the land?  And then there were some meetings with 
the government that the land we claimed is commercial, so we have to keep it 
commercial.  So then we started thinking, okay we have to use the land to develop our 
area…”  22
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  The RLCC officials strongly advised the Ngcolosi community to keep the land as 
commercial farmland, as a ‘going concern’.  They said that the community would repay the 
government for the land through taxes on the timber and sugar cane that was harvested and 
sold.   However, many of the beneficiaries wanted to move their homesteads and their herds 23
back onto the land that had been restored to them.  The valleys to which they had been evicted 
were dry and overgrazed, and the claimed farms were lush and fertile.  “In our thinking,” 
recounted the Ngcolosi chief, “most of us believed that with the land back it means we must 
move back on it and build homes there and do whatever we wanted with the land.”   The 24
leadership of the claim spent a lot of time convincing people otherwise.  A sugar cane manager 
recalled, “We had to go through a process of explaining the effects of such a move [to the 
community] and that it would impact negatively on the very assets which are supposed to 
improve their lives.” (Gwatyu, 2008, p.26)  The son of one of the founding claimants explained 
the process of persuading community members to keep the land commercial: 
“By having the AGMs we managed to help people understand what is happening, what 
the constitution says, to give them the chance to ask questions and get answers.  They are 
being told that this farm is theirs.  They requested for farms, and they understand that it is 
wrong to kill the sugarcane and build a house, to kill a forest and build a house. They 
started to understand that the land is used to create money.”  25
4.4.2.  A Strategic partnership 
 The RLCC had agreed to suggest a few potential joint venture partners who could 
provide the Amangcolosi and Amakhabela with business management guidance and commercial 
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farming expertise. (During the claim negotiations, there was some discussion of having the 
former farmers serve in this role, but ultimately this did not pan out. (SCA, 2015) The regional 
RLCC recommended only one partner to the communities: Crystal Holdings, based out of 
Richards Bay and started by two relatives of the farmers whose land had been claimed.  When 
the communities asked for additional partner options, they were told that the Department had 
done the vetting for them, and Crystal Holdings was the cream of the crop.  They even provided 
government vehicles for the communities to go see the Crystal Holdings farm at Empangeni.   26
The Ngcolosi trustees liked Crystal Holdings well enough, and the company had promised to get 
them the equipment they would need to start working. Despite some disagreement amongst the 
trustees, they made a quick decision so that the farms could continue operating.   Both Trusts 27
signed contracts giving Crystal Holdings a share in their agricultural ventures.  The Amangcolosi 
formed Ithuba Agriculture, and the Gayede Trust formed Mkuzangwe Pty Ltd.  Crystal 28
Holdings was a 40% shareholder in each of these new companies.  
 Surprisingly, a few weeks after the signing of the contract, the RLCC came back to both 
communities and forcefully advised that that they withdraw from the shareholders’ agreement 
with Crystal Holdings, claiming the company was corrupt.   Both Trusts refused, as the 29
 D. Khumalo, personal communication, 3 December 201526
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 Parliamentary proceedings in 2013 (DRDLR 2013) explicitly refer to Mkuzangwe as a CPA.  However, 28
interviewees from Gayede and Mkuzangwe stated it was a Pty Ltd company.  The land is held by Gayede 
Trust, and Mkuzangwe’s mandate was to run the agriculture business, as a company with Crystal Holdings 
as 40% shareholder. 
 The Regional Commissioner at the time reported that Crystal Holdings had signed an agreement with the 29
communities behind the RLCC’s back, without going through the tender process.  An Mkhabela leader 
asserted the opposite, that after introducing them to the company, the RLCC officials arrived in Kranskop 
with an MoU that had already been negotiated and signed by the Commission and by Crystal Holdings.  
The communities were then asked to simply add their signature, with no opportunity to negotiate terms.
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contracts were signed, work plans had begun, and they did not have alternate partners.  One of 
the founding Amangcolosi trustees recalls:  
We said… ‘No, we are not going to let this land die.  We are going to work with this 
mentor until we see for ourselves how bad they are.’ Then we were at loggerheads with 
the government.  We signed an agreement with Crystal Holdings.  If we didn’t do that, 
this farm would’ve stopped at the time.  But that’s why [the Department] didn’t give us a 
grant.  30
 As a result of their refusal to break with the company, the communities’ relationship with 
the RLCC turned sour.  At Gayede Trust, the RLCC went so far as to state that they would bring 
Mkuzangwe operations to a halt if the Gayede Trust did not break their agreement with Crystal 
Holdings.  Mkuzangwe took the RLCC to court for interfering in community affairs.  The judge 
ruled that once the land had been returned to the community, it was not up to the RLCC to tell 
them what to do.  The court put in place a six-month interdict forbidding the Department from 
interfering obstructively in Mkuzangwe affairs.  After this, neither community received any 
financial support from the government to start operations; the Department refused to assist them 
as long as they were working with Crystal Holdings.  This was confirmed in the Department’s 31
2008 Annual Report. (DRDLR, 2008, p.52) 
 Crystal Holdings brought on a sugar cane expert and a timber expert, who were employed 
to manage the farming for both claims.  For the first year or so, the two Trusts worked closely 
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together, even sharing managers and office space.  In 2007, for reasons that were unclear , they 32
separated.  33
 Immediately upon transfer of the land, Ithuba suspended all the employees of the 
transferred farms for a month, with a promise that when they returned to work they would be 
paid for that month away.  This gave the new managers time to find financing to pay wages.  
They then went door to door to their contacts in the farming business, and asked for second-hand 
equipment on credit, personally guaranteeing payment once the year’s harvest was sold.  They 
also negotiated an advance on payment from the a mill.  The operations manager recalls those 34
first months: 
We had no bakkies , we had nothing. [We] went all over the place trying to get finance. 35
[…] We sat on the floor in those offices, and we designed the farm.  How our structures 
were going to be, how many tractors were needed what the financing would be, what our 
limits were in terms of purchasing of every item, how much we were going to pay the 
employees for every specific job. […] We sat there and we designed those farms.  And 
that was very, very rewarding, because driving around I’d seen the potential of those 
farms. Thinking, you’ve got this massive potential, how are you now going to make this 
thing into a giant that generates money for the local people, not only through 
employment but also through community-based type operations.  We wanted to build 
stadiums, clinics, schools.  I built that school at Dulumbe.  36
They started out at Ithuba with a debt of R20 million.  Most of the workforce of the 
previous farms had been retained, as had some of the managers.  New staff was brought on as 
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 V. Dube, personal communication, 13 March 2015. 34
R. Williams, personal communication, 14 November 2015.
 “Bakkie" is a South African colloquial term for a pick-up truck.35
 R. Williams, personal communication, 14 November 2015.36
A. Tekié  !68
well, and with experts managing the agriculture, and strong systems in place, the farm went from 
strength to strength.  The operations manager continued, “That farm was like a well-oiled 
machine.  … Every year everything was improving, until we surpassed what the previous 
farmers had done.”  After four years, they had repaid their debt, and by the fifth, they had a 37
profit of R20 million.     38
While Ithuba was flourishing, things had gone sour with Crystal Holdings.  A few years 
into operations, some of  Amangcolosi trustees secured copies of the banks statements, and found 
that up to 9 million had been transferred out of Ithuba into the Crystal Holdings account. Money 
was being bounced from Ithuba to the Mkuzangwe farms (of which Crystal Holdings was also 
40% shareholder), and to the company’s third farm at Empangeni. (Hlongwe, 2008a).  
Crystal Holdings denied any intentional wrongdoing.  In those days, with no start up 
capital and no financial support from government, they were doing everything they could to keep 
the farms going.  Their own farm at Empangeni was put up as surety for equipment and loans, 
and they were even putting their own funds into the projects.  It may have been inappropriate 
financial management, they argue, but it was simply a desperate attempt to manage cash flow, 
not a criminal undertaking.   The matter was settled out of court. Crystal Holdings reportedly 39
returned the funds, and turned their 40% shares in Ithuba over to the AmaNgcolosi Community 
Trust.  40
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After the break with Crystal Holdings, the managers they had appointed stayed on at 
Ithuba, with a newly appointed CEO.  The team worked well together, and the company 
prospered.  Ithuba has 3800 ha of timber, 2000 ha of sugar cane, as well as “short crops” such as 
kiwis, maize, and chilis.  In 2011, they issued the first shareholder dividends to beneficiaries, of 
R3000 per person.  By 2014 this was up to R6000 per person.   One of the beneficiaries, 41
reflects, “At first I used to think that it will never happen that a business of this magnitude can be 
run by black people successfully. I was seriously confused and doubtful but as time went on I 
realised that it was possible, as it happened.”  42
4.5.  Ithuba: From Strength to Strength? 
4.5.1.  Capacity and governance 
Crystal Holdings, and the management team they brought on, played an important role in 
the success of Ithuba.  However, the Trust itself must be credited for having the capable 
leadership, good governance and effective management which were able to bring to fruition the 
potential of the land and contributions of their commercial partner.  CPI capacity and governance 
is where many land reform projects, and joint venture partnerships, fall apart. 
4.5.1.1.  Institutional design, administration and governance  
Strong administration and governance were critical to the community’s success.  The 
Amangcolosi Community Trust is the owner of the restored land, and also the sole shareholder in 
Ithuba Agriculture.  The Trust is governed by the Deed of Trust (often referred to as their 
Constitution).  The trustees are elected by the beneficiaries, and are accountable to them through 
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the annual general meetings (AGMs), which have been held consistently every year since 
restitution.   Although there has been turnover on the Board of Trustees, it seems that trustees 43
have been replaced gradually, through nominations at the AGMs, rather than through a board re-
election at five-year intervals, as required by the Deed.   
The literature notes that often CPI constitutions or deeds are simply based on templates 
provided by government or NGOs, with insufficient customisation for the specific context of the 
project.  Furthermore, the legal terminology makes these inaccessible to beneficiaries, if they are 
even able to access a copy in the first place.  This is indeed the case at Ithuba; trustees report that 
they were given a template deed by the RLCC which they simply filled out, with some 
amendments made much later.   They did, however, provide a copy of the Trust Deed to every 44
beneficiary at the first (and possibly subsequent) AGM.  (One trustee recalled their 
disappointment when after the meeting they found numerous copies of the Deed left behind on 
the seats. )  45
The Trust submits reports and financial statements to the Master of the High Court, in 
Pietermaritzburg (under the Department of Justice).  Once elected, trustees go through 
governance training, both internally and by outside experts, to understand their role and 
 M. Sibiya, personal communication, 13 March 201543
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obligations.  They are also required to sign a code of conduct.  The Trustees are responsible for 
appointing the Board of Directors for Ithuba Agriculture, which is a Pty Ltd company.  This 
Board has four directors.  There are currently two Ithuba Directors who are also trustees, which 
may present a conflict of interest. Ithuba’s only shareholder is the Trust, and therefore 100% of 
Ithuba’s profits must be either reinvested in the company paid out to the Trust.  It is not clear 46
whether there is a written contract between Ithuba and the Trust.   Ithuba is audited annually, 47
and according to the CEO, has passed those audits without qualification.  
4.5.1.2. Technical capacity and training 
From the outset, Ithuba avoided the pitfall of nepotism, and selected leaders and 
managers based on their merit and capabilities rather than their social position or connections.  
Ithuba hired a series of individuals with solid experience in farming sugar cane and timber, and 
in managing large scale agriculture.  They also brought onto the board of the Trust some 
individuals with business and financial experience.  This was the basis for building agricultural 
operations that were highly productive and efficient, and for building financial and governance 
structures which were professional and transparent.   Much of this capacity was built by Crystal 48
Holdings at the start of the partnership, as the company’s directors were experienced in 
commercial farming and fully invested in making the venture successful.  Furthermore, they had 
a good relationships with timber and sugar mills as well as agricultural supply companies, which 
paved the way for trade contracts and a viable business plan.  Outside of Crystal Holdings, the 
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business acumen and extensive networks of the CEO were also a core factor in Ithuba’s rising 
success.  The board is strong and the company is run by capable managers with experience in the 
industry. 
 4.5.1.3.  Accountability and support 
Lack of effective and sufficient post-settlement support from government is a common 
complaint of CPIs and the civil society organisations supporting them.   Initially, the 
AmaNgcolosi Community Trust was not at all unique in this.  Once the land was transferred, the 
RLCC did a messy job of assisting with the joint-venture partnership, and then withdrew all 
financial and technical support out of anger that the Trust did not follow their shifting guidance.   
Only years later, after Ithuba had proven itself as a viable and successful company, did the 
government start providing financial support. 
Despite this, in a 2014 interview, the Ithuba CEO could not stop singing the praises of the 
RLCC in Pietermaritzburg.  “Whenever we have any problems or questions, we just go to the 
office in Pietermaritzburg and they provide us with whatever advice and assistance we need.”   49
He repeatedly thanked government for its excellent support and assistance.   This is strikingly 
different than the experience of most land claim communities in KZN, and it does not it line up 
with the accounts of other trustees and managers regarding RLCC involvement.  This 
relationship is queried in more depth in Section 5.2.3. 
 D. Cele, personal communication, 2 February 201649
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4.5.2.  Reaping benefits 
The profits from the Ithuba are used to benefit claimants, and the Ngcolosi community as 
a whole.  With these funds, the Trust pays out annual dividends to the 376 beneficiaries.  The 
dividend amount has increased annually.   The Trust has also financed and supported the 
following community development initiatives, many of which benefit the Amangcolosi as a 
whole: 
• the building of five classrooms at Dulumbi, 
• installation of 11 dip tanks for cattle immunisations 
• installation of a water scheme for some communities 
• electrification of some communities 
• a youth soccer league 
• university bursaries for students in the community 
• 10 cooperative gardens in which mostly women plant crops for subsistence and sale 
• a computer lab for community use 
• transportation for students to school 
Interviews overflowed with appreciation for Ithuba’s work in the community::  
“Ithuba is very much involved; they helped us when there was water shortage. When 
there is an outbreak of livestock disease Ithuba arranges for agricultural advisors to come 
and vaccinate cattle.”  50
“In other situations, for families who have nothing, Ithuba will donate coffins for their 
loved one’s funerals.”  51
 S. Mkhize, personal communication, 2 February 2014.50
 V. Dube, personal communication, 2 February 2014.51
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“We are grateful for the development that [Ithuba] did for us .We are making money [through 
the cooperative gardens], there are customers buying and money is banked. We are thankful.”  52
4.5.3.  Employment 
 Perhaps the most powerful impact of the project is through employment. As of February 
2014, Ithuba employed 538 people.   Responses vary widely on how many of these are also 53
beneficiaries of the claim - some say most are, others say most are not beneficiaries.  From day 
one, the company instituted very well-considered human resource practices.   The following 54
factors are core to maintaining the morale and allegiance of Ithuba employees: 
1. Secure employment with fair wages and treatment, UIF, leave, etc. (On previous farms 
they were not registered as employees.) 
2. Workers council, which allows them to air their grievances and be part of decision-
making process 
3. Company culture of mutual respect and community ownership  
As explained by a timber worker: 
“Ithuba has made a big difference in our lives. … We are paid far better than what 
we earned under white people… Also, a lot more people are employed who never 
used to work before. Even the work environment changed; now we are treated with 
respect whereas before they would tell you anything, you were a slave. Now that the 
land has changed hands, management respects us and they ask for our opinions. That 
is why Ithuba is so successful and growing because we as workers also have input 
and air our opinions about the work we do.  … We are prepared to work hard.  We 
end up not feeling the hardship in our hearts because we are paid fairly. If maybe 
there was a mistake in your pay it is attended to and you get your money as you 
 M. Mabuya, personal communication, 2 February 2014.52
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should have and that is the greatest motivation - that you will receive what you have 
worked for.”  55
The founding management team instituted a workers’ council, in which elected shop stewards 
from each area of the business meet monthly with senior management to relay the concerns of 
staff and have the opportunity to weigh in on company decisions.   As one worker explained, 56
“We sit down with management and discuss how much will the wages be increased by. 
They discuss that with us, they do not do it unilaterally … The same applies with 
disciplinary hearings - we get called in if there is an employee who has a disciplinary 
case. We sit down and solve that problem. [… ] And also, as workers there are 
suggestions you make and you see them being implemented and contributing to the 
growth of the company. … Previous management did not treat us as well as Ithuba does. 
Before Ithuba we used to work and in the end we will only receive R50.00 bonus per 
annum.  We have seen change with Ithuba, now we get a healthy bonus at the end of the 
year.  57
Ithuba culture was open and respectful, and there was not a strong enforcement of hierarchy.  
This built a strong morale amongst workers, as some of the following quotes from field 
interviews attest to:  
“I was encouraged by all this knowledge that I gained and I realised that you do not 
have to look down on somebody who works with a hoe or look down on someone who 
fell trees because they gain knowledge in their work,” - Sugar cane worker.  58
“For most of us it was out first time to work somewhere like that.  When you get to 
the office, everybody is happy.  You are laughing until the sun sets.” - Former trustee and 
maintenance manager  59
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“People are very proud to work for Ithuba; one was saying that sometimes he wears 
his Ithuba jacket in Greytown or Pietermaritzburg just to hear people ask, ‘Who you 
working for?’ ‘I work for Ithuba.’  They are very proud.” - CEO.   60
Such results from a land reform project in South Africa are, needless to say, 
extraordinary. It leads one to believe that either the institutional leadership and structures must be 
exceptional, or that there is another story which is not being told.  In actuality, both are true. 
4.6.  Difficulties faced  
4.6.1.  Challenges at Mkuzangwe 
When the government approved the Mkhabela land claim, the approved settlement also 
included a settlement planning grant of R384,480, and restitution discretionary grants of 
R801,000. (DRDLR, 2013) After the fallout with the regional Commission and Crystal Holdings, 
these grants were withheld. The regional officers argued that since an interdict had been put in 
place to prevent them from interfering obstructively in the claim, they would not be involved at 
all.  (DRDLR, 2013)  61
Furthermore, the land restored to the Amakhabela was less productive than the Ngcolosi 
land.  Much of the timber was still young, and most of the farmers had cleared the land of every 
last tree before turning it over the Gayede Trust. Raising the necessary capital was a struggle, as 
young timber would not be ready to harvest for years to come, and so could not be used for 
credit.  Unlike Ithuba, the farm had only a very small section sugar cane, which has a shorter 
time to harvest and is thus better placed for credit.   Crystal Holdings, and the Mkuzangwe 62
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director hired to manage  the farms, struggled to get things off the ground without a cent of 
capital. 
As with Ithuba, Crystal Holdings put up their own houses as guarantees to obtain second 
hand equipment, and provided the money for the first month of salaries.   Mkuzangwe harvested 63
and sold what timber they could, and the farms were operational, if struggling.  When Crystal 
Holdings was was charged with theft at Ithuba, there was division within the Gayede Trustees on 
whether to terminate their own partnership with the company.  Ultimately, they retained the 
partnership.   However, with the loss of Ithuba, its prize farm, and with fallouts in relationships 64
with commercial partners, Crystal Holdings was losing viability.  In 2013, the company went 
bankrupt, and their shares in Mkuzangwe were turned over to AFGRI, one of their debtors.  
AFGRI was not interested in investing any funds into the project, and the farms went into 
disrepair, with people chopping down trees and selling the timber individually.   65
Around this time, the son of the late iNkosi Dlomo decided to do something about the 
condition of the farms that his father had worked hard to win back for the community. He wrote 
a letter to government for assistance. In 2013 the Amakhabela had a meeting with the National 
Parliamentary Committee in regards to the failure of the Pietermaritzburg office to provide them 
with support, and the non-payment of the promised grants.  The Committee ruled that the RLCC 
had wronged the community, and must provide them with assistance. (DRDLR, 2013) However, 
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this support has not yet materialised, even after three subsequent visits by the parliamentary 
committee to Kranskop to see the farms.   66
The new management has a formidable task ahead, with 18,000ha of land to manage. 
There are still outstanding debts, both to agricultural supply companies and to SARS. Like the 
Amangcolosi Community Trust, Gayede is committed to managing their land as a commercial 
farm, although during the current drought they are allowing their community and a neighbouring 
community to use the land for grazing.  Although the Gayede Trust itself doesn’t own any cattle, 
stock theft amongst the cattle on their land has become a problem.  There is a 7000ha game farm 
which has been hijacked by a former employee who is bringing tourists to hunt their for his own 
profit, with no permission from or payment to the trust.  Water is a big challenge; the drought is 
compounded by dams which have fallen into disrepair, causing difficulties for both the cattle and 
the game.   67
The new management is employing 150 people, but they are still in desperate need of 
capital funding, as well as skilled managers.  They are verifying the initial 267 beneficiaries, and 
have a list of more potential claimants who are being verified. They have submitted business 
plans to the government, and were planning to host the first AGM at the end of 2015.  They have 
started making plans to provide bursaries for youth in the community to study agriculture, and to 
support a cooperative farming project for beneficiaries on part of the land. They are hoping that 
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the government will provide them with financing and support, now that they have a new board 
and are getting things in order.   
Beneficiaries are supportive, but there is tension with some who want to be on the board 
or be otherwise involved. “They think we eat money here”, says the new farm manager from 
their office at the former homestead of a white farmer, in an empty outbuilding with few rooms 
and very little furniture. “They don’t understand that this is business - in business, you can’t just 
eat money. … They think there is a lot of money, they want that money.  …  The tension can is 
very bad. It is a lot of pressure for us to live under, the friction.”   68
4.6.2.  Challenges at Ithuba 
Despite its annual profits, beneficiary dividends, and shining reputation as model of land 
restitution,  all is not well at Ithuba.  In discussions with Ithuba leadership, the following 69
challenges were raised: 
High Turnover:  Recent years have seen very high turnover in management, with senior 
managers often lasting only a year or two.  When asked why, no one could provide a clear 
answer, but repeatedly suggested it was the responsibility of the executive team to explore and 
address this.  70
Quality of farming declining: Several interviewees noted that there has been a visible 
decline in the standards of Ithuba’s crops in recent years.  Weeds are rampant, and the cane is 
 Ibid.68
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much shorter than in previous years.  Ithuba is ordering a fraction of the amount of fertiliser and 
pesticides it used to order, suggesting a change in how the agriculture is managed.   71
Maintaining board continuity & integrity.  Current trustees expressed concern that as new 
generations of leadership come in, the initiative could be put in jeopardy.  If Trustees start 
prioritising personal interests, it could be downfall of Ithuba.  One elderly trustee and founder of 
the claim feels this has already begun to happen.   72
Competing claims:  Since the reopening of land claims, there is at least one claim that has 
been placed on Ithuba land. The Amakhabela also plan to fight for their land once they are 
functioning properly and can make a strong case.  (KZN Violence Monitor, 2013) Ithuba is, in 73
the meantime, interested in acquiring more land, through both claims and purchase.  74
In interviews with those outside of Ithuba and the Amangcolosi Trust, deeper allegations 
came to light.  Some community members feel the Trust has been hijacked by certain members 
of the current leadership, perhaps even in collusion with government officials.  Over the last few 
years there have been reports of large, irregular payments of Trust funds to individuals, and Trust 
leadership is consistently dodging member requests to see financial statements.  In the same time 
period, some key individuals in management and governance were dismissed or pushed out.  
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This has resulted in court cases from both sides, and intense conflict over who is controlling the 
Trust.   
On 6 November 2015, the sons of a founding claimant submitted a memorandum to the 
Amangcolosi Trust Chairman, complaining of “nepotism and fraud” and demanding resignation 
of the CEO. (Khathi, J & Khathi, M, 2015)  It lists the following charges: 
• Building of school and a church without AGM resolution 
• Spending of R1.1 million for school construction contract for only four small 
classrooms, and without putting the contract to tender.   
• Building of computer lab without AGM resolution and without tendering construction  
• Building a Lutheran church, which is of no direct benefit to the community, only to the 
chairman who is a member of that church 
• Giving bursaries to the children of non-beneficiaries 
• Installing electricity and water scheme without AGM resolution 
• Spending money on community gardens without AGM resolution 
• Purchasing Fortuner as a gift for the chief without an AGM resolution 
• Demolition of farm buildings at Vitoli and Palm Grove without informing that 
community and providing rationale 
• The LIMCO trucking company used by Ithuba is owned by CEO’s brother in law, and 
no trucking tender was ever put out.  [Ithuba purchased trucks which were always 
sufficient for transporting cane and timber; according to some these are now sitting 
unused.] 
• Farm houses are being rented out; claimants don’t have details on where the funds are 
going. 
• Non-beneficiaries are being paid annual stipends and benefiting from trust funds.  
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• Audited financial statements are not provided to or accessible by claimants 
• The CEO is employing relatives to run the business 
• They and he are overpaid. 
• Ithuba employees have been taken to other farms, such as Cele and Zubane, to work 
without approval by the Trust or report on how much was spent for this, and despite the 
fact that Ithuba farms are not in good shape. [Ithuba CEO is also on the Board of 
Trustees for these farms] 
• An Ithuba truck was sold to a trustee for only R30,000, and was never advertised for sale. 
To date the administration has avoided confrontation and refused to respond to charges .   
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5.  DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS 
At the time of writing, just over ten years after receiving their land, the two Trusts are in 
very different positions.  The Amangcolosi Community Trust has a reputable agricultural 
company, which has been turning profit for years and providing shareholder payments and 
community upliftment projects.  However, this is now jeopardised by power struggles and 
declining management standards, and the trustees may soon be taken to court for corruption   
Gayede, on the other hand, is starting almost from scratch with little to show for the last 
ten years.  They have a new board, committed team, a skeptical community, and promises from 
government for much needed capital that has yet to materialise. 
This research set out to understand what factors determined the initial success of the 
Amangcolosi Community Trust.  Many land claims have failed even under promising conditions 
(See Lahiff, Davis, & Manenzhe, 2012)  Why did it work for the Amangcolosi?  This chapter 
will explore the core reasons for their success where others have failed, particularly Gayede, 
which was working in very similar conditions.  It will then explore where were the fissures in 
governance or operations that have allowed for elite capture at the Trust.  Finally, it will explore 
the implications of the Ngcolosi experience for governance of the commons. 
5.1.  Evaluating Success 
5.1.1.  Is the Amangcolosi Community Trust a success? 
5.1.1.1.  Measuring Success 
With a profitable agricultural company, annual dividends to the community, a strong 
leadership team, and support of the tribal authority and the DRDLR, the Amangcolosi 
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Community Trust seems to be an obvious success.  However, it is useful to query what 
successful CPI actually means, and whether the Trust meets that definition.  
The Legal Entity Assessment Project (LEAP) was started in 1998, to focus on why land 
reform CPIs appeared to be failing.   
“[LEAP] questioned the widely held view that the land reform communal property 
associations (CPAs) and trusts needed capacity building. Instead, LEAP argued that there 
were no clear indicators for assessing success or failure and that these micro institutions 
were overloaded with development objectives that often were the proper responsibility of 
government.”  (Mdukatshani, 2012)  
Ultimately, LEAP suggested tenure security should be the primary mandate of CPIs, and 
the foundation for other development objectives. (Ibid.)  The primary goals of a CPI should be to 
1. enable transfer of land for the group, thereby securing the  group’s tenure  
2. provide security of tenure for the members of the group  
3. provide democratic, accountable, equitable governance  
4. manage natural resources sustainably  
5. manage development  
6. ensure gender equity.  (Cousins & Hornby, 2002) 
The AmaNgcolosi Community Trust has enabled transfer of land and secured group 
tenure.  Claimants also have security of tenure as beneficiaries of the trust, although they do not 
have usage rights for the land.  Democratic, accountable, and equitable governance systems were 
in place, although the quality of governance ha seemingly declined. (See Sections 4.5.1 & 5.2.6)  
Development is managed through profit sharing and development projects.  Gender equity is 
enshrined in the Trust Deed (ACT, 2012), and women have membership and land rights; 
however, there is currently no female representation on the Board of Trustees and management 
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positions are dominated by men.  Is commercial farming a good way to manage natural resources 
sustainably?  This is a longer discussion outside the scope of this report, but for these purposes, 
the land is being used in away that will allow for long-term use and benefit to the community.   
So with caveats on gender equity and recent governance issues, the Trust is relatively 
successful by LEAP standards.  Furthermore, it is paying taxes, providing employment, and 
contributing to community development and the local rural economy, which fulfils the state’s 
ambitions for land reform.    
 5.1.1.2. Factors contributing to success 
Research from the Centre for Applied Social Research identified the following factors 
contributing to success and failure of settled land reform projects (as cited in SDC, 2007a): 
Factors contributing to success • Factors contributing to failure
• Skilled and experienced leadership.  
• Active participation of claimant 
structures in project steering 
committees.  
• Availability and utilisation of 
settlement planning and discretionary 
grants.  
• Sustained support from government 
and NGOs. 
• Strategic partnerships, special purpose 
vehicles, mentoring and appointment 
of managers.
• Attempts to manage business 
enterprises under communal 
management. 
• Project steering committees that close 
out participation of members. 
• Inappropriately structured and 
supported legal entities. 
• Unclear determination of individual 
rights and benefits. 
• Lack of clarity about roles and 
responsibilities leading to conflict. 
• Lack of management and financial 
skills to run commercial enterprises. 
• Poor quality/inadequately monitored 
service provisions.
FIGURE 3: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO LAND REFORM SUCCESS & FAILURE (SDC 2007A)
A. Tekié  !86
Ithuba definitively has only two out of the five ‘factors contributing to success’: skilled 
and experienced leadership, and a strategic partnership.   The settlement planning grants 
promised by government were withheld.  There were no NGOs involved, and sustained 
government support only came well after they had proved themselves successful.   Research 
findings cannot conclusively report on whether there was active participation of claimants, but 
given the tone of interviews with the Trust leadership, and the way the story of Ithuba’s 
development and success is told, it does not seem that claimants played a forefront role in project 
design and decision making.  (See Section 5.1.4 on leadership.) 
The Trust, did however, manage to avoid most of the factors leading to failure.  The 
farms were managed through Ithuba, a separate legal entity, rather than through the Trust itself, 
which too often results in entangled finances and reporting structures, insufficient technical 
capacity, and failed farming operations for CPIs. Even if decision making did not meet the ideal 
standards of democracy, members were sufficiently involved and informed to retain their support 
for the Trust.  As the farms were run commercially, and the land not accessible to claimants for 
individual use, the issue of claimant rights and benefits was simpler.  The right human resource 
systems were in place and there was enough unity of purpose amongst the leadership to avoid 
significant conflict.  Crystal Holdings helped to bring management skills, and some of the 
Trustees had business experience as well; furthermore, they had the foresight to identify and 
engage the current CEO due to his financial expertise.   
So although the Trust and Ithuba were by no means perfect, enough of the core systems, 
capabilities and good governance principles were in place to see the potential of the land and the 
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JV partnership to their fruition.   Three core factors stand out as foundational to the Ngcolosi 
success: 
1. Good fertile land in a land reform friendly industry,  
2. Strong joint-venture partner, and 
3. Strong and united leadership, including support of the traditional authority. 
These inputs combined to create to financial viability, a high level of CPI capacity, and ongoing 
community support for Trust leadership. 
 
  The following sections will look at each of these three factors and their outcomes.  
Subsequent changes in governance and management standards, and the drivers of those, will be 
explored in the subsequent section. 
FIGURE 4: AMANGCOLOSI KEYS TO SUCCESS
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5.1.2.  The Land and the industry 
5.1.2.1.  The quality of land 
An Ngcolosi leader from the Tribal Authority at Hillcrest recalled, “When they opened 
the process for land claims, everyone was trying to get their hands on those farms at 
Ntunjambili.”   The land restored to the Amangcolosi was highly fertile and productive, which 75
is perhaps the most important criteria in the success of any agricultural venture.  Furthermore, 
the timber was ‘in cycle’, meaning that every year, a portion of it was ready for harvest.  Finally, 
the farms included large sections of sugar cane land which, as noted below, is useful for 
accessing credit.  76
As noted in the findings, the Ngcolosi claim was not without contestation.  They may 
have their forefathers to thank for selecting a good location, or they may owe their claim to 
savvy leadership and a cozy relationship with the RLCC.  This will be explored in more detail in 
5.2.2.  Regardless, the base fertility of their land, a factor over which they have limited control, 
has been a core factor in their success. 
5.1.2.2.  Land reform friendly industries 
In South Africa’s highly competitive, globalised agricultural markets, the most well 
resourced of farms may struggle to compete.  Land reform communities, which start on the back 
foot in terms of capacity, resources, and economic integration, are even more hard pressed to 
succeed in these markets.  However, sugar and timber, the main commodities farmed by both of 
the case studies in this report, have been the two sectors most responsive to land reform.  Sugar 
 M. Ngcolosi, personal communication, 26 November 201575
 R. Williams, personal communication, 19 February 201676
A. Tekié  !89
and timber mills are dependant on a steady supply of cane and timber for sufficient turnover; if 
farms are unproductive, then the mills are unproductive.  Milling companies have thus made 
extensive efforts to assist land reform farmers in keeping production levels high.  As noted by 
David Mayson (2003), the sugar industry has a long history of working with the black farmers: 
In the 1970s the sugar industry recognised the potential for expanding the throughput of its 
mills by utilising the access that black farmers had to communal land in the homelands, so 
it began encouraging the development of small-scale cane growing. This was possible on 
land that is communally held, a tenure status which precludes the land being used as 
collateral for credit. The nature of sugar cane production means that the crop itself can be 
used as collateral. The other crop which has been grown on communal land in this way is 
timber. 
By 2012, 21% of sugar cane land under freehold had been transferred to black ownership, 
far surpassing the 7% transferred at the time in the rest of the country. (Sherry, 2012) 
As the RLCC withheld their capitalisation grants due to the Crystal Holdings 
relationship, Ithuba had to find large sums of start up capital to finance equipment, labour, and 
inputs.  Good relationships with the mills, access to credit based on future harvest, and a 
accessible market for their produce were critical to getting farm operations off the ground, and 
turning a profit in the early years of the business, which kept the community happy. 
5.1.3.  The Joint-venture (JV) partnership  
5.1.2.1.  The Partnership structure 
 Since 2005, strategic partnerships have become the norm in high value restitution cases.  
Lahiff, Davis & Manenzhe (2012), attribute this to the “higher quality of transferred land, the 
technical and financial challenges faced by large claimant communities in operating the farms, 
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and perhaps most importantly, growing pressure on communities from state agencies…to avoid a 
repetition of the well publicised collapse of earlier restitution projects.” (p. 10)   From 
interviews, it does not seem that amongst the leadership of the Kranskop claims the option of 
using the land for communal or individual farming and grazing was ever seriously considered.  
There was a lot of pressure to maintain the employment of the hundreds of farmworkers on the 
claimed land.  They had also seen the ‘failed’ land reform projects around them and they wanted 
a different outcome.   Crystal Holdings was key to that outcome. 77
Strategic partnerships can be structured in a number of ways, with detailed agreements on 
how capital is sourced, benefits are distributed, and risks are shared.  Generally, ownership of 
land is vested in the claimants, through a CPA or trust.  The claimant community and private 
partner(s) establish an operating company, with shares usually split 50/50 or 60/40.  The 
company then leases the farmland from the community property institution.  Rights and 
responsibilities are spelled out in the shareholder agreement, lease agreement, and/or other 
documents.   The JV partner usually takes the lead in acquiring the capital, whether from their 
own resources or through loans and investors. They are also normally responsible for financial 
oversight and day to day operations of the farming company.  Once the company makes a surplus 
(which may take a few or many years), profits are either reinvested in the company, or paid as 
dividends to the shareholders. (Lahiff, Davis & Manenzhe, 2012) 
This was the model used for both Ithuba and Mkuzangwe.  Crystal Holdings  brought on 
skilled managers, used their relationships with mills to get capital advances on the upcoming 
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cane harvest, and worked intensively to get Ithuba and Mkuzangwe off the ground.  With access 
to some of the most fertile land in KZN, the project was appealing both technically and 
financially for Crystal Holdings, and the directors were supportive of land reform, and wanted to 
be part of making it work.  The joint venture companies paid leases (albeit small) to their 
respective trusts, and the profits from the companies were divided 60/40 between the Trusts and 
Crystal Holdings.  Each trust was then responsible for using the profits to benefit the community, 
through development projects or shareholder dividends.  78
5.1.2.2.  Crystal Holdings Contribution 
 When restitution lands are farmed as a going concern, claimants have few to no land 
usage rights; their benefit from the restored land is thus entirely dependent on profitable 
commercial agriculture.  In a 2010 Farmers Weekly article (Phillips, 2010), the General Manager 
of Ithuba (brought on by Crystal Holdings) made the following suggestions to other land reform 
communities farming commercially: 
• Partner with proven farming companies;  
• Employ experienced farm management team while developing the available staff through 
training and mentorship; 
• Maximise outputs through effective agricultural practices; 
• Make use of the experience of the successful land reform farms to set up a new farming 
ventures; and 
• Good record keeping and accounting practices could be used when applying for bridging 
finance.  
These highlight the critical component of agricultural expertise.  Crystal Holdings 
brought to Ithuba technical expertise on managing commercial farmland, good business sense, 
 V. Dube, personal communication, 13 March 2015 78
D. Khumalo, personal communication, 3 December 2015
A. Tekié  !92
and strong relationships with local suppliers and purchasers.  When these were put to use on very 
fertile land in accommodating markets, the potential for agricultural success was high.  Coming 
from a corporate background, the general manager placed great importance not only on expert 
agricultural management, but also on creating the right organisational structures, effective human 
resource policies, and strong business management.   The Crystal Holdings directors also recall 79
working intensively with the Trust to put in place strong governance structures that were 
transparent and financially sound. 
Informant responses on whether Crystal Holdings contributed capital funds varied 
substantially.  Regardless of whether or not they put in their own funds, the majority of Ithuba’s 
critical start-up capital was raised on the basis of the fertile land and the reputations of the 
Crystal Holdings director and the general manager.   As the Ithuba CEO reported: 
When we started in 2005, we didn’t have working capital.  We actually had to try and 
make it work ourselves, hence the JV partner came in.  But he didn’t come with any 
money, the only thing that he came with was the weight behind the business, as they are 
known in the industry The commercial  banks will not even look  at you as a black newly 
formed company; by having them as our JVs it actually helped us to manage to get 
equipment on hire purchase.  80
The Crystal Holdings partnership ended with embezzlement charges and and out-of-court 
settlement at Ithuba, and at Mkuzangwe it ended with bankruptcy.  However, most interviewees 
at Ithuba recognised that Crystal Holdings was essential to getting their business off the ground.  
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One claimant, who is spearheading efforts to overthrow the current leadership, admitted in 
reference to Crystal Holdings, “Even white people are good sometimes.”   81
5.1.4.  Strong and united leadership  
Chipkin & Ngquluba (2008) suggest that social cohesion, defined as feelings of solidarity 
among compatriots, is a proxy measure for the state of governance: where there is high social 
cohesion, it is much more likely that government will be effective, transparent, and democratic. 
Research by the Centre for Applied Social Research found that community conflict undermined 
development in 34% of the projects studied.  (SDC, 2007b, p. 259). It categorised conflict as 
disagreement:  
• within communities,  
• within leadership structures, or  
• between communities and their leadership structures. 
Research limitations did not allow for in-depth research with the majority of claimants, 
and so this report cannot comment with any certainty on the general level of social cohesion or 
conflict within the AmaNgcolosi community.  However, discussions around why the Ithuba 
model succeeded reveal purposeful efforts to build unity and cohesion in two of the three areas 
above: within the leadership, and between the leadership and the community.  An additional area 
of cohesion is among the company and its employees, which is critical to operational success of 
the business. 
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5.1.3.1.  How leadership maintained unity  
When asked why the Amangcolosi have succeeded where so many others failed, the 
Ngcolosi chief responded:  
“The secret of the success as we can see it, it lies on the these people here in the 
committee, how they operate, how they select directors and staff for managing the farm. 
… The secret is within these people here.  If these people were not working hands 
together, if they were not united, nothing would have been a success.  It is because of this 
knowledge and unity.  82
At the time of the claim and the subsequent land transfer, much of the community was 
hesitant and suspicious, as people were convinced the farms were going to fail and everyone 
would lose their jobs.  It was the work of the Trustees to prove them wrong, and to garner their 
trust and support, which would be essential if the venture was to succeed.  Their approach to this 
was two-fold.  The first method of building trust was intensive communication efforts.  Dietz, 
Ostrom & Stern (2003) note the importance of communication in effective commons 
governance, not only to provide information but also to develop trust.  Those leading the claim, 
and later the trustees, held regular meetings to explain how they planned to use the land, and 
convince claimants that this was the right path.  This was a long and ongoing process, which still 
continues.   
Sustainable Rural Development, an NGO from the Eastern Cape, was one of many 
organisations to visit Ithuba as a learning site for land reform communities.  Their newsletter 
reported the following about the trip:  
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“What’s their secret one might ask? According to the farming operations manager… and 
the Ngcolosi Community Trust chairperson… it’s sheer hard work and the ability to make 
tough decisions and to stick to them. This meant community leadership had to remain 
strong and focused in persuading community members (the shareholders in Ithuba 
Agriculture) that they would not get rich overnight and to invest any initial profits along 
the way back into the company.” (SURUDEC, 2011) 
The second method of maintaining unity within the leadership and between leadership 
and community was a firm leadership style.  The Ithuba operations manager noted the 
importance of avoiding or resolving conflict within the leadership: 
If you don’t have peace, you don’t have a business. … They [Ithuba/Trust leadership] 
got rid of people that tried to create a divide.  They were taken off the directors’ board 
and sorted out.  If you don’t take out those rotten apples you won’t continue.  2% in any 
situation, or 3%, can actually bugger up the whole operation.    83
A founding trustee also commented on the need to get rid of those who were “disuniting” 
them:    
If you are guilty of doing a mess you are out. …  That one sends a message to the 
people.  [They see that] if you mess around with those people, they will show you the 
door.  And it makes the people have a bit of trust in us.  84
One does not get the sense that the management style of the trustees was particularly 
open and democratic.  Communication with the claimant community is usually discussed in 
terms of ‘bringing them around’, explaining and teaching them about how the project works and 
convincing the beneficiaries to support the direction chosen by leadership.  When reflecting on 
the AGMs, a conversation with Trustees went as follows:  
You found the first meeting was a very bad meeting.  The second was a little bit better.  
At the third one there was still some complaining about this and that.  At the fourth one, 
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things had come alright, and the one which was had last year it was a SMOOTH one!  
Everything went well.  We were happy, because we had been explaining to them.   
What he is trying to say is that initially there were tensions that we had to normalise… 
now they seem to understand what the process is for all these meetings.  85
It is less about getting input from the beneficiaries, and more about maintaining their 
support.  Indeed, one of the beneficiaries who is disgruntled with current leadership stated 86
repeatedly that the Trust and Ithuba are like government in the area.  They spend the money and 
make the decisions; they are in control.    It may be that it was initially more democratic, and 87
that the shift towards executive decision making has accompanied the shifts in power.  On the 
other hand, it may be that the AmaNgcolosi benefited from ‘benevolent dictator’ style of 
leadership - with the best interests of the community at heart, but with a firm fist that did not 
allow a variety of interests and perspectives to paralyse decision making or interfere with 
strategy.  
5.1.3.2.  Business success and community cohesion 
This is not too say that community support for Ithuba is not genuine.  As Ithuba began to 
bring in revenue, and certainly as beneficiaries began to receive shareholder dividends and see 
community projects take shape, maintaining support between community and leadership became 
less and less of a challenge.  Claimants could see the long term potential of the project, as well as 
its viability, and therefore had less reason to object.  The importance of short term benefits to the 
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 It is important to note that this was the perception of the researcher, supported by the tone and content of 86
interviews.  However, the findings are by no means conclusive; the Trust processes may have been more 
democratic than it seems. 
 C. Bhembe, personal communication, 26 November 2015.87
A. Tekié  !97
community was noted in the literature on why commercial partnerships fail.  When years pass 
and the claimant community sees no benefit from their land, they are frustrated, resulting in 
disputes, power struggles, and loss of faith in the partnership.  (Vumelana Advisory Fund, 2014) 
Leadership then becomes paralysed by divisions, spending most of its energies managing 
community dynamics and politics, and is unable to effectively manage the CPI and related 
business.  The business suffers, resulting in less profit, resulting in further frustration by the 
community.  Business success and community support are thus mutually reinforcing in land 
reform projects: 
            !  
The operations managers at Ithuba had a very different leadership style than the trustees.  
The level of morale described in Section 4.5.3, the sense of pride and ownership in the company, 
were carefully built and nurtured by the founding team.  This was done through the workers’ 
councils, an open and lateral management style, fair treatment of employees, and the building of 
FIGURE 5: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS SUCCESS AND COMMUNITY COHESION
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a common vision.  Reflecting on how they initially brought everyone together, the original 
operations manager recalls: 
In the beginning, it was 12 or 13 individual farms [coming together from the claim], and 
everyone had their own way of doing things. We basically had to streamline that so that 
everyone had the same vision. For the first three, four, five months there was a lot of 
tugging and pulling.  But it’s basically having a vision and getting everyone to understand 
that vision and accept that vision as the way your going.  And then you have buy-in and 
everyone is pulling in the same direction.  That’s what I do.  How do you articulate the 
vision? It’s having excitement about what you’re doing and portraying excitement, saying 
“next week we are doing this, the month after we are doing that, the month after we are 
doing that.”  Everyone understands that there is a process, and that the process is actually 
taking us forward to something better.  88
Employee buy-in to Ithuba’s vision was one factor which set it apart from other commercial 
agricultural companies, and allowed operations and productivity to soar.  As some employees 
were also beneficiaries who shared in Ithuba’s profits, the success of the business further 
improved employee morale and productivity, again a virtuous cycle.   
5.1.3.3.  Support from the Tribal Authority 
One cannot look at unity and leadership in the Amangcolosi community without 
discussing the role of the traditional authority, particularly the chief.  Like most rural KZN 
communities, the Amangcolosi are firmly rooted in their tribal identity, and the traditional 
authority plays an important role in leadership and mediation.  Although the chief at the time of 
the claim was supportive, the land claim was submitted on behalf of individual claimants, not in 
the name of the tribal authority.  The current chief is a figurehead of the land claim.  He is not 
officially a registered trustee (ACT, 2012), but is sometimes referred to as a trustee. (Ithuba 
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Agriculture, 2010)  There are no other members of the tribal council on the Board of Trustees.  
The chief helps the Trust in communicating to the community, serving as a leader, and mediating 
disputes:  “The Tribal Council helps to solve problems when we have conflicts, disputes among 
the committees or members. They decide who is right and wrong.”  89
The iNkosi recalls how when the land claim was underway, he felt it would be his 
responsibility to see it succeed, and was daunted by the task.  However, seeing the skills 
available in the community and on the management team, he realised it would be possible to 
make it work, and now sees the community reaping the benefit: 
We [the Inkosi and induna] have many roles in the life of Ithuba and the Trust.  We have 
seen some changes since it started to operate.  They made great impact in the community 
- classrooms, cattle dips, these things make a big impact.  So our aim and goal is that it 
must be sustained so we continue to get help from Ithuba, because if there is ever 
something we need, we can come to Ithuba for it.   90
The relationship between the traditional authority and the Trust is mutually beneficial.  
The chieftaincy benefits from community development and positive morale resulting from 
Ithuba’s success.  In return, the iNkosi’s support is important in keeping the community united 
behind the Trust.  As noted by an Ithuba Director and Trustee: 
If you are not on good terms with iNkosi it is not easy.  We sat down and said iNkosi 
must be part of this because he represents the community.  If he has information about 
what happens here, he can easily answer and respond.  We have made the right decision 
to make him part of what is happening.   91
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The last sentence is significant, as it suggests that the involvement of the iNkosi is a 
choice.  The Ngcolosi claim does exemplify an instance where the relationship with the tribal 
authority, if ambiguous, does not compromise the autonomy of the CPI.  The Trust seems to be in 
an enviable position of having the support of the iNkosi, which is essential in maintaining the 
support of the community, without having to relinquish control over decisions and operations to 
the traditional authority. The previous chief passed away in the years between the lodging of the 
claim and the settlement of the claim.  At the time the land was officially restored, the new chief 
had not yet been installed.  This may have played a role in enhancing the autonomy of the Trust 
over the tribal authority. 
Ithuba’s profitability combined with effective leadership by trustees and support of the 
tribal authority were the keys to maintaining community support for the vision and decisions of 
the trustees.  Although there were certainly those who wanted things done otherwise, the degree 
of community support behind the venture was sufficient to avoid embroiling the Trust in ongoing 
disputes. 
5.1.5.  Why Ithuba succeeded and Mkuzangwe failed 
The Amangcolosi Community Trust succeeded because it had institutional capacity 
(technical/managerial and governance), and strong leadership (able to keep community united 
behind the CPI, and maintain the support of the tribal authority).  Ithuba succeeded as a business 
because of its access to resources (fertile land in a friendly industry) and the commercial 
partnership (which provided access to expertise and financial capital).   
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Why did the neighbouring Mkhabela claim experience such different outcomes?  
Mkuzangwe also had access to fertile land, in the same industries; it shared the same commercial 
partner for access to expertise and capital.  Information on Gayede Trust under its original board 
is limited, but there were clearly gaps in managerial capacity and governance.   
The data available on Gayede reveals an unfortunately stereotypical CPI.  Although the 
Board of Trustees held monthly meetings, not a single AGM was held.   Some say this was 
simply because the Chairperson did not know he was supposed to hold an AGM. Others 
suggested that perhaps they were hesitant to meet with the community as things were not going 
well, or because they had something to hide.  The trustees had a five year term, but after eight 92
years there had still been no new election.  According to the new management, many of the 
Gayede claimants did not even know they were beneficiaries of the land reform project.   93
Was this then, the weak link at Gayede?  Not necessarily.  Three informants intimately 
involved in the Mkhabela claim, including the manager and the JV partner, argue otherwise.  The 
reasons they gave for Mkuzangwe’s failure were relatively simple, and based on two of the most 
foundational inputs for a successful farm:  land and money.  If Gayede had been given the 
government settlement grants as promised, they would have had the finances necessary to cover 
initial capital costs and get the farms running, eventually building up a profitable enterprise.  
Without those grants, they had to scramble to raise the funds.  This was much more difficult for 
Mkuzangwe than for Ithuba, as they had inherited primarily timber farms, which had either been 
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fully razed or had only young timber not ready for harvest, and only a very small area of sugar 
cane.  The amount of credit they could access from mills based on future harvest was therefore 
much smaller than for Ithuba.  Furthermore, although their land is productive it is significantly 
less fertile than Ithuba’s land, meaning that annual profits would be smaller, debts would take 
longer to repay, and the community would see less money coming back to the trust.  Mkuzangwe 
fell apart simply because it could not services its debts, or, from another perspective, because it 
never received the support promised by government.  94
Understanding what happened at Gayede sheds further light on the secret to success at 
Ithuba.  When asked about the secret of their success, responses from the Amangcolosi usually 
included good leadership and hard work.  These were important factors.  However, if the 
previous farmers had left the farms in a different condition, so that the timber or cane was not 
harvestable or was insufficient for credit, it may be that Ithuba never would have gotten off the 
ground.  If the farms had been less fertile, the community would have seen less return on their 
land, potentially bringing early division and conflict to the Trust.    95
It is useful to note that timing and condition of farms at transfer is a critical issue in land 
reform.  When farmers know their land is under claim, they often put fewer resources into 
maintaining the infrastructure and ensuring a good yield, as they may not be around to benefit 
from the harvest. The communities then receive land that is in poor condition, without viable 
harvests in the short term (as was the case with Gayede).  In the case of the Ngcolosi claim, the 
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RLCC discussed reimbursing the farmers for pesticides and fertiliser costs during the transfer 
period, so that the land would be in good shape when the communities received it.  However, 
after settlement the RLCC never paid farmers (who say that the RLCC had committed to the 
idea), and their is an ongoing lawsuit against the RLCC by the farmers involved. (SCA, 2015).  
The sugar industry has recently negotiated with the DRDLR to implement land transfers along 
the cycle of cane so that harvests are not lost during the transfer period. (Dardagen, 2015) 
5.2.  Sources of conflict and capture 
Recent years, and changes in management, have seen a slow shift in attitudes towards the 
Ithuba and Amangcolosi Community Trust leadership.  Some former trustees and claimants feel 
that board trustees have begun to find ways of benefiting personally from Ithuba’s prosperity, 
resulting in allegations of nepotism, embezzlement, and running the farms down.  
An important aspect of the Ngcolosi success was their strong leadership and governance.  
The principle role of good governance is to prevent corruption, and yet there is widespread 
acknowledgement in the Ngcolosi and broader Kranskop community that some corruption has 
set in.  Were the governance systems not as strong as initially supposed?  Or is there another 
fissure in the structures, policies, and politics at the Trust that has allowed for personal interests 
to override the best interests of the claimants? 
This section will look at the current conflict at the Amangcolosi Community Trust.  The 
first two sections provide relevant context on the validity of their land claim and the role of the 
RLCC.  The next three sections look at corruption within the Trust, what types of mechanisms 
for conflict resolution are being used, and the role of the traditional authority.   
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5.2.1.  Narratives of dispossession  
5.2.1.1.  Competing claims 
 While the Amangcolosi have inarguably made a success of Ithuba, the underlying validity 
of their claim on the land is widely disputed, by the former famers and by other Zulu tribes.  
Commercial farmers whose land is/was under claim assert that their forefathers arrived on those 
farms in the 1800s, and no one was using the land at the time. :   96
Kranskop was different in that there wasn’t a claim which was then validated and 
then farms were handed over. After years of attacks and murders and burning of the farms 
and everything, they did willing seller, willing buyer scenario.  The farms were never 
validated.. they could've disputed it right back because the farms were actually inhabited 
in 1870-something.  Graves on Biltmore, on Wonderfontein farm in Kranskop indicated 
that the farms were there way before black people lived there.  Especially the 
Amangcolosi.”   97
 Indeed, the Ngcolosi history actually accounts for why pioneering farmers might not find 
blacks in the Kranskop area in the 1800s - they had recently fled in the wars with King Dingane 
and others, and they returned to their land during the same period that white farmers had begun 
to settle and claim large farms in the area.   
 According to the Amakhabela, there is documented evidence that a good portion of the 
land claimed by the Amangcolosi is actually Mkhabela land.  Many in the Kranskop area, even 
outside the two communities, support the Mkhabela claim.   A partner at Crystal Holdings 98
recalls that initially the Ngcolosi trustees did not know the boundaries of their land, and when 
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driven through it, were surprised at its extent.  Deep in Ithuba land, in the corner furthest from 
the Mkhaba border, they found the homestead of an elderly widow.  Her chief, she said, was 
Dlomo, the Mkhabela chief.  99
 The Amangcolosi, of course, disagree with the competing claims.  Oral histories from the 
claimants tell of land evacuations by whites moving into the area, and labourers being evicted, 
both before and after 1913.  They had consulted the indunas, and could show officials from the 
Department of Land Affairs the graves of their forefathers and their previous homesteads.  
Interviews told of a map was located by the RLCC which reinforced these claims, and photos 
found at a Cape Town museum of Ngcolosi elders on the land when they were young.   A list of 100
people who had been evicted from the land was compiled, and the RLCC worked with them to 
verify the individual claimants. As the Ngcolosi claimants tell it,  
“We knew each other and where we were staying before eviction, so we could make a 
list of who was neighbouring us when we were still in the farms, before eviction.  And we 
were helped by the office of the regional commissioner who compiled a list - it was their 
responsibility to ask question and ensure it was really the right people.”    101
“Everyone came and put his name forward and the verification was done where they 
actually screened each and every individual, get the history of that household, how they 
were evicted and all that. The people who came forward were over 700 but only 376 were 
found to be the legitimate claimants.  102
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According to Mkhabela informants, in December 2004 they and the Amangcolosi were to 
meet with the RLCC project officer to verify the boundaries of the claim.  The Amangcolosi met 
on the 19th, and the Amakhabela on the 20th.  When the latter arrived at their meeting, much of 
their land had been already claimed by their neighbours, and the RLCC wasn’t willing to change 
it or register competing claims.  Some feel that RLCC officials benefitted by in supporting 
Amangcolosi claims to more fertile lands, and that this was the beginning of RLCC interference 
and personal interest in the two claims.   103
 The KZN Provincial Review of the Restitution Business Process (Forsyth, 2013) noted 
the problems caused by bundling land claims.  The Amakhabela submitted their land claim 
nearly three years prior to the Amangcolosi. As the communities were both in the same area, the 
Commissioners coming from Pietermaritzburg suggested they process the claims jointly, for the 
sake of efficiency.  Other accounts take it further, asserting that the two groups were actually 
putting in a joint claim, which they would later sort out ‘under a tree’.   In any case, the 104
processing, negotiation, and settlement of the claims was done jointly, despite the fact that the 
land portions they were each claiming were not ‘coherent and contiguous’ as required for the 
legal bundling of claims.  The KZN Review notes a similar case of claim bundling: 
The solution of consolidating the land was apparently one that was imposed on 
communities who were not fully aware of the possible implications and consequences. 
In this case the conflict apparently came about because one area is more productive 
than the other. This is an in-built recipe for conflict and dispute between communities. 
A manager noted ‘these kinds of cases are ticking time bombs’ and generate volatile 
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community dynamics. Mediators then have to be appointed, but this is not the 
solution. (p. 27) 
 When it was time to draw the boundaries of each claim, the RLCC essentially divvied up 
the land in question, giving preference to the Amangcolosi.  So while some aspects of the 
bundling were likely efficient and posed no problem to the community,  especially as ultimately 
the claims were separated, it allowed the Amangcolosi to claim without contestation land that 
may rightfully belong to the Amakhabela.  As noted above, much of Ithuba’s success can be 
traced to the specific portion of land it received, which was “by far” the more fertile portion.   105
Whatever the basis for determining the claim boundaries, the Regional Commissioner defined 
the future of the respective CPIs when she drew those particular lines on the map. 
5.2.1.2.  The ‘Master narrative’ 
This case of disputed boundaries and competing rights at Kranskop is by no means 
unique.  The original Land Restitution Act tried to address competing histories and overlapping 
land rights by approving claims only for dispossession from 1913 onwards, and only when 
racially motivated.  However, as seen in these case studies, even those boundaries leave 
complexities that become impossible to untangle.  There are many different historical narratives 
around the Kranskop land, and it may be that all of them - or parts of all of them - are true.   
Cherryl Walker explores the idea of a ‘master narrative’: the overarching story of land 
dispossession and racial oppression in South Africa that fundamentally informs the restitution 
project.  That story includes colonial wars of dispossession and white supremacist land policies; 
it includes forced removals and resettlements away from fertile land and economic centres; and it 
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includes the immense losses, in every sphere, suffered by black South Africans as the result of 
the land theft and removals.  
 While never questioning the validity of this master narrative, Walker (2000) explores the 
way in which it is understood and carried by dispossessed South Africans, particularly land 
claimants: 
“More often it is a very limited stock of phrases, drawn from a collectivised memory, 
that is presented [to the Commission].  The phrases, scripted elsewhere, have become part 
of the standard repertoire of those reporting their dispossession. ... ‘We were forcibly 
removed’, ‘Before we were removed we lived in happiness and peace’, ‘We received 
peanuts for compensation’.” (p. 3)  
Claimants have access to a story, she continues, that  is already written for them. The 
exact dates and timelines of dispossession are less relevant; events and personalities from the 
1800s, or 1913, or since, are treated almost as if they are in the present day. (Ibid., p. 5).  The 
historical figures and public themes of the master narrative serve very local, specific agendas and 
perspectives.  
The master narrative informing land restitution, Walker argues, is too simple. It does not 
recognise competition among the dispossessed, it does not include notions of citizenship, of 
limited choices and what is in the interest of the broader public.  It stops at the points of 
dispossession, and does not consider what has happened to communities and land in the 
subsequent years.   This too-simple narrative results in a notion of restitution that is also too 
simple.  (Ibid.) Furthermore, the South African population has grown ninefold (from 6 million in 
1911 to 53 million in 2013), on the same amount of land, and rural economies have changed 
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dramatically. (Walker & Cousin, 2016).   There can be no straightforward reversal of racially 
based land dispossession.  
Mention of stock phrases used to describe dispossession echoes the concerns expressed in 
the 2014 Review of the Land Restitution programme (Genesis Analytics, 2014).  The KZN 
evaluator noted that “specific case research was often replaced by a generic narrative of the 
history of apartheid legislation that was cut and pasted from one project file to another, without 
an evidence of project specific research.” (Forsyth, 2013, p. 42)  It seems the same ‘master 
narrative’ is repeated at every level, from the dispossessed, to the government officials, through 
to the Constitution.   In a very politicised environment, with multiple competing claimants,  “the 
responsibility of the Commission is to be both principled in its reading of the claim and the 
[Restitution] Act, and practical in its interventions.  There is a terrible responsibility to get ‘it’ 
right, quickly.” (Walker, 2000, p. 15) The result of this immense pressure is that the complex 
tangled narratives of land ownership, occupation, and dispossession are artificially simplified.  
This is compounded when claims are not well researched, and boundaries are influenced by 
multiple agendas.   
At the time of the Ngcolosi and Mkhabela claims, the Commission was indeed under 
great pressure to speed up the settling of claims, and to show large amounts of land transferred. 
(CRLR, 2006) According to one interviewee, the RLCC was so eager to get the Kranskop land 
claims settled that once the farmers had agreed to sell, the actual claim validation was rushed to 
in order to quickly process and negotiate the land transfer.   106
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Over 750,000 hectares of land in KZN has been transferred (Forsyth, 2013), and the 
Commission can publish this with pride in their annual report.  The achievement, however, is 
short-lived.  Poor and corrupt management of claims generate conflict within and between 
claimant communities.  That tension simmers, and months or years down the road it erupts - even 
more so when the business is prosperous and large amounts of profit are at stake, as with Ithuba.  
“One day,” noted an interviewee in regards to the competition over claimed land, “there will be 
chaos in Kranskop.”    107
5.2.2.  Government maladministration 
 A 2013 article in the KZN Violence Monitor was entitled “Is the Department of Rural 
Development & Land Reform stoking the flames of violence in Kranskop?” This article 
supported the assertion that the Ngcolosi claims were never validated, that much of the Ithuba 
land truly belongs to the Amakhabela, and that the government set up both claims to fail by not 
providing post-settlement support and by refusing to engage with them [after Crystal Holdings 
partnership]. “Tensions are rising, and there are fears that violence will erupt.  If it does, the 
responsibility must be laid at the feet of Department of Rural Development and Land 
Reform.” (KZN Violence Monitor, 2013, p.1)  
5.2.2.1.  Corruption at the RLCC 
In 2013, Corruption Watch, an online non-profit service which allows people to report 
government corruption, reported a ‘sizeable’ number of complaints implicating the DRDLR in 
abuses of power, corruption in procurement, and bribery.  (Talane, 2013) The majority of 
complaints come from rural areas (as that is where the large claims are), and KZN has the 
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greatest number of cases (35% of reported charges).  “In analysing the reports we’ve received 
from the public, it’s become clear that Communal Property Associations (CPAs) are vulnerable 
to abuse by government officials.” (para. 5)  At the time of the Kranskop claims, the KZN 
regional commissioner had already been charged in the media with nepotism and corruption. 
(Zulu King taken to court, 2002) At a 2013 civil society workshop on CPI challenges, a claimant 
from the Amajuba district in KZN reported that farmland that was supposed to be restored to 
communities was going to corrupt DRDLR officials. (Molose, 2013)   In September 2015, the 
KZN premier’s office found over R500 million of DRDLR funds had been stolen by KZN land 
reform officials through fraud, including false claims with made-up beneficiary lists. (Erasmus, 
2015)  Mike Cowling, executive director for the land rights movement AFRA, was cited in a 
News24 article, noting that “the high number of fraudulent claims saw ‘genuine claimants 
marginalised’.  We have documented this for years and while we have handed over 
documentation to the authorities, nothing has been done.’” (Ibid., para. 12)  108
 Regardless of exactly what happened at Kranskop, there is clearly a basis for questioning 
the agendas and interests driving decisions at the Pietermaritzburg RLCC. A number of questions 
arise around the behaviour of the Regional Land Claims Commission in these cases: 
1. Why were the Amangcolosi given preference when the borders of the claims were 
defined, especially if there is evidence contradicting those borders? 
2. Why did the RLCC push for the Crystal Holdings partnership, without offering 
alternatives?  What caused the swift change of preference, and subsequent attempts to do 
everything in their power to destroy the same partnerships they had created?   
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3. Why did the RLCC obstruct progress and withhold post-settlement support grants when 
trustees did not do as RLCC wanted, to the extent of intentionally causing division 
between Mkhabela trustees and the claimant community?  
Further allegations against RLCC officials include: 
• Reinforcing power of current Amangcolosi administration. [Commissioner still attends 
Amangcolosi AGMs, standing up front with the Trust management. One beneficiary said 
after an AGM, the Regional Commissioner approached him and admonished him for 
challenging the administration and asking too many questions.]  109
• Placing Ithuba CEO on boards of community property institutions throughout the region, 
for benefit of both the commissioner and the CEO.  110
• Channelling government funds to Ithuba, and then into private pockets.  111
• Channelling government funds to the ANC, in collusion with Ithuba leadership.  112
This research had no definitive answer for these questions, only a variety of suggestions 
and conjectures offered by those interviewed.  Most of those suggestions involve personal 
interest on the part of the RLCC commissioner and project officer.  There is a widespread 
assumption that the Commissioner was hoping to benefit from the Crystal Holdings partnership, 
through rights to a transport supply contract or a farmhouse.  Once she realised this would not be 
the case, she swiftly changed tact and tried to dissolve or destroy the partnership.   Another 113
theory is that RLCC staff had a financial interest in supporting the Amangcolosi, which is why 
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they were given superior land.  The Amakhabela could go to court to fight the borders, but the 
DRDLR or the courts would not be inclined to take land from a flourishing land claim project 
and reassign it to a failed project.  The RLCC and the Amangcolosi were thus invested in 
keeping Mkuzangwe from succeeding.    114
A final theory involves national politics.  Bongi Mlambo, brother of then Deputy 
President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, was a behind-the-scenes shareholder in Crystal Holdings.  
He was involved in facilitating the partnership with the claimant communities, but withdrew 
from the partnership after the embezzlement charges. (Hlongwe, 2008b) In the same months that 
the Kranskop land was transferred to the communities, the Deputy President was under 
investigation for involvement in the ‘Oilgate’ scandal, whereby billions of rands in government 
funds were channelled to the ANC via the parastatal PetroSA.  Bongi Mlambo had shared 
investments with his sister, and so was also implicated in some of the charges.   The theory is 115
that the ANC was trying to get Mlambo-Ngcukva out, and the regional commissioner may have 
been under pressure from the party to sever any government deals with her or family members 
involvement.  116
The point of including the many allegations above in this report is two-fold: to show the 
variety of ways in which government involvement in land claims extends far beyond 
straightforward administration, and to illustrate how deeply complex and political individual 
claims are.   To blame the inter- and intra-community conflict in land reform projects purely on 
 D. Khumalo, personal communication, 3 December 2015 114
P. Armstrong, personal communication, 22 January 2016
 Both were ultimately cleared of any involvement by the public protector. (Hlongwe, 2008b)115
 P. Armstrong, personal communication, 22 January 2016116
A. Tekié  !114
mismanagement and power dynamics within the communities themselves is to bypass perhaps 
the most influential external factor: the capacity and interests of government land reform 
institutions. 
5.2.2.2.  Blurred lines of post-settlement support 
Did the RLCC officials recommend Crystal Holdings in good faith, and then, a few 
weeks later, genuinely believe they had made a mistake and try to reverse it?  Perhaps, although 
it would not account for all of their actions, and their reputation suggests otherwise.  However, 
the boundaries between corruption and incompetence at the Commission are unclear.  The KZN 
Review notes the tension at the Commission in regards to its role in providing communities with 
support once claims have been settled: 
In practice, the focus of the CRLR has expanded to take responsibility for a variety of 
project needs which lie beyond its mandate and competence. These include taking 
responsibility for post-settlement outcomes, resolving ongoing community and local 
political economy disputes, and taking responsibility for broader local economic 
development issues. These all lie beyond the legal and administrative scope of the 
restitution function, and they detract from the core tasks of the restitution process.  
(Genesis Analytics, 2014, p. x) 
While post settlement support was not part of the RLCC mandate, this support was so 
desperately lacking in the Land Restitution programme that  the Commission often was obliged 
to get involved, whether or not it had capacity.  In the case of the Crystal Holdings partnership, 
one may argue that the Commission went too far in trying to force paths of action that the CPIs 
did not want.  Even years later, after the court interdict and the RLCCs refusal to provide support 
and withholding of promised grants, the commissioner and project officer are still interfering in 
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Gayede affairs, presenting lists of trustees for election, and meeting with the community to sway 
its support of the Board.     Even if the RLCC was acting in good faith, and believed that CPI 117
leadership was not acting in the community’s best interests, the questions arises at what point 
should the government step back and let the community make the decisions on use of land that is 
officially theirs?  At what point might government interference be doing more harm than good? 
5.2.3.  Sources of internal conflict  
It is within this context of corruption and maladministration at the regional office 
overseeing land reform that corruption and elite capture have set in at the Amangcolosi 
Community Trust.  Disputes have arisen over two primary issues:  the role of non-beneficiaries 
on the Board of Trustees (and the resulting expenditures), and alleged corruption by the Ithuba 
executive. 
5.2.3.1.  Non-beneficiary trustees 
According to a founding Ngcolosi trustee, the RLCC advised them to have non-
beneficiaries on the board of the founding Trust, who could provide objective viewpoint, 
independent governance, and specialised skills or expertise to the Trust as it developed. For 
subsequent boards, trustees should be beneficiaries.   This is in line with legal practice around 118
trusts (not specific to land reform) which finds it is advisable to appoint at least one non-
beneficiary trustee to promote the independence of the trust.  (Lee Attorneys, 2015).  In the case 
of the Amangcolosi, at least half of the founding trustees (including the chairperson) were non-
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beneficiaries, some of whom were involved in helping the claimants lodge the initial claim.   119
Clause 13.4 of the Amangcolosi Community Trust Deed states the following: 
Save for the initial Trustees, all future appointments of Trustees shall be made with due 
regard to the eligibility requirements that all Trustees serving from time to time shall be 
persons who are themselves members.  (ACT, 2012, p. 11) 
 The subsequent clause states that should any legal regulation or statute require them to 
have non-beneficiaries on the Board, such persons would be nominated for election.  When the 
Trust Deed was amended in 2012 and the Board changed, nine of the eleven resulting board 
members were non-beneficiaries, completely flouting these regulations. 
 According to the Trust Deed (ACT 2012), Trustees have “complete and absolute 
discretion” with how funds are spent, provided they fall within the mandate of the Trust.  This 
mandate is laid out as follows: 
1) To acquire and hold land in common for the benefit of its’ members.   
2) Further to this main objective, to 
- carry on activities for the development of the community and improvement of 
quality of life of the members 
- secure and hold additional assets and property 
- raise funds, set trading companies, and purchase property 
- invest with an accredited financial institution. 
 Beneficiaries have complained that trust funds are going to projects which benefit the 
broad Ngcolosi community or individuals, but not the beneficiary community specifically.  This 
 As the researcher was not able to access a copy of the beneficiary list, she was reliant on informants to 119
note who is and is not a beneficiary of the land claim.  If there are internal disputes over beneficiary status, 
this may have impacted informant responses which cannot be considered definitive.  However, the 
interviews did corroborate each other (including some from outside the community).
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is clearly the case in the building of the school and dip tanks which are open to all Amangcolosi.  
The memorandum, however, presents further allegations of  non-beneficiaries being given 
bursaries, voting at AGMs, and even being paid shareholder dividends, in exchange for political 
support of the current leadership. This too is in direct contradiction to the Trust Deed. The 
‘Principle of Equity’ is given as the overarching principle governing the decisions of the trustees, 
“which shall require that the trustees deal with the assets of the Trust and confer benefits 
hereunder only for the benefit of the members…” (ACT, 2012, p. 5)  
 The chief supports the notion that Trust projects must be for the benefit of the broader 
community: 
I would say it is not only the 400 trustees that benefit, the whole community does because 
if we build a school it will not only cater for the children of the 400 trust families, it will 
cater for everybody. If we build dip tanks, it’s for every member of the community. Every 
single member of the community benefits.  120
In a 2014 interview, the former chairperson responded as follows when questioned whether there 
was conflict from Amangcolosi who were outside the claimant community: 
No, the problems comes mainly from the 400 beneficiaries. Amongst them there are 
those who want only beneficiaries to benefit, whereas we believe we all should benefit, 
and if we develop we should develop as a community. Then there are those who say 
people who are not owners of the land should be left aside. So we have to put them in line 
and win them over because we believe what we do should affect everybody in the 
community.   121
 When the government has spent such large sums of money to restore land, it does seem 
fitting that the project should benefit as many people as possible.  Yet when the majority of the 
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trustees are not from the claimant community, it is hard to ignore a measure of self-interest in the 
above statement.     
 In an article on tenure arrangements in land reform, Lahiff touches on this issue precisely, 
noting that trusts are “considered unsuitable for land reform projects because they vest 
ownership in non-beneficiaries (the trustees) who are not democratically accountable to the 
beneficiaries.” (Lahiff, 2009)  Beyond this, there is little discussion in academic literature of the 
issue of non-beneficiaries acting as trustees in land reform projects, and the researcher was not 
able to find similar situations in other land reform cases. 
When asked why a trust was chosen as the legal form of CPI, one of the founding 
trustees, not himself a beneficiary, responded that they had felt a trust would ensure that “the 
members of the community have power over their land.” In reality, it has resulted in the exact 
opposite: through the structure of the trust and election of non-beneficiaries, the beneficiaries 
have placed control over their land almost entirely into the hands of those who are outside the 
claimant community.  
5.2.3.2.   Elite capture 
There is also dissent at the agricultural company.  Interviews with Ithuba employees in 
February 2014 were, as reported above, overwhelmingly positive.  A year later, in March 2015, 
the attitude seemed to be changing.  Management was complaining that employees were lazy and 
disgruntled.  Employees complained that they had been given an annual increase of only R2, and 
that the CEO had increased the standard task of weeding 100 rows of cane to 140 and then to 180 
without increasing their pay.  (Their were also rumours that employees had been moved to 
A. Tekié  !119
seasonal rather than full time status and that some were not being consistently paid.  However 
these latter allegations could not be verified.)  There was at least one instance of employees 
burning a sugar cane field in protest.  The new operations manager had seemed optimistic and 
committed in his new position.  Six months later, he had left the company, reportedly due to 
frustration with management.     122
Reflecting back on Koch’s classification (Section 3.1.3) of what drives conflict in 
community based natural resources management, three of the five sources are relevant to the 
Ngcolosi case.  Initially, the conflict reported in interviews was primarily around residential and 
grazing rights over commercial land use, which falls into Koch’s category of ‘competing 
livelihood strategies’.  Although the issue simmers, it seems to have been generally resolved 
through communication, firm leadership, and, perhaps most importantly, sharing of benefits from 
Ithuba profits.  Another relevant source of conflict is the ‘fluidity of communities’ which touches 
on the issue described above of non-beneficiary trustees, and where the boundaries of 
community are drawn in spreading the benefits. 
More recently the conflict between the community and leadership centres around 
‘competition for benefits at the time of success’.  One aspect of this is known as ‘elite capture’.  
As Grant (2011) notes, 
Within the South African Land Reform process, elites are able to access position of 
power due to their status, significantly influencing community dynamics and politics, to 
affect the land transfer processes and subsequent development strategies and land use 
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management. Such elites often take the form of western educated individuals, and/or 
traditional authorities. (p. 57)   
If there is any validity to the slew of allegations against the current CEO, this is exactly 
what has happened at Ithuba. He is accused of embezzlement and abuse of power on several 
fronts (see Section 4.6), including outright theft of Ithuba funds.   
The CEO was brought on because of his business and financial skills, which are often 
lacking amongst land reform communities. Indeed, with these skills he was able to expose the 
mismanagement of funds by Crystal Holdings.  He was respected by colleagues and partners for 
his business acumen, which has been a core factor in Ithuba’s ongoing success.  Those same 
skills, however, are what allow for capture of resources and power when personal interests 
become prioritised.   
5.2.4.  Modes of conflict resolution 
Research limitations prevented an in-depth understanding of how conflict is managed and 
resolved in the Ngcolosi land reform project.  As noted in Section 2.3, access to the broader 
community was limited, not all answers could be verified or supported, and the conflict was far 
deeper and more complex than initially anticipated.  However, there was one striking find in this 
area.  In discussions with leaders at Ithuba, the Trust and the Tribal Authority, the same theme 
was recurring across interviews: when disputes arise, they sit together to discuss the problem and 
sort it out, whether it be at the foot of the iNkosi, in the Boardroom, or at Workers’ Council 
meeting.   
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Later, in interviews outside Ithuba, a very different picture of conflict management 
emerged, especially regarding the current power struggle and corruption allegations.  The two 
groups are by no means sitting together under the proverbial tree to sort out their differences.  
Rather, they are taking each other to court, in a dozen ongoing cases over both petty and 
substantial charges.  They are organising employee strikes and marches and burning sugar cane 
fields.  They are hiring hit men to have opposition leaders killed.    123
Multiple informants mentioned visiting their lawyer or going to court, which is notable in 
a rural area where people have limited disposable income and the tribal council is traditionally 
responsible for mediation.  In some cases it seems the courts have become another platform for 
political tussles, a tool used alongside strikes and guns.  The use of local courts to hash out 
power struggles is not limited to this case.  In Midlands, a case study of farm violence and race 
relations in rural KZN, Jonny Steinburg (2002) noted this phenomenon precisely:  
And when democracy came and they were still tenants of white landlords, they began to 
fight a scrappy and opportunistic campaign.  They learned the country’s new laws 
quickly, and they used them as hardened and brutal men do. (p. 179) 
That said, the courts, and the Constitution behind them, may be the last hope for people 
who are trying to fight for their rights and their land.  It is the court which forced the former 
Gayede Trustees to hand the paperwork over the new board so they can rebuild Mkuzangwe.  It 
is the court which supported the communities when they wanted to get down to business and 
start farming operations with Crystal Holdings against the wishes of the RLCC. It is the court to 
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which the Ngcolosi beneficiaries are looking when their trustees refuse to engage with them over 
allegations of corruption. 
5.2.5.  Role of the traditional authority 
With the explicit responsibility of mediation within the community, and as a figurehead 
of the land claim project, the Ngcolosi chief should hold some responsibility in addressing and 
resolving the breaches in governance and allegations of corruption. Where does the traditional 
authority sit in these particular disputes?  In 2010, Ithuba Agriculture and the Trust presented the 
chief with new Toyota Fortuner vehicle.  “Upon receiving the car, the Chief thanked the 
Directors and Trustees saying that the new car will enable him to attend important meetings and 
to visit the people in his community.” (Ithuba Agriculture, 2010, p. 12) The current iNkosi does 
not have the reputation of a strong chief.  Many feel that his relative youth, lack of wealth, and 
well known drinking problem compromise his stature as a chief, and possibly his allegiances.  
Those battling the current leadership do not feel it is worthwhile to bring the charges to the 
iNkosi, as he is aligned with the trustees.   
5.2.6.  Weak links: governance and accountability 
The AmaNgcolosi Community Trust and Ithuba were an exemplary land claim project.  
They had strong leadership, with the support of both the community and the tribal authority.  
They had a successful, reputable agricultural business which consistently grew in profitability, 
and employed hundreds of workers on fair terms.  Finally, those profits were distributed in 
shareholder payments, and a number of verifiable community projects were developed.   
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Recent claims of corruption and elite capture by non-beneficiary trustees and the CEO 
have not been substantiated in court, but they have been corroborated by a variety of informants 
with divergent interests (including a former financial manager at Ithuba, and locals from within 
and outside of the community), and substantiated by contextual factors, such as obvious decline 
in farm quality, irregular expenditures, disgruntled employees, and abnormally high turnover in 
management.  In 2012, there was an investigation by the Hawkes, a directorate within the South 
African Police Force mandated with serious organised crime and corruption, into Ithuba 
finances. They did an extensive investigation in Kranskop, but in the end nothing came of it.  It 
is reported that they went into a boardroom with the CEO, and then left Kranskop with no further 
questioning.  124
 There is debate around exactly who among formerly disadvantaged South Africans should         
benefit from land reform, and there are divergent opinions on whether it should be the poor 
majority, often rural subsistence farmers, or whether it should be the small middle layer of 
emerging professional black farmers, who have the education and capital to create a new sector 
of black large scale commercial farming.   Although the political language of land reform is 125
directed at the rural poor, many would argue that the government policies are more interested in 
supporting the latter.  As Ben Cousins (2013) quoted in an article on elite capture in the land 
redistribution program: 
“I guess elite capture is part of the process,” DRDLR Director General Mdu Shabane 
conceded at last week’s meeting with MPs. “We’ve seen people coming from nothing and 
becoming so powerful. They have a vision of saying they want to make a billion. I think 
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that’s exactly what we want them to do. We need to restore the class of black commercial 
farmers destroyed by the 1913 land act.” (para. 14)  
 A white farmer from the Kranskop surrounds seemed to feel that elite capture is simply a         
necessary evil. The CEO’s extensive political connections are instrumental in bringing funds to 
the project, and he has the strategic skills to hold it all together.  He may be stealing money, but 
on the other hand, without him the whole thing would probably fall apart.  126
 Those closer to the project, however, assert the exact opposite.  With the falling quality of         
the farms, disgruntled employee relations, and a group of angry beneficiaries, the prioritisation of 
personal interests over community interests is about to destroy everything that the Trust and 
beneficiaries have worked so hard to build over the last 10 years. 
The burning question, then, is what went wrong?  Where was the weak link which 
allowed strong, established institutions to be corrupted? 
5.2.6.1.  Red flags on governance 
Any exploration of the roots of corruption must start with governance.  The Trust seemed 
to have the right principles and structures in place for good governance.  As described above in 
Section 4.5, trustees are elected by the claimant community, on a five year term; AGMs are held 
consistently every year; good financial systems are in place with annual audits; there is clear 
legal and financial separation between the Trust and the company; and the Trust Deed (ACT, 
2012) lays out clear criteria and processes regarding membership criteria, rights, and obligations.  
There are clauses in place to ensure financial transparency, protect resources from being 
exploited by individual or non-beneficiary interests, and to promote fair and objective arbitration 
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in case of a dispute. The Deed also protects the right of women to be both members and trustees; 
however, as it does not require a minimum number of female trustees, it is not effective in 
preventing gender bias among the leadership.   
At a closer look, however, the research has raised several red flags in regards to Trust 
governance: 
 Irregular trustee elections and termination: As the Trust was founded in 2004, and the Deed 
calls for five-year terms of trustees, there should have been two elections.  However, there has 
only been only one change in trustees registered with the Master of the High Court, in 2012. 
(ACT, 2012)  Trust leaders say that trustees have been replaced gradually, rather than through a 
full election, to protect the ethos and culture of the board.   Critics of the current board 127
complain that elections are rigged: when a space on the board is open, the trustees bring their 
own nominations and let people choose from among them.  128
Interestingly, the current Trust Deed (amended from the original in 2012) includes the 
following clause: 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary hereinbefore contained, a two-thirds majority 
of the Trustees in office at any time…shall be entitled to remove any one or more of the  
Trustees as they may consider to be necessary and appropriate to the interests of the 
Trust”, provided that the Trustee is given ten days notice and the opportunity to address 
fellow Trustees regarding the reasons for his/her removal. (ACT, 2012, p.12) 
In other words, a majority group of board members can simply remove any trustee who is 
perceived as problematic.  ‘The interests of the Trust’ can be loosely interpreted, opening wide 
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the opportunity for a few strong leaders to gain support, and then remove any trustee who 
opposes them.  In the words of one trustee “if you mess around with [us], [we] will show you the 
door.”    This is exactly what happened, with several trustees being kicked off the board before 129
their term was finished.  It was presented as getting rid of the “rotten apples’’ to preserve unity 
and integrity,  but it could also be straightforward capture of the Board by the interests of a 130
few.  131
Non beneficiary trustees: In the case of the Amangcolosi, those few are not actually 
beneficiaries of the land claim, and they have filled the board with others who are also not 
beneficiaries, with only two claimants on the Board.    For non-beneficiaries to control the 132
board, they would have to have a majority control, for the nature of self-governance is that 
trustees who are beneficiaries would generally not be supportive of decisions which are not in 
interests of the beneficiary community.   
Ithuba Board accountability:  The Ithuba Board is comprised of four members. (Ithuba 
Agriculture, 2011) Two of these, the Ithuba CEO and the founding Chairperson of the Trust, are 
also trustees.   The Ithuba Board of Directors is directly accountable to the Amangcolosi 133
Community Trust.  If 50% of the Ithuba Board also sits on the Trust Board (and are among its 
most powerful members), governance is not independent, and accountability of the Ithuba Board 
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is compromised.  As long as those individuals can maintain the support of their fellow trustees, 
they can do what they like at Ithuba.  This may be why the current CEO has gotten away with 
taking over the roles of human resource management and financial management. 
Irregular expenditures and breaches of Trust Deed:  Claimants have alleged that Trust 
funds are being spent on personal projects, inflated tenders and shareholder payments to non-
beneficiaries.  Many of these irregular expenditures are fully visible: for example, a church built 
with Trust funds to support the religious affiliation of a (non-beneficiary) trustee; large supply 
contracts given, without a tender process, to family members or affiliates of trustees;  non-
beneficiaries given bursaries (despite a clause precluding the Trust from making grants or loans, 
“save to or for the benefit of persons who are members”. (ACT, 2012, p. 23)).  These are listed in 
full in Section 4.6. 
Lack of financial transparency: Multiple claimants have been denied access to the Trust’s 
financial statements.  Furthermore, there was a change in auditors from an internationally 
recognised firm to a small local firm, which beneficiaries suspect was done to cover up financial 
irregularities.  134
Thus, although the right governance structures are in place, they have been breached 
repeatedly and without disciplinary repercussions.  It seems the Amangcolosi Community Trust 
has good governance structures, but has poor governance. 
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5.2.6.2.  Insufficient accountability  
The AmaNgcolosi trustees are accountable to the Trust beneficiaries, as elected 
representatives, and to the Master of the High Court in the Department of Justice.  As noted in 
the literature on trusts, the High Court is an inappropriate monitor of land reform CPIs. It is 
distanced from the policies and issues around land reform projects, as these issues comprise only 
a fraction of the Court’s responsibilities.  Furthermore, it has no legal mandate to monitor these 
trusts, and so will only be aware of problems if they are brought to the court by legal action.  
(SDC, 2007b) Situated in a tribal authority, the Trust is also under the oversight of the iNkosi, 
who would be expected to take action if community resources were co-opted.  However, if the 
iNkosi chooses for any reason not to act, the Trust has virtually no oversight other than that of its 
members.  If trustees can suppress internal disputes, they can continue to exploit the 
community’s common resources for their own short term interest. 
The final clause of the AmaNgcolosi Trust Deed is entitled “Trustees’ Discretion” and 
reads: 
“Save as hereinbefore otherwise stipulated, where discretions are vested in the Trustees, 
such discretions shall be complete and absolute, and any decision made by them 
pursuant to such discretionary powers shall not be challengeable by any member or 
any other person affected thereby, provided the trustees conform to the Main Objects 
of the Trust, and to the other terms, conditions, and principles of this Trust Deed.” (ACT, 
2012, p.27, emphasis added)  
5.2.6.3.  The Role of the trust structure 
The situation of the Amangcolosi Community Trust exhibits exactly the reasons for the 
creation of the CPA Act:  decision-making at the Trust is controlled by a small group of 
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individuals, rather than through democratic process; the Trust has little accountability and 
oversight from the state; and leadership structures have little to no female representation.   
The CPA was intended as a more democratic and accountable legal entity in land reform.  
However, as noted in the literature review, CPAs face many of the same challenges as Trusts.   A 
parliamentary briefing on CPIs (DRDLR, 2010) noted the following challenges, categorised by 
type of legal entity: 
Challenges to Trusts Challenges to CPAs
Abuse of power: Trustees do not always 
act in the best interest of beneficiaries, or in a 
democratic way. 
Abuse of Power: Allocation of rights 
to members not sufficiently clarified (few 
individuals amass power and rights for 
themselves)
Conflict with traditional authorities: 
Traditional authorities and trustees have 
disputes over management of communal land. 
Conflict with traditional authorities: 
Legal entities do not operate properly when 
co-existing with traditional leadership
Poor Governance: Failure of Trusts to 
hold Annual General Meetings and failure to 
provide financial and operations reports.
Forced communities: Nature & size of 
land reform grants compelled individual 
households into communal ownership of 
land.
Poor Governance:Failure to hold elective 
meetings where the term of Trustees has 
expired. 
Gender bias: Membership of CPAs 
based on families and not individuals. –
giving powers to heads of households, 
mainly males 
Lack of accountability: Lack of capacity 
in the Master’s Office to hold trustees 
accountable in terms of Section 16 of the Trust 
Act.
Lack of accountability: Lack of 
monitoring of CPAs –impacts on the 
accountability of CPA Committees to their 
members 
A. Tekié  !130
 
Both types of CPIs struggle with abuse of power, tension with tribal authorities, and lack 
of accountability.  Though not listed above, gender bias is just as much an issue for trusts as for 
CPAs (if not more) - in fact, gender bias of trusts was one of the motivators for establishing 
CPAs in the first place.  CPAs, for their part, do have widespread issues with poor governance.  
(eg., SDC, 2007b) 
Would outcomes be different, then, if the AmaNgcolosi land was held by a CPA rather 
than a trust?  Potentially,  
• Trust expenditures would decided by vote at the AGM, rather than by executive decision 
of Trustees. 
• Leaders would be more directly accountable to their members, and would not hold 
“complete and absolute discretion” on Trust decisions. 
• As a direct democracy, it would be more difficult for non-beneficiaries to take control 
over a CPA. 
• The DRDLR would have oversight over CPA governance, and could intervene in cases of 
corruption or mismanagement of resources, as well as mediate disputes. (RSA, 1996).  
This may be more direct and effective than going through the court system. 
However, the chart above particularly notes that CPAs are also marred by abuse of power, 
with few individuals amassing power for themselves, just as in the Trust.  For example, the 
Ravele CPA in Limpopo received its land the same year as the Amangcolosi. 10 years later, and 
Lack of accountability: Failure to use 
(to the fullest extent) remedies provided in 
the CPA Act for Department to intervene. 
FIGURE 6: COMPARISON OF CHALLENGES OF TRUSTS & CPAS
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despite successful commercial farming enterprise, claimants have not reaped any benefits from 
the land, and there are rumours of non-beneficiaries receiving payments.   The claimants and the 
DRDLR have taken the tribal authority to court for hijacking the CPA for their own interests.  
(Timse, 2015) 
In land reform experience, the legal structure of the CPA does not seem be substantially 
more effective at preventing elite capture and poor governance than that of the trust. The most 
important difference is the CPA’s line of the accountability to the DRDLR, which can provide 
both support for post-settlement operations, as well as oversight and regulation when things go 
wrong, as they are doing in the case of the Ravele. 
However, given the poor (albeit improving) DRDLR monitoring of CPAs, as well as the 
layers of corruption and poor administration at the DRDLR and the RLCC, in some cases 
Departmental accountability may not be any more effective or efficient than the court system.  
5.3.  Reflections on governing the commons 
The AmaNgcolosi story was chosen for this research because of its exceptional success in 
building a land restitution initiative that is profitable and delivering benefit to the claimants and 
the local economy.  Perhaps most importantly, it provides an example of how land reform can 
work despite the challenges.  Critical in this case were  
1. strong and united leadership, with the traditional authority playing a supportive, rather 
than leading role;  
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2. an effective JV partnership to provide technical capacity and access to networks and 
finance often unavailable to land reform communities; and  
3. highly fertile land in a land-reform friendly industry, illustrating the importance of the 
quality of the resource communities have to work with, and the critical role of the 
market environment.   
However, perhaps the most interesting implications for commons management are from 
the potential jeopardisation of the AmaNgcolosi success, through alleged co-option of power and 
resources.   This final section looks at the role of leadership in successful commons management, 
and how corruption at state agencies impacts governance of the commons.  
5.3.1.  Leadership in the commons 
When looking at the Ngcolosi success factors, it is difficult to rank one as more important 
than another.  The strength of Ithuba is in these factors coexisting and successfully reinforcing 
each other, in a virtuous cycle.  That said, strong leadership is an overarching factor.  The trustees 
were effective in building a vision and making the right decisions to realise it successfully, as 
well as in maintaining the support of the community and the tribal authority.  Leadership from 
the JV partner and their management team was foundational in building effective long term 
business structures and high-yield farming processes. Each case of land restitution will have its 
own context-specific assets, challenges and model of land use: the key is effective leadership 
which can work with and around these to envision and fulfil the potential of the land. 
The logic of collective action follows that if members of a group have a common 
objective that is of benefit to all, they will rationally act to achieve that objective. (Olson, 1965, 
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as cited in Ostrom 1990, p.5)  However, at the heart of this, and of the tragedy of the commons, 
is the problem of the ‘free-rider’.  As Ostrom explains, “Whenever one person cannot be 
excluded from the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the 
joint effort, but to free-ride on the efforts of others.” (Ibid, p.6)   
The problem of the free-rider is central to commons management, and often leads to an 
inability of groups to effectively coordinate and fix a platform or programme of action.  (Van 
Belle, 1996)  The role of leaders is to overcome this paralysis and mobilise membership.   In a 
global study of communal management of fisheries, Gutiérrez, Hilborn, & Defeo (2011) found 
that strong leadership was the most important attribute contributing to success.  
Presence of at least one singular individual with entrepreneurial skills, highly motivated, 
respected as a local leader and making a personal commitment to the co-management 
implementation process, was essential.  Legitimate community leaders, when guided by 
collective interests and not self-benefits, give resilience to changes in governance, 
influence users’ compliance to regulations, and enhance conflict resolutions…(pp. 
387-388) 
The legal structure of a Trust may have facilitated elite capture at Ithuba, but it may also 
have facilitated the firm and decisive leadership which is in part responsible for Ithuba’s success.  
If decision-making was more democratic, disputes and divergent interests would also be more 
likely to paralyse decision making.  For instance, the decision to initially retain the Crystal 
Holdings, despite heavy pressure from the RLCC and resulting in withdrawal of all government 
grants, ultimately was a key factor in the company’s success, but could easily have exploded into 
internal disputes in a more democratic structure, or ended up in stagnation, waiting for a 
sufficient quorum to vote at the AGM. 
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Strong and effective leadership and elite capture can unfortunately become two sides of 
the same coin.  In an article on leadership in collective action, Van Belle (1996) proposes that:  
individuals initiate the formation of groups for collective activity or join early in the 
collective activity, with the expectation of becoming the leadership of the group.  As the 
leadership of the group, they expect to reap additional benefits, leadership benefits, that 
are highly significant in comparison to the other values involved in the collective action. 
(p. 111) 
This aligns with Robert Michel’s famous ‘Iron Law of Oligarchy’, which argues that no 
matter how democratic an organisation, a small group of leaders will ultimately take power.  
Initially this is necessary to facilitate decision making and action, but once ensconced as leaders, 
these elite few will work to maintain their positions.  In solidarity with each other, they will work 
together in fending off criticisms, and even resort to co-opting rank-and-file members to suppress 
resistance. (Tolbert, 2010)    
Herein lies the importance of external oversight in commons management. 
 5.3.2  Accountability and corruption:  Covenants with broken swords 
The Ngcolosi story emphasises the importance of CPI accountability in land reform. “If 
private interests cannot be expected to protect the public domain, then external regulation by 
public agencies, governments, or international authorities is needed.”  (Ehrenfield, 1972, as cited 
in Ostrom, 1990, p.9)  In a study of fisheries management, de la Torre-Castro (2006) concluded 
that “a crucial factor for improving results is the institutionalisation of any kind of monitoring 
efforts. Without the involvement of the state and the consideration of national policies and goals, 
projects are less likely to succeed.” (p.11)  This may be particularly important when  
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1. restored land is being used commercially, and thus claimants are not involved in day to 
day decisions 
2. when the CPI has substantial layers of hierarchy, such as in a trust, that create power 
differentials between leadership and the community. 
Part of recent DRDLR proposed policy reforms for communal land tenure included:  
pro-active and reactive intervention powers of the Registrar of CPAs… [which] will have 
the necessary powers to investigate and report on irregularities, call on CPAs to account, 
ensure adequate document retention and access to required documentation (internally and 
externally). (Gobodo, 2014, p. 6) 
However, the question that arises in this case study is where do the layers of that external 
regulation end?  Ithuba is regulated by the Trust, and the Trust is regulated by the national 
government, via the High Court and the DRDLR.  If even the external regulator is exploiting the 
resource for private benefit, as is the case in this story and in much of the global commons, what 
next? 
Communal property management with and without state oversight have been termed 
‘covenant with swords' and ‘covenant without swords’, respectively.  In exploring how 
government corruption impacts governance of the commons, Sundström (2014) introduces the 
concept of a ‘covenant with broken swords’.  “In situations with corruption, the likelihood of 
achieving sustainable outcomes for management of CPRs [common pool resources] is severely 
decreased.” (p. 25)  This is a critical issue for the new institutions rising to manage the commons, 
such as the commons trusts described in Section 3.1.2; where does final accountability lie?  
Sundström continues: 
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the destructive effects from corruption on governance of the commons… is a big 
challenge for scholars and policy-makers. How to tackle the fact that CPRs around the 
world – for instance, the tropical forest reserves that are key in global efforts to store 
carbon and protect biodiversity – are monitored by institutions that are infested with 
corruption? (p. 231) 
De la Torre-Castro (2006) suggests that when state agencies are involved in corruption 
and rent-seeking, bottom-up initiatives may improve monitoring. (p.11) The importance of the 
legal structure of a CPI arises here: ultimately, if the external regulator (the DRDLR) is corrupt 
or otherwise unable to fulfill its role, it falls back to the claimants to hold their fellow members 
and/or leaders in check.  The CPA, which prescribes direct accountability of leadership to the 
claimants and more democratic decision making than trusts, may therefore in principle be a 
better option for communal management of restored land.  The policy reforms noted above 
included the institutionalisation of use rights in which governance structures are accountable to 
households. (Gobodo, 2014) 
Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003) advocate for coordinating governance structures, at 
different scales: 
Institutional arrangements must be complex, redundant, and nested in many layers. … 
[They] must use mixtures of types (e.g. hierarchies, markets, community self-
governance) that employ a variety of decision rules to change incentives, increase 
information, monitor use, and enforce sanctions.  (p. 14) 
In the case of the Amangcolosi, such checks and balances may still rein in exploitation of 
power by leaders.  The claimant community has stood up to the corruption, and they are using 
the court to try to end exploitation and enforce their shared rights and governance principles as 
enshrined in the Trust Deed.  Furthermore, the Tribal Authority may under internal or external 
pressure, step up to end the corruption, as the decline of Ithuba would be a huge loss to the 
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chieftaincy and the community as a whole.   Finally, there has been increasing attention on the 
corruption at the KZN RLCC, which may result in a change in officials, and more accountable 
oversight of restitution projects.  One or all of these may happen, or none of them may, and 
Ithuba may continue to degrade as have so many land reform projects.  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
6.1.  Review of research aims, literature & methodology 
 This research was borne out of an interest in how a remarkably successful land restitution 
project has managed to avoid the pitfalls and overcome the barriers of post-settlement land use 
that have plagued so many communities.  Through an in-depth case study of the Amangcolosi 
Community Trust experience, in comparison with the case of the neighbouring Gayede trust, it 
aimed to understand  
1. What is unique about the Amangcolosi experience that led to success where many others 
CPIs, especially Gayede, have failed? 
  Over the course of the research, allegations of corruption and misuse of resources 
surfaced, revealing a much more complex and multi-dimensional case than was initially 
anticipated.  In addition to understanding why the Amangcolosi were able to succeed so 
remarkably, a subsequent question had to be explored: 
2. What factors have allowed elite capture to jeopardised that success?  
  Having explored what factors allowed the Amangcolosi to succeed, as well as what 
facilitated co-option of common resources, the final aim of the research was to understand what 
light the Amangcolosi case could shed on the challenges of common property management: 
3. Are there transferrable lessons for governing the commons? 
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This final question refers both to the practical aspects of CPI management in South African land 
reform, and the broader global challenge of how common pool resources can be effectively and 
sustainably managed for long term benefit. 
 The key areas of literature that informed this study were as follows: 
 Governing the commons: This is the debate around how common pool resources can 
effectively be managed to prevent exploitation and preserve the resource for long term use.  Key 
issues include whether privatisation or state regulation are the only means of preventing 
individual exploitation of the group resource (known as the tragedy of the commons) or whether 
communities can self regulate successfully over the long term.  This is particularly relevant as 
most land restitution claims in South Africa, as well as many redistribution projects, transfer land 
ownership to a group of people, rather than to individuals. 
 The challenges of effective land use in post-settlement land reform cases: This centres 
particularly around Community Property Institutions (CPIs), which face common challenges of 
governance and administrative capacity, lack of technical expertise, and insufficient post-
settlement support and accountability from government.  Furthermore, once land has been 
restored, internal community dynamics are in some cases the biggest barrier to successful land 
use.  Power struggles, conflict over how to use resources, and elite capture of resources are the 
undoing of numerous land reform projects throughout South Africa. 
 The influence of external actors: The community dynamics underpinning land reform, as 
well as the potential for a CPI’s success, do not play out in isolation; they are heavily impacted 
by other actors outside the claimant community.  Especially relevant are the roles of the 
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Department of Rural Development and Land Reform, where operations are hindered by 
insufficient resources and corruption; Traditional Authorities, who often attempt to undermine 
the power and land rights of CPIs; and commercial partners, who have varying motivations and 
capacity for assisting land reform communities, and can make or break the project in cases where 
communities continue to farm the land commercially. 
 To answer the three research questions, the qualitative case study method was used, with 
a secondary case for comparative purposes.  Research tools were entirely qualitative as well, 
including semi-structured in-depth interviews, informal focus groups, and document analysis.  35 
interviews were conducted, with 27 informants, in two field trips supplemented by telephone 
interviews over the course of a year.  
6.2.  Key points of findings and analysis 
 Key findings were as follows: 
6.2.1.  What factors allowed the Amangcolosi to succeed where others failed?   
1. The land restored to the Amangcolosi was highly fertile, and the sugar and timber 
industries are particularly open to working with land reform communities, which 
facilitated access to start-up capital, credit as needed, and accessible markets. 
2. The leadership of the Trust had a strong vision and was effective in realising it.  They 
made the right business decisions in their oversight of Ithuba, and of equal or greater 
importance, they managed to maintain overall support of both the community and the 
traditional authority. 
3. The joint-venture partner and their management team had in-depth knowledge and 
experience in making commercial agriculture profitable.  They were able to raise the 
necessary start-up capital, build a remarkably efficient and effective farming 
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business, and put in place the right governance and HR structures to keep the 
business profitable over the long term. 
 These ‘inputs’ resulted in good capacity and governance at the CPI, financial viability of 
the venture, and ongoing support from the community.  It was noted that the success of the 
business in the short-term was critical in retaining support from the claimants, as they could see 
early on the potential benefits of the project.  On the other hand, community support also 
reinforced the success of the business, as farming operations are often foiled by power struggles, 
delayed decision making, and community conflict in land reform projects.  
6.2.2.  What factors allowed elite capture to jeopardise that success?  
 Although the Amangcolosi Community Trust has strong governance structures, standards 
of governance have slipped. In direct contradiction to the principles of the Trust Deed, the 
current Board of Trustees is dominated by non-beneficiaries, which impacts how funds are spent 
and who receives benefits.  Furthermore, there are substantiated allegations that the CEO of 
Ithuba is stealing funds and mismanaging the company, and that individual trustees are abusing 
their power for personal benefit of themselves and their supporters.   
  What has allowed for governance standards to slip without repercussions?  First of all, 
the legal structure of the trust gives trustees ‘complete and absolute discretion’ over much of the 
decision making on use of land and resources.  While this may have made it easier for trustees to 
govern efficiently and build a successful company, it also creates greater hierarchy between 
trustees and the claimants, making it more difficult for the claimant community to reproach 
trustees.  Certain clauses in the Deed of Trust (which was revised in 2012) reinforce this 
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hierarchy, stating that a trustee can be kicked off the board if other trustees if they deem it 
necessary, and that members shall not challenge the decisions of the trustees.  Furthermore, trusts 
are accountable to the high court rather than the DRDLR, and so have little oversight or 
monitoring from the department, which could interfere if a CPA was in a similar situation.  
 Secondly, layers of corruption and mismanagement at the RLCC/DRDLR have actually  
fuelled problems at the Amangcolosi Trust. From the beginning, land claims were not properly 
verified and borders between Ngcolosi and Mkhabela land were poorly researched, aggravating 
conflict between the communities and limiting chances of success for the Mkhabela’s Gayede 
Trust.  There are also indicators that the Regional Commissioner and/or other RLCC staff 
members are in collusion with the corruption at Ithuba, and are also benefitting from the funds.  
This would not be unusual; reports of corruption and abuse of power by the KZN RLCC are 
echoing throughout the province.  The department cannot, then, be expected to enforce good 
governance at the Trust.  In the meantime, claimants are in the process of taking Trustees to court 
over the allegations.  
 In principle, methods of conflict resolution through dialogue and mediation exist at all 
levels of the Amangcolosi project; however, current disputes have degenerated into demands, 
strikes, violence, and legal action.  Although the Amangcolosi traditional authority has been a 
help to the Trust (rather than a hindrance as in so many other land reform cases), until now the 
chief seems to have also turned a blind eye to the corruption allegations.  
A. Tekié  !143
6.2.3.  Are there transferrable lessons for governing the commons? 
  Strong leadership, from both the Trustees and the JV partner, is the overarching factor 
accounting for the Amangcolosi success.  Leadership has been noted as a critical requirement of 
successful collective action, to overcome the paralysis that occurs when group ownership dilutes 
responsibility and individuals wait for someone else to act.  However, as explained by Michel’s 
‘iron law of oligarchy’, once leaders are in power, they will inevitably collude and suppress 
resistance in order to retain their position and its benefits, resulting in control of the group 
resources by an elite few.  This is helpful in understanding what may have happened at the 
Amangcolosi Community Trust.  It also underlines the critical importance of accountability and 
oversight of communal management in land reform - particularly when there are substantial 
layers of hierarchy within the community or CPI, and claimants are not involved in day to day 
land use, as is often the case when restored land is farmed as a commercial venture. 
  A critical question in both the literature on governing the commons, and in this case 
study, is who regulates the regulator?  Oversight must not only come from the top; bottom-up 
monitoring and accountability is critical in keeping leaders in check.  Building layers of 
accountability across multiple institutions (such as the state, the traditional authority, and within 
the community) can create the necessary checks and balances limit unfettered exploitation of 
group resources.  The need for both top-down and bottom-up accountability reinforce the CPA as 
a better structure for group management in land reform, as it allows for DRDLR monitoring, as 
well as more democratic internal processes by which, in theory, claimants can limit abuse of 
power by leaders.  Dual and multilayered accountability must also be built into the structures of 
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the new commons trusts and other models being developed for sustainably managing our shared 
resources. 
It is yet to be seen whether the Amangcolosi story will become a true tragedy of the 
commons, or whether it will weather current threats to good governance and remain a landmark 
case of land restitution, providing an example that can inspire and inform other CPIs.  
A. Tekié  !145
7.  REFERENCES 
AgriTV (2012, April 4). “Deputy Minister goes walkabout in Amangcolosi.” Retrieved from 
http://www.sacanegrowers.co.za/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/ITHUBA-AGRICULTURE-
Arestitution-land-reform-success-story.pdf.   
Alcock, R., & Hornby, D. (2004). Traditional land matters: A look into land administration in 
tribal areas in Kwazulu Natal. KwaZulu Natal, South Africa: Legal Entity Assessment 
Project. Retrieved from http://www.mdukatshani.com/resources/Traditional%20land
%20matters.pdf 
Amangcolosi Community Trust (ACT) (2012, 19 December).  [Deed of Trust] No IT 1099 / 2004 
/ PMB.  Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, Pietermaritzburg, KZN.  
Barnes, P. (2003). Capitalism, the Commons, and Divine Right. Twenty-third Annual E. F. 
Schumacher Lectures. Schumacher Centre for a New Economics. Stockbridge, MA. October 
2003. Retrieved from http://www.centerforneweconomics.org/publications/lectures/barnes/
peter/capitalism-the-commons-and-divine-right 
Business Trust (2011). Opportunities for Investment in Pro-poor Economic Growth.  Commercial 
partnerships for the development of restored and communal land (1).  Business Trust and 
German International Cooperation: Johannesburg.  Retrieved from http://
www.vumelana.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/1.2_Toolkit-1_Investor-Guide2.pdf 
Bhengu, T. (2012). History of the AmaNgcolosi: People talking about themselves. Durban: Africa 
Institute for Cultural Economy.  
Biggs, S. (2006). Learning from the positive to reduce rural poverty: Institutional innovations in 
agriculture and natural resources research and development. Impact Assessment Workshop, 
CGIAR Systemwide Programme for Participatory Research and Gender Analysis. Mexico 
City, Mexico.  Retrieved from http://www.positivedeviance.org/pdf/publications_other/
Biggs2007.pdf 
Centre for Law and Society (CLS) (2013). Fact Sheet: Restitution of Land Rights Amendment 
Bill October 2013.  Cape Town: University of Cape Town.  Retrieved from http://
www.cls.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/downloads/RestitutionBill_Factsheet_Oct2013.pdf 
Centre for Law and Society (CLS) (2015).  Fact Sheet: Communal Property Associations 
(CPAs).  Cape Town: University of Cape Town.  Retrieved from http://www.cls.uct.ac.za/usr/
lrg/downloads/Factsheet_CPAs_Final_Feb2015.pdf  
Chipkin, I., & Ngqulunga, B. (2008).  Friends and family: Social Cohesion in South Africa. 
Journal of Southern African Studies 34(1), 61-76.  
A. Tekié  !146
Chitonge, H. (2013). Land use and rural livelihoods in South Africa: Emerging evidence from 
the Eastern Cape. Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, 2(1), 1-40. 
Chitonge, H., & Ntsebeza, L. (2012). Land reform and rural livelihood in South Africa: Does 
access matter? Review of Agrarian Studies, 2(1), 87-111. 
Claasens, A. (2014, 14 July). ‘Communal land’, property rights and traditional leadership’.  
Presented at Public Positions : Property, communal land, and traditional leadership.  Wits 
Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of the Witwatersrand.  Retrieved from 
http://wiser.wits.ac.za/event/public-positions-property-communal-land-and-traditional-
leadership 
Clark, M. (17 June 2015). Bakgatla ba Kgafela CPA’s Constitutional Court case goes to heart of 
land reform.  Custom Contested  Retrieved from http://www.customcontested.co.za/bakgatla-
ba-kgafela-cpas-constitutional-court-case-goes-to-heart-of-land-reform/ 
Collier, D. (1993). The comparative method.  In A. Finifter (Ed.), Political Science: The State of 
the discipline II (pp 105-118).  Washington, DC: American Political Science Association. 
Cousins, B. (1995). A Role for common property institutions in land redistribution programmes 
in South Africa (Gatekeeper Series No. 53).  IIED.  Retrieved from pubs.iied.org/pdfs/
6067IIED.pdf.  
Cousins, B. (2008). Contextualising the controversies: Dilemmas of communal tenure reform in 
post-apartheid South Africa. In A. Claasens (Ed.), Land, Power and Custom: Controversies 
generated by South Africa’s Communal Land Rights Act (pp. 3-33) Cape Town: UCT Press. 
Cousins, B. (2013) Land redistribution, populism and elite capture: New land reform policies 
under the microscope.  Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation, 70, 11-19. 
Cousins, B., Hall, T., & Dubb, A. (2014).  The Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act of 
2014: What are the real implications of reopening land claims? (Policy Brief 34). Belville: 
PLAAS, UWC. Retrieved from http://www.plaas.org.za/plaas-publication/PB34_restitution 
Cousins, T., & Hornby, D. (2002). Leaping the fissures: Bridging the gap between paper and real 
practice in setting up common property institutions in land reform in South Africa (PLAAS 
Occasional Paper No. 19).  Belville: PLAAS, UWC. Retrieved from http://www.plaas.org.za/
plaas-publication/lrac-19 
Dahlberg, L., & McCaig, C. (2010). Practical Research and Evaluation: A Start-to-Finish 
Guide for Practitioners. Sage. 
Dardagen, C. (2012, 26 March). The way land reform should be. IOL News. Retrieved from 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/the-way-land-reform-should-be-1263553 
A. Tekié  !147
Dardagen, C. (2015, 21 April). SA, sugar sector agree on land handover formula. IOL News. 
Retrieved from http://www.iol.co.za/business/news/sa-sugar-sector-agree-on-land-handover-
formula-1848036 
de Satge, R. & Baiphethi, M. (2013). Report on a communal property institution workshop held 
4-5 March 2013. (Workshop Report). Cape Town: Phulisani Solutions. Retrieved from http://
vumelana.org.za/uploads/media/
20130509_Improving_the_performance_of_Communal_Property_Institutions.pdf 
de Villiers, B. & van den Berg, M. (2006). Land reform: Trailblazers.  Seven successful case 
studies. (Case Studies) Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 
de Villiers, P. (2003). Land reform: Issues and challenges.  A comparative overview of 
experiences in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Australia.  (Occasional Papers) 
Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. 
de Villiers, P. (2008). Land reform: A commentary.  Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.  
Retrieved from http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.15657/ 
“Debate still rages over SA’s land reform” (2016, 24 February).  SABC News Retrieved from 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/a/96f132804bcc027b84518496fb2bb898/Debate-still-rages-over-
SAs-land-reform-20160224   
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) (1994).  General Notice in Terms of the Restitution of Land 
Act, Act No. 22 of 1994: Kranskop. Government Gazette No 24964. Notice No. 584. 
07-03-2003. 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) (2008). Commission of 
Restitution of Land Rights -Annual Report 2007-2008. Retrieved from http://www.gov.za/
documents/commission-restitution-land-rights-annual-report-20072008 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) (2010). Presentation to the 
portfolio committee on rural development and land reform: The state of communal property 
associations and other legal entities in land reform projects. 3 March 2010.   Retrieved from 
http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/100303CPA-edit.pdf 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) (2011). Green paper on land 
reform, 2011.  Retrieved from http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/
land_reform_green_paper.pdf 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) (2012a). Communal Property 
Associations Annual Report 2011/12. Retrieved from http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com/131008cpa.pdf 
A. Tekié  !148
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform DRDLR (2012b, 22 February). Media 
Statement: Amangcolosi Community Trust hand school to the community.  Retrieved from 
http://www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/news-room/media-statements/file/1217 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) (2013a). “Status Report for 
Amakhabela Community Land Claim”.  Office of the Regional Land Claims Commission, 
KZN. 15 October 2013. Retrieved from https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16538/ 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) (2014). Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights, Annual Report 2013-2014.  Retrieved from http://
www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/publications/annual-report/category/249-commission-on-
restitution-of-land-rights 
Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) (2015). Communal Property 
Associations Annual Report 2014-2015. Retrieved from https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/21790/ 
Devane,T. (2009). The positive deviance approach: A briefing. Retrieved from http://
www.positivedeviance.org/pdf/research/The_Positive_Deviance_Briefing_T_Devane.pdf 
DiCiccio, B., & Crabtree, B. (2006). The Qualitative research interview. Medical Education 40, 
pp. 314-321. 
Dietz, T., Ostrom, E., and Stern, P. (2003). The Struggle to govern the commons. Stanford 
University.  Retrieved from http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/
DietzOstromStern.pdf 
Dutta, D. (2009). Elite capture and corruption: Concepts and definitions. National Council of 
Applied Economic Research.  Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/237917/
Elite_Capture_and_Corruption_Concepts_and_Definitions  
Erasmus, J. (2015, 28 September). Land claims a fraud magnet.  News24.  Retrieved from http://
www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Land-claims-a-fraud-magnet-20150927 
Fabricus, C., Collins, S. (2007). Community-based natural resource management: Governing the 
commons. Water Policy, 9(2), 83-97. 
Feeny, D., Berkes, F., McCay, B., and Acheson, J. (1990). The Tragedy of the commons: Twenty-
two years later.  Human Ecology 18(1).  1-19.  Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/
profile/James_Acheson/publication/226432105_The_Tragedy_of_the_Commons_Twenty-
two_years_later/links/5493007a0cf22d7925d597ac.pdf 
Forsyth, P. (2013). KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Review of the Restitution Claim Settlement 
Business Process. Johannesburg: Genesis Analytics. 
A. Tekié  !149
Frantz, G. (2010). Repealing the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act : A constitutional analysis. 
MA Thesis, Faculty of Law, Stellenbosch University, Stellensbosh, South Africa. 
Genesis Analytics (2014). Implementation Evaluation of the Restitution Programme: Final 
evaluation report by Genesis Analytics for the DPME. Johannesburg. Retrieved from 
Gobodo, N.  (2014, 8 September).  Presentation on Communal Property Associations Policy. 
2014 National Land Tenure Summit, Boksburg.  Retrieved from http://
www.ruraldevelopment.gov.za/publications/land-tenure-summit-2014/file/2874  
Grant, J. (2011). Rural development in practice? The experience of the ‡Khomani Bushmen in 
the Northern Cape, South Africa. PhD dissertation, Centre for African Studies, University of 
Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland. 
Grootes, S. (2014, February 21). Traditional Courts Bill is Dead.  Eyewitness News, Retrieved 
from http://ewn.co.za/2014/02/21/Traditional-Courts-Bill-dead  
Gutiérrez, N., Hilborn, R., and Defeo, O. (2011). Leadership, social capital and incentives 
promote successful fisheries.  Nature 470, 386-389.  
Gwatyu, M. (2008, 4 April).  Projects in progress: Get on board the Ithuba express.  Farming SA. 
p. 26  
Hall, R. (2009). Ch. 2: Land Use, Production, and Livelihoods. In R. Hall (Ed.) Another 
Countryside (pp. 22-60). Belville: PLAAS, UWC. 
Hall, R. and Cliff, L. (2009). Introduction. In R. Hall (Ed.) Another Countryside (pp. 1-19). 
Belville: PLAAS, UWC. 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science 162(3859), 1243-1248. 
Hart, T. (2013, 26 March).  Translating rural land reform into benefits.  Presented at Land 
Divided: Land and South African society in 2013, in comparative perspective.  UCT: Cape 
Town. 
Heard, J. (2016, 3 February). It could take 144 years to settle land claims, warns researcher. City 
Press. Retrieved from http://city-press.news24.com/News/it-could-take-144-years-to-settle-
land-claims-warns-researcher-20160203 
Hlongwe, W.  (2008a, 11 February). Phumzile’s brother in land claim swindle. City Press.  
Retrieved from http://152.111.1.87/argief/berigte/citypress/2008/02/11/CP/2/
whbonga-231.html 
Hlongwe, W.  (2008b, 22 June). Crystal Holdings bosses face fraud investigations. City Press. 
Retrieved from http://m24arg02.naspers.com/argief/berigte/citypress/2008/06/23/CP/5/
whcrystal.html 
A. Tekié  !150
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (1995).  Empowerment of the Poor. 
(Discussion Paper 1). Conference on Hunger and Poverty.  Retrieved from http://
www.ifad.org/events/past/hunger/empower.html. 
Ithuba Agriculture (2011). http://www.ithubaagriculture.co.za/our-farmland.html. 
Ithuba Agriculture (2010, December). Christmas comes early for the chief. Ithuba News, 1(1), 
12.  
Jacobs, P.  (2011). Tenure Security under the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996: 
An analysis of establishment and management procedures with comparative reference to the 
Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  MA thesis, Faculty of Law, Stellensbosch University, 
Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
James, D. (2000). Hill of Thorns: Custom, knowledge, and the reclaiming of a lost land in the 
new South Africa. Development and Change, 31, 629-649. 
Kamieth, A. (2007) The Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003, and its 
subsequent provincial legislation.  MA thesis, Faculty of Law, University of the Western 
Cape, Bellville, South Africa. 
Kepe, T. (1999). The problem of defining ‘community’: challenges for the land reform 
programme in rural South Africa. Development Southern Africa, 16(3), 415-433. 
Khathi, J., & Khathi, M. (2015, 6 November). “Complaints about the operation of the company 
Ithuba Agriculture.” Memorandum submitted to the Amangcolosi Community Trust. 
Klug, H. (2000). Constituting community: Universalism and communal governance in the 
recreation of rural communities in South Africa. Unpublished. 
KZN Violence Monitor. (2013, 27 February). Is the Department of Rural Development & Land 
Reform stoking the flames of violence in Kranskop? KZN Violence Monitor, 23. Retrieved 
from http://www.violencemonitor.com/?p=175 
Lahiff, E. (2000). ‘Capitalist collectivisation’? How inappropriate models of common property 
are hampering South Africa’s land reform. Presented at “Governing Shared Resources: 
Connecting local experiences to global challenges,” 12 Biennial Conference of the 
International Association for the Study of Commons. Cheltenham, England.  Retrieved from 
http://iasc2008.glos.ac.uk/conference%20papers/papers/L/Lahiff_126501.pdf  
Lahiff, E. (2009). With what land rights? Tenure arrangements and support. In R. Hall (Ed.), 
Another Countryside (pp. 92-117).  Belville: PLAAS, UWC. 
Lahiff, E. (2013, March). Commercial partnerships in South Africa’s land reform programme: 
Lessons and experience since 1994. Paper presented to the ‘Land Divided’ Conference, 
A. Tekié  !151
University of Cape Town, 24-27 March 2013.  Retrieved from http://
www.landdivided2013.org.za/sites/default/files/Lahiff%20commercial%20partnerships.pdf 
Lahiff, E., Davis, N., & Manenzhe, T. (2012). Joint ventures in agriculture: Lessons from land 
reform projects in South Africa.  London: International Institute of Environment and 
Development. Retrieved from http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12569IIED.pdf 
Lee Attorneys (2015). Basics of a Trust Instrument. Retrieved from http://www.leelegal.co.za/
wp-content/uploads/2015/01/trust.pdf 
Mahlangu, V. (2011). Communal Property Associations Annual Report 2009/10: Presentation to 
the Portfolio Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform, 31 August 2011. 
Mayson, D. (2003). Joint Ventures (Evaluating land and agrarian reform in South Africa, 
Occasional Paper No. 7).  Belville: PLAAS, UWC. Retrieved from http://www.plaas.org.za/
sites/default/files/publications-pdf/ELARSA%2007.pdf 
Mdukatshani (2012). Background and history of LEAP. Retrieved from http://
www.mdukatshani.com/leap-home.php 
Mogaswa, S. (2013). Communal property associations presentation to Vumelana Workshop.  
Presented at Vumelana CPI Workshop.  Johannesburg, South Africa.  Retrieved from http://
vumelana.org.za/index.php?id=115 
Molose, V. (2013). National Land Workshop for Civil Society, Johannesburg 2-4 October 2013. 
(Workshop Report). Belville: PLAAS, UWC. Retrieved from http://www.plaas.org.za/plaas-
publication/NLW2013 
“New school for rural KZN learners.” (2012, 22 Feb). SANews.gov.za. Retrieved from http://
www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/new-school-rural-kzn-learners  
Njomane, M. (2015, 2 October). Political will’, not ‘corruption will’, can accelerate land reform 
to benefit South Africa’s landless poor.  PLAAS [Web log post].  Retrieved from http://
www.plaas.org.za/blog/%E2%80%98political-will%E2%80%99-not-
%E2%80%98corruption-will%E2%80%99-can-accelerate-land-reform-benefit-south-africa
%E2%80%99s 
Ntsebeza, L. (2000). Traditional authorities, local government, and land rights.  In B. Cousins 
(Ed.), At the Crossroads: Land and agrarian reform in South Africa into the 21st Century (pp. 
280-305).  Belville: PLAAS, UWC. 
Ntsebeza, L. (2002). Decentralisation and natural resource management in rural South Africa: 
Problems and prospects. (PLAAS Occasional Paper No. 22).  Belville: PLAAS, UWC. 
Retrieved from http://www.plaas.org.za/plaas-publication/lrac-22 
A. Tekié  !152
Ntsebeza, L. (2011). The Land Question: Exploring obstacles to land redistribution in South 
Africa. In I. Shapiro & K. Shebeu (Eds.) After Reinventing South Africa?  Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press. Retrieved from http://www.yale.edu/macmillan/apartheid/
ntsebezap2.pdf 
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Universtiy Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1999).  Collective action and the evolution of social norms. (W99-20) Workshop in 
Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University: Bloomington. Retrieved from http://
ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/reprints/R00_11.pdf 
Ostrom, E. (2004). Understanding collective action. In R. Meinzin-Dick and M. Di Gregorio 
(Eds.), Collective Action and Property Rights for Sustainable Development. Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute. Retrieved from http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/
bitstream/16549/1/fo041102.pdf 
Pamira Resource Agency (2012). Ngcolosi Community Participatory Rural Appraisal.  
Kranskop: South Africa. 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) (2010). Communal Property Associations, trusts and 
other landholding entities: Departmental briefing.  Chair, S. Sizani.  Retrieved from http://
www.pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/11281/ 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) (2014). Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill 
[B35 - 2013]: Public hearings Day 2. Chair, J. Thibedi.  Retrieved from http://
www.pmg.org.za/report/20140129-restitution-land-rights-amendment-bill-b35-2013-public-
hearings-day-2 
Patton, M. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods (3rd ed.). Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Peters, P. (2002). Grounding governance: Power and meaning in natural resource management.  
In A. Benjaminsen, B. Cousins, & L. Thompson (Eds.), Contested Resources: Challenges to 
the governance of natural resources in South Africa (pp. 7-19).  Belville: PLAAS, UWC. 
Pienaar, G. (2005). The meaning of the concept community in South African land tenure 
legislation.  Stellenbosch Law Review 16, 60-76.   
Pienaar, K. (2002). ‘Communal’ Property arrangements: A second bite. In B. Cousins (Ed.),  At 
the Crossroads: Land and agrarian reform in South Africa into the 21st Century (pp. 
322-329). Belville: PLAAS, UWC. 
Phillips, L. (2010, 30 July).  A Land reform success! Farmers Weekly.   
A. Tekié  !153
Positive Deviance Initiative (PDI) (2014). What is positive deviance?. [Web log post] Retrieved 
from http://www.positivedeviance.org/ 
Quilligan, J. (2009). People Sharing Resources: Toward a New Multilateralism of the Global 
Commons. Kosmos (Fall/Winter) 2009.  Pp. 36-43. Retrieved from https://
www.kosmosjournal.org/wp-content/article-pdfs/people-sharing-resources-toward-a-new-
multilateralism-of-the-global-commons.pdf 
Rangan,  H., and Gilmartin, M. (2002). Gender, traditional authority, and the politics of rural 
reform in South Africa.  Development and Change, 33(4), 632-657. 
Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1988).  Trust Property Control Act, Act No. 57 of 1988.  
Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1994). Restitution of Land Rights Act, Act No. 22 of 1994. 
Republic of South Africa (RSA) (1996). Communal Property Associations Act, Act No. 28 of 
1996. 
Republic of South Africa (RSA) (2004).  Communal Land Rights Act, Act No.  Of 2004.  
Republic of South Africa (RSA (2015).  Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act, Act 15 of 
2014. 
Ruhiiga, T. (2011). Land reform and rural poverty in South Africa.  Journal of Social Sciences 
29(1), 29-38. 
Rule, P. (1993). Nokukhanya: Mother of Light. Johannesburg: The Grail. 
Sherry, S. (2012, 12 September). Deficiencies of land reform. Financial Mail. Retrieved from 
http://www.financialmail.co.za/politics/2012/09/12/deficiencies-of-land-reform 
South African Cane Growers Association (SACGA) (2011). “Ithuba Agriculture: A Land reform 
success story”.  Retrieved from 
South African Police Service (SAPS) (2003). Report of the Committee of Inquiry Into Farm 
Attacks. https://africacheck.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Final-Report-Committee-of-
Inquiry-Farm-Attacks-July-2003.pdf 
Steinberg, J. (2002). Midlands. Johannesburg: Johnathan Ball Publishers.   
Sundström, A. (2015). Covenants with broken swords: Corruption and law enforcement in the 
commons. Working paper series 2014:10.  The Quality of Government Institute, University of 
Gothenburg. 
A. Tekié  !154
Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA) (2015, 21 August). Rooyendal (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of 
Land Affairs. (20049/14) Retrieved from http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/
2015/108.html  
SURUDEC (2011). “Study tours a key element to learning.” SURUDEC News 1(2), February/
March 2011. Retrieved from http://ruliv.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
SURUDEC_news_2_FINAL_low_res.pdf 
Sustainable Development Consortium (SDC) (2007a). Learning from experience: An overview 
of the Evidence. In Settlement and implementation support strategy for land and agrarian 
reform in South Africa. Pretoria: Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, Department of 
Land Affairs. Retrieved from www.phuhlisani.org.za/oid%5Cdownloads%5CChapter
%201.pdf 
Sustainable Development Consortium (SDC) (2007b). Chapter 8 | Quadrant 2: Securing rights, 
enabling social institutional and capacity development. In Settlement and implementation 
support strategy for land and agrarian reform in South Africa. Pretoria: Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights, Department of Land Affairs. Retrieved from 
www.phuhlisani.com/oid%5Cdownloads%5CChapter%208.pdf 
Swanborn, P. (2010). Case study research: What, why and how.  London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Talane, V. (2013, 11 July). Corruption and land: What the public have told us. Corruption Watch, 
[Web log post]. Retrieved from http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/corruption-and-land-what-
the-public-have-told-us/ 
Taylor, C. (2002). Thinking and living deep diversity.  Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield. 
Thompson, B. (2000). Tragically difficult: The Obstacles to governing the commons. (Working 
Paper No. 187). Stanford Law School. Retrieved from https://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/
bitstream/handle/10535/6348/tragically%20difficult.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
Timse, T. (2015, 10 August). Conflict erupts over Limpopo CPA control. Mail & Guardian.  
Retreived from http://mg.co.za/article/2015-08-10-bitter-conflict-erupts-over-limpopo-land-
restitution 
Tolbert, P. (2010). Robert Michels and the iron law of oligarchy [Electronic version]. Retrieved 
from Cornell University, ILR School site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/397/ 
Tomales Bay Institute (2006). The commons rising: A report to owners from the Tomales Bay 
Institute. San Fransisco, CA: Tomales Bay Institute. Retrieved from http://bollier.org/sites/
default/files/Commons_Rising_06.pdf 
de la Torre-Castro, M. (2006). Beyond regulation in fisheries management: The dilemmas of the 
“Beach Recorders” Bwana Dikos in Zanzibar, Tanzania. Ecology and society 11(2), 35-46. 
A. Tekié  !155
Tjosvold, D. (2006). Defining conflict and making choices about its management: Lighting the 
dark side of organisational life. International Journal of Conflict Management 17(2), 87-95.  
University of Cape Town (UCT) (2012).  Submission on the Traditional Courts Bills.  Cape 
Town: Law, Race and Gender Unit. Retrieved from http://www.lrg.uct.ac.za/usr/lrg/docs/TCB/
2012/lrg_feb2012_ncopsubmission.pdf 
Van Belle, D. (1996).  Leadership and collective action: The Case of revolution.  International 
Studies Quarterly 40(1), 107-132. 
Vumelana Advisory Fund (VAF) (2014, 28 March). Commercial partnerships for land reform: 
Building a community of practice. Conference Report.  Indaba Hotel, Johannesburg. http://
www.vumelana.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/20140414_CoP-Event_Summary-of-
proceedings-report_Final.pdf  
Walker, C. (2000). Relocating restitution.  Transformation (44), 1-16. 
Walker, C. & Cousins, B. (2015, 4 March).  Has land reform lost its purpose?  Business Day. 
Retrieved from http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/03/04/has-land-reform-lost-its-purpose 
Warner, M. & Jones, P. (1998).  Assessing the need to manage conflict in community-based 
natural resource projects. Overseas Development Institute: Natural Resources Perspectives 
35, July 1998. Retrieved from www.odi.org/resources/docs/2891.pdf 
Yin, R. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods (4th Ed). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.   
Zulu, A. (2014, 9 August). Request for provision of land reform figures. Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform.  Retrieved from http://www.poa.gov.za/rural/Supporting
%20Documentation/Land%20Reform%20figures%20corrected%202014.pdf 
“Zulu King taken to court.” (2002, 5 April). Sunday Times. Retrieved from http://www.sadocc.at/
news2002/2002-114.shtml#top 
